OPTIONS EVALUATION REPORT (OER)

Line 99Z - Refurb OER- N2605 revision 1.0



Ellipse project no(s): TRIM file: [TRIM No]

Project reason: Reliability - To meet overall network reliability requirements **Project category:** Prescribed - Replacement

Approvals

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Change history

Revision	Date	Amendment
0	18/09/2021	Initial Issue
1	13/11/2021	Minor Update



Executive summary

Line 99Z is a 132kV transmission line between Australian Newsprint Mills (ANM) and Albury. The oldest structures on the line were commissioned in 1980, with a part of the line was rebuilt in 2002 as part of the Hume Motorway expansion. The 13 structures from ANM to Structure 12, are the only remaining wood pole structures on the line. The route of this section crosses the Hume Motorway and two separate railway lines, including the main Sydney to Melbourne railway.

Detail analysis on asset condition information has identified that six structures on Line 99Z currently have condition issues. In addition to the six structures already identified to have condition issues, it is expected that a further three structures will experience decay and degradation by 2028. This estimate of additional structures is based on average decay rates over the past 10 years on this line.

Given the extent of condition issues across the wood pole structures on Line 99Z, it is considered that the entire line is approaching the end of its serviceable life. The total number of expected wood pole replacement is 13.

The main drivers of the need to remediate these issues are:

- Manage network safety risk levels "As-Low-As Reasonably-Practicable" in accordance with the regulation obligations and TransGrid's business risk appetite. Under the Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014 Section 5 'A network operator must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of its network (or any part of its network) is safe'; and
- > Provide economic benefit to consumers through reduction in safety and bushfire risks.

The assessment of the options considered to address the need/opportunity appears in Table 1.

Table	1	-	Evaluated	options
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Option	Description	Direct capital cost (\$m)	Network and corporate overheads (\$m)	Total capital cost ¹ (\$m)	Weighted NPV (PV, \$m)	Rank
Option A	Replace all remaining wood pole structures with steel or concrete pole structures only, including all associated attachments (e.g. insulators and fittings)	2.58	0.23	2.81	76.84	1

The preferred option is Option A, as it has the highest weighted NPV result of the technically feasible options which were considered. It is therefore recommended that the option be scoped in detail and progressed from DG1 to $DG2^2$. In consideration of the delivery requirements and the economic benefit NPV analysis for the need, its optimal timing is in 2024/2025.

¹ Total capital cost is the sum of the direct capital cost and network and corporate overheads. Total capital cost is used in this OER for all analysis.

² DG stands for 'decision gate' that forms a part of TransGrids investment decision process.

1. Need/opportunity

Background

Line 99Z is a 132kV transmission line between Australian Newsprint Mills (ANM) and Albury. The 13 structures from ANM to Structure 12, are the only remaining wood pole structures on the line. The route crosses the Hume Motorway and two separate railway lines, including the main Sydney to Melbourne railway. The line along this section has condition issues of wood poles with deterioration and decay, which increase the risk of asset failure. This presents a bushfire and safety risk which TransGrid is obligated to manage.

Detailed analysis on asset condition information has identified that six structures on Line 99Z currently have condition issues.

In addition to the six structures already identified to have condition issues, it is expected that a further three structures will experience decay and degradation by 2028. This estimate of additional structures is based on average decay rates over the past 10 years on this line.

The wood pole condition issues on this section of line are forecast to cover more than 70% of the line section. Given the extent of condition issues across the wood pole structures on Line 99Z, it is considered that the entire line is approaching the end of its serviceable life.

The total number of wood pole structures expected to require replacement is 13.

There is a need to remediate these condition issues to:

- Manage network safety risk levels "As-Low-As Reasonably-Practicable" in accordance with the regulation obligations and TransGrid's business risk appetite. Under the Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014 Section 5 'A network operator must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of its network (or any part of its network) is safe.'
- Provide an economic benefit to consumers through reductions in safety and bushfire risks. The direct impact of asset failure can result in a conductor drop event with potential fire ignition and/or safety hazard consequences to the general public, as evaluated in the associated modelling.

If the condition issues on the line are not addressed in sufficient time, then the asset will operate with increasing risk of failure as it continues to deteriorate. The level of reactive corrective maintenance needed to keep the line operating within required standards may also increase, particularly when asset failures ultimately occur.

Consequently, the proposed project has an economic benefits need, and addressed this need will provide avoided cost savings from reduced in bushfire and safety risk, and maintenance costs that would otherwise occur without refurbishment.

2. Related needs/opportunities

> ARTC have approached TransGrid to replace Structure 7 with a concrete pole structure to achieve greater clearance over the main Sydney to Melbourne rail crossing. This has yet to be committed.

3. Options

In developing options to address this need, TransGrid considered the followings:

> A Base case for this assessment as a 'do nothing' scenario, where the assets are left in service until they fail and require replacement.



> An option which targets replacing all wood pole structures with steel or concrete pole structures including all associated attachments (e.g. insulators and fittings)

3.1 Base case

It is noted that a 'run to fail' scenario, where the identified issues are addressed through increased asset monitoring and preventative maintenance tasks, is not considered a valid base case for this need. The condition issues on the asset have already been identified through existing maintenance inspections; increasing inspections and preventative maintenance will not rectify them.

The base case will instead be defined as a 'do nothing' scenario, where the assets are left in service until they fail and require replacement. The cost replacing failed assets has been included as part of risk cost (under the financial category) on the asset under this option.

3.2 Options evaluated

Option A — Replace all remaining wood pole structures with steel or concrete pole structures only, including all associated attachments (e.g. insulators and fittings) [NOSA N2605, OFS N2605A]

The total number of wood pole structures expected to require replacement is 13.

It is estimated that this option would cost $2.81 \text{ million} \pm 25\%$ in 2020-21. This option is expected to be completed within the 2024 - 2028 regulatory period, and within 22 months following DG1.

3.3 Options considered and not progressed

The following options were considered but not progressed:

Option	Reason for not progressing
Increased inspections	The condition issues have already been identified and increased inspections where applicable has already been included in the base case. Increased inspections will not rectify the condition issues, so will not meet the need of managing network safety risk to ALARP.
Elimination of all associated risk	This can only be achieved through retirement and decommissioning of the associated assets which is not feasible due to reliability issue.
New transmission line	Due to significant costs of this option, a new 132 kV transmission line is not considered commercially feasible.
Non-network solutions	TransGrid does not consider non-network options to be commercially or technically feasible to assist with meeting the identified need, as non-network options will not mitigate the environment (bushfire) and safety posed as a result of corrosion-related asset deterioration.

Table 2 Options considered but not progressed

4. Evaluation

4.1 Commercial evaluation methodology

The economic assessment undertaken for this project includes three scenarios that reflect a central set assumptions based on current information that is most likely to eventuate (central scenario), a set of assumptions that give rise to a lower bound for net benefits (lower bound scenario), and a set of assumptions that give rise to an upper bound on benefits (higher bound scenario).



Assumptions for each scenario are set out in the table below.

Table 3 Scenario Inputs

Parameter	Central scenario	Lower bound scenario	Higher bound scenario
Discount rate	4.8%	7.37%	2.23%
Capital cost	100%	125%	75%
Risk costs	100%	75%	125%
Scenario weighting	50%	25%	25%

Parameters used in this commercial evaluation:

Table 4 Parameters used in the NPV evaluation

Parameter	Parameter Description	Value used for this evaluation
Discount year	Year that dollar values are discounted to	2020/2021
Base year	The year that dollar value outputs are expressed in real terms	2020/2021 dollars
Period of analysis	Number of years included in economic analysis with remaining capital value included as terminal value at the end of the analysis period.	25 years
Expected asset life	Period of depreciation of the asset	50 years
ALARP disproportionality	Multiplier of the environmental and safety related risk cost included in NPV analysis to demonstrate implementation of obligation to reduce to ALARP.	Refer to section 0 for details.

The capex figures in this OER do not include any real cost escalation.

4.2 Commercial evaluation results

The commercial evaluation of the technically feasible options is set out in Table 5. Details appear in Appendix A.



Table 5 - Commercial evaluation (PV, \$ million)

Option	Capital Cost PV	Central scenario NPV	Lower bound scenario NPV	Higher bound scenario NPV	Weighted NPV	Ranking
Option A	2.34	67.46	30.09	142.35	76.84	1

Based on the commercial analysis, Option A is the preferred option as it yields the highest weighted NPV and is technically and commercially feasible. The main driver of the benefit in the NPV is bushfire risk benefit.

4.3 ALARP evaluation

TransGrid manages and mitigates bushfire and safety risk to ensure they are below risk tolerance levels or 'As Low As Reasonably Practicable' ('ALARP'), in accordance with the regulation obligations and TransGrid's business risk appetite. Under the Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014 Section 5 'A network operator must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of its network (or any part of its network) is safe.' TransGrid maintains an Electricity Network Safety Management System (ENSMS) to meet this obligation.³

In its Network Risk Assessment Methodology, under the ALARP test with the application of a gross disproportionate factor⁴, the weighted benefits are expected to exceed the cost. TransGrid's analysis concludes that the costs are less than the weighted benefits from mitigating bushfire and safety risks. The proposed investment will enable TransGrid to continue to manage and operate this part of the network to a safety and risk mitigation level of ALARP.

Evaluation of the above options has been completed in accordance with As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) obligations. The Network Safety Risk Reduction is calculated as 6 x Bushfire Risk Reduction + 6 x Safety Risk Reduction + 0.1 x Reliability Risk Reduction.

Results of the ALARP evaluation are set out in Table 6.

Table 6 - Reasonably practicable test (\$ million)

Option	Network Safety Risk Reduction	Annualised Capex	Reasonably Practicable? ^⁵
Α	0.56	0.15	Y

The result of the ALARP evaluation is that Option A meets the ALARP threshold.

4.4 **Preferred option**

The preferred option is Option A, as it has a positive weighted NPV result and is technically feasible. Option A also meets the ALARP threshold. The optimal delivery date for this option is FY2025 based on an optimal timing analysis (see Section 5**Error! Reference source not found.**).

Capital and Operating Expenditure

The required capex expenditure is \$2.81 million.

³ TransGrid's ENSMS follows the International Organization for Standardization's ISO31000 risk management framework which requires following hierarchy of hazard mitigation approach

⁴ The values of the disproportionality factors were determined through a review of practises and legal interpretations across multiple industries, with particular reference to the works of the UK Health and Safety Executive. The methodology used to determine the disproportionality factors in this document is in line with the principles and examples presented in the AER Replacement Planning Guidelines and is consistent with TransGrid's Revised Revenue Proposal 2023/24-2027/28.

⁵ Reasonably practicable is defined as whether the annualised CAPEX is less than the Network Safety Risk Reduction.

Regulatory Investment Test

A regulatory investment test for transmission (RIT-T) is not required as the estimated capital cost for the preferred option is below the threshold of \$6 million.

5. Optimal Timing

In consideration of the delivery requirements and the economic benefit NPV analysis for the need, its optimal timing is 2024/2025.

The test for optimal timing of the preferred option has been undertaken. The approach taken is to identify the optimal commissioning year for the preferred option where net benefits (including avoided risk costs and safety disproportionality tests) of the preferred option exceeds the annualised costs of the option. The optimal timing assessment considers the delivery requirements of the project and the estimated delivery timeline of 21 months in the OFS.

The commencement year is determined based on the required project disbursement to meet the commissioning year based on the OFS.

The results of optimal timing analysis is:

- > Optimal commissioning year: 2024/2025
- > Commissioning year annual benefit: \$0.63 million
- > Annualised cost: \$0.15 million

Based on the optimal timing, the project is expected to be completed in the 2024-2028 Regulatory Period.

6. Recommendation

The preferred option is Option A, as it has the highest weighted NPV result and is technically and commercially feasible option considered as part of this need.

It is therefore recommended that this option be scoped in detail, so that it can be progressed from DG1 to DG2. Total project cost is \$2.81 million including an amount of \$0.2 million to progress the project from DG1 to DG2.



Appendix A – Option Summaries ⁶

Project Description	Line 99Z Refurbishme	nt		
Option Description	Option A - Replace all remaining wood pole structures with steel or concrete pole structures only, including all associated attachments			
Project Summary				
Option Rank	1	Investment Assessment Period	25	
Asset Life	50	NPV Year	2021	
Economic Evaluation				
NPV @ Central Benefit Scenario (PV, \$m)	67.46	Annualised CAPEX @ Central Benefit Scenario (\$m)	Annualised Capex - Standard (Business Case) 0.15	
NPV @ Lower Bound Scenario (PV, \$m)	30.09	Network Safety Risk Reduction (\$m)	Network Safety Risk Reduction 0.56	
NPV @ Higher Bound Scenario (PV, \$m)	142.35	ALARP	ALARP Compliant? Yes	
NPV Weighted (PV, \$m)	76.84	Optimal Timing	Optimal timing (Business Case) 2025	
Cost (Central Scenario)				
Direct Capex (\$m)		Network and Corporate Overheads (\$m)		
Total Capex (\$m)	2.81	Cost Capex (PV,\$m)	2.34	
Terminal Value (\$m)	1.35	Terminal Value (PV,\$m)	0.35	
Risk (Central Scenario)	Pre	Post	Benefit	
Reliability (PV,\$m)	Reliability Risk (Pre) 0.00	Reliability Risk (Post) 0.00	Pre – Post 0.00	
Financial (PV,\$m)	Financial Risk (Pre) 7.29	Financial Risk (Post) 0.13	Pre – Post 7.16	
Operational/Compliance (PV,\$m)	Operational Risk (Pre) 0.00	Operational Risk (Post) 0.00	Pre – Post 0.00	
Safety (PV,\$m)	Safety Risk (Pre) 0.04	Safety Risk (Post) 0.00	Pre – Post 0.04	
Environmental (PV,\$m)	Environmental Risk (Pre) 62.54	Environmental Risk (Post) 1.15	Pre – Post 61.39	
Reputational (\$m)	Reputational Risk (Pre) 0.87	Reputational Risk (Post) 0.02	Pre – Post 0.85	
Total Risk (PV,\$m)	Total Risk (Pre) 70.74	Total Risk (Post) 1.30	Pre – Post 69.44	
OPEX Benefit (PV,\$m)	-		OPEX Benefit 0.00	
Other benefit (PV,\$m)		Incremental Net Benefit 0.00		
Total Benefit (PV,\$m)	Business Case Total Benefit 69.44			

Commissioning year annual benefit (\$k):



⁶ Figures may not add due to rounding

