

Quarterly Compliance Report

October - December 2006

March 2007



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1 Introduction

The Australian Energy Regulator (AER) is responsible for compliance monitoring, reporting and enforcement in the National Electricity Market (NEM).

Section 15 of the National Electricity Law requires the AER:

- (a) to monitor compliance by Registered Participants and other persons with this Law, the Regulations and the Rules; and
- (b) to investigate breaches or possible breaches of provisions of this Law, the Regulations or the Rules that are not offence provisions.

In carrying out its monitoring functions, the AER collects and analyses information from Registered Participants and the National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO). The AER ensures that, to the extent practicable, its monitoring processes:

- (1) are consistent over time;
- (2) do not discriminate unnecessarily between Registered Participants;
- (3) are cost effective for the AER, all Registered Participants and NEMMCO;
and
- (4) are publicised, and information is published or otherwise made available to the market, subject to any confidentiality requirements.

The purpose of this report is to summarise the results of the AER compliance monitoring and enforcement activities during the period October – December 2006. It provides an overview of the results of investigations conducted by the AER including special reports into significant market or power system events, which have been published separately, and the results of the AER's targeted compliance program.

2 Compliance monitoring strategy

The AER monitors the operation and performance of the National Electricity Market (NEM), conducts special investigations in response to market outcomes and/or specific events and aims to encourage compliance by market participants.

The AER compliance monitoring program includes targeting a number of specific National Electricity Rules (NER) provisions each year. These provisions relate to areas in the Rules assessed by the AER as appropriate for specific targeting, where compliance concerns have been identified or where changes to the Rules have been introduced. The AER aims to target a minimum of 24 Rules each year for review. The AER assesses compliance with the targeted provisions by examining all, or a sample of, relevant market participants' behaviour. **Appendix A** summarises the provisions targeted, investigations and rebidding inquiries instigated to date.

The AER compliance review process encourages market participants to maintain an ongoing compliance management focus by targeting specific provisions of the Rules and reviewing compliance. The AER also conducts a rolling program of reviews of Registered Participants' compliance strategies and plans. The reviews provide the opportunity to engage with participants, and to discuss compliance strategies and critical challenges faced by each participant in discharging its obligations under the Rules.

The AER's approach to monitoring compliance relies, in the first instance, on comprehensive observation and reporting. During the compliance review process, the AER assesses the adequacy of compliance on the basis of the information provided by the Registered Participants, and may review compliance with these obligations at regular intervals.

In the December quarter, the AER continued to focus its compliance monitoring program on the obligations of participants with respect to the ancillary service provisions established under clause 3.8.7A(k), 4.9.8(d) and 4.9.9B of the Rules. The obligation in relation to rebidding under clause 3.8.22(c)(2), in particular the requirement to include, as part of a rebid reason, the time at which the event(s) or other occurrence(s) presented by the Scheduled Generator or Market Participant as the reason for the rebid occurred was also audited. The AER targeted the obligations of a Network Services Provider in relation to routine testing of protection equipment in accordance with clause 5.7.4 of the Rules.

The AER is keen to hear from participants and other interested parties on any matters of compliance, including with respect to the specific areas targeted for review.

3 Compliance monitoring outcomes

As part of the compliance monitoring strategy, the AER aims to conduct one-on-one meetings with market participants each quarter. During the December quarter, the AER met with three individual market participants, as well as NEMMCO and the National Generators Forum (NGF), to discuss compliance issues. The discussions with the three participants and NEMMCO focussed on the AER's investigation into the events of 23 May 2005 in Tasmania. Those discussions were to clarify the matters identified in the incident report published by NEMMCO in September 2006, and the steps taken since to resolve those issues. The AER also presented the results of its investigation into the events of 31 October 2005 to the NGF Market Working Group, and, as foreshadowed in its report on the investigation, released the first AER compliance bulletin to the NEM.

3.1 Targeted provisions

3.1.1 Ancillary service provider obligations

The AER continued its review of ancillary service provider obligations and responsibilities. This quarter the focus was on systems in place in Victoria and South Australia, selecting three of the larger ancillary service providers for review. This followed earlier reviews in Tasmania and Queensland.

The dispatch of the appropriate level of frequency control ancillary services is needed to satisfy the frequency standards established by the Reliability Panel. NEMMCO relies on the ancillary service offers submitted by participants reflecting actual capability to achieve that standard.

Clause 4.9.8(d) places a general obligation on market participants who offer ancillary services to ensure that the generating unit or load is at all times able to comply with the latest ancillary service offer.

Clauses 3.8.7A(k) and 4.9.9B set out the requirements and obligations placed upon providers of ancillary services to ensure that offers to provide ancillary services match the capability of the relevant plant, and that any changes as to the availability of such plant is made known to NEMMCO without delay.

Clause 3.8.7A(k) requires that:

“An Ancillary Service Provider that submits a market ancillary service offer must ensure that the ancillary service generating unit or ancillary service load, as the case may be, is at all times capable of responding in the manner contemplated by the market ancillary service specification.”

Clause 4.9.9B requires that:

“A Market Participant which has classified a generating unit or load as an ancillary service generating unit or an ancillary service load must, without delay, notify NEMMCO of any event which has changed or is likely to change the availability of a market ancillary service, or the capability of the generating unit or load to respond in the manner contemplated by the market ancillary service specification, as soon as the Market Participant becomes aware of the event.”

The AER wrote to three ancillary service providers with facilities in Victoria and South Australia, requesting a review of the arrangements for compliance with the provisions set out above. Participants were requested to provide the following information:

- details of the process the service provider undertakes to ensure that its ancillary service units are at all times capable of responding in the manner contemplated by the market ancillary service specification.
- details of the process the service provider has in place to ensure that NEMMCO is notified of any changes in availability or capability of its ancillary service units.
- whether the service provider notified NEMMCO of any event(s), other than through normal market mechanisms, during the period October – December 2006, which changed the availability of a market ancillary service, or the capability of the unit to respond in the manner contemplated by the market ancillary service specification in accordance with clause 4.9.9B of the Rules.

Review outcome

The AER reviewed participants' responses against the requirements of the Rules. The responses demonstrated that the participants targeted had the necessary processes in place to ensure compliance with the Rules with respect to the provisions reviewed.

Testing of ancillary service generating units

- Responses indicated that each of the targeted ancillary service providers have testing systems in place to ensure that the nominated capability of their generating units is matched by the units' performance.
- The targeted ancillary service providers also perform tests to determine the actual performance of the generating units conformed to the offers made.
- One ancillary service provider stated that it ensures that all of its plant operators are aware of the ancillary service obligations and that they notify the spot traders of any changes in availability.

Notification to NEMMCO

- Responses indicate that each of the three targeted ancillary service providers notify NEMMCO of the availability of the units via the market bidding systems.
- The targeted ancillary service providers then submit any changes to the capability to NEMMCO through those same market systems.
- One ancillary service provider indicated that where there was an irregular change to market ancillary service capability, notification through the market systems was supplemented by a direct phone discussion or email notification to NEMMCO.

- *External arrangements*
- One ancillary service provider identified arrangements it has with generator operations personnel to provide “Daily Operating Advice”, as well as regular ongoing advice that highlights the control status of the generating units, including information regarding AGC, Pressure Control or MW Target Control.

Other issues

- One ancillary service provider indicated that a new digital control system, currently being implemented, would allow a more efficient way of providing contingency services.

AER assessment

Based on the information provided by the participants, and the AER’s assessment of that information against the requirements in the Rules, the AER is satisfied that the participants reviewed are aware of their obligations with respect to clauses 3.8.7A(k) and 4.9.9B of the Rules.

The AER will continue to monitor the accuracy of ancillary service offers including through the monthly frequency and time deviation reports and operating incident reports published by NEMMCO. Instances where a participant fails to respond in accordance with its ancillary service offers will be closely examined to ensure that ancillary service providers meet the general responsibilities of clause 4.9.8 and more specific obligations under 3.8.7A(k) and 4.9.9B of the Rules.

3.1.2 Rebidding by scheduled generators and market participants

The AER targeted the obligations of market participants with respect to rebidding following an audit of rebids submitted throughout the December quarter.

The Rules allow a market participant to revise its bid or offer at any time, effectively up to the time of dispatch. The Rules, however, require that market participants notify NEMMCO of the reason for the rebid and the time at which the events giving rise to this rebid occurred. Specifically clause 3.8.22(c)(2) requires that:

“A Scheduled Generator or Market Participant must provide to NEMMCO, at the same time as the rebid is made:

- (i) a brief, verifiable and specific reason for the rebid; and*
- (ii) the time at which the event(s) or other occurrence(s) adduced by the Scheduled Generator or Market Participant as the reason for the rebid occurred;*

During the December quarter, there were just over 72 000 energy market rebids. Around 2700, or 3.6 per cent, of these rebids failed to include (as part of the rebid reason) the time at which the event(s) or other occurrence(s) presented by the Scheduled Generator or Market Participant as the reason for the rebid, occurred.

The AER wrote to seven market participants who had, during the quarter, failed to include the time as part of a rebid. Participants were asked to provide the following information:

- details of the process undertaken to ensure that rebids submitted by the market participant include a time as required by clause 3.8.22(c)(2)(ii)
- whether the market participant notified NEMMCO of any reasons for not including a time in those rebids; and
- any other information that might be useful to the AER in assessing this matter.

Review outcome

Market participants identified the processes used to ensure that a time stamp is provided with a rebid. For all targeted participants, the processes identified are as follows:

- Rebidding software provides the user with a pre-defined list of reasons for a rebid that automatically include the event time; and
- Where the pre-defined list does not sufficiently describe the reason for a rebid, an operator may enter a reason including the time.

In all of the instances examined, the failures to provide a time stamp were attributed to anomalies associated with the rebidding software system, or the use of manual processes for the entry of the rebid. In one instance, changes to the bidding software, introduced early in 2006, had inadvertently introduced an error when rebids were cancelled. This error had gone undetected. In three instances, changes to the bidding software were initiated immediately following the AER inquiry.

Most of the market participants targeted have instituted training modules to ensure personnel involved with rebidding are aware of the need to enter the time manually in such circumstances.

AER assessment

The good faith provision in clause 3.8.22A requires generators to honour a bid or rebid unless circumstances change materially. The rebid reasons should explain the change in circumstances. Guidelines describing the detail to be included in the reason for a rebid are available on the AER website. The AER intends reissuing those guidelines before June 2007.

The rules also require the generator to state the time at which the decision to rebid was made. Including the time is an important element of the rebid explanation. It allows the AER to verify what events took place before and after the decision and to assess whether there was a material change in circumstances at the time the decision to rebid was made.

The AER's inquiries indicate that there is significant non-compliance with the requirement to state the time of the rebid decision. The AER notes that in all the cases examined, the failure to provide a time could be attributed to anomalies associated with

the rebidding software system or manual intervention. The market participant's failure to detect this anomaly was the overwhelming response. This is clearly the responsibility of those participants that rebid.

The AER notes that, following its inquiry, all of the participants identified have reviewed their internal processes and implemented additional processes to ensure compliance in the future, including modifications to bidding software.

Based on the information provided by the participants, and assessment of that information against the requirements in the Rules, the AER is satisfied that the participants reviewed are aware of the obligations with respect to clause 3.8.22(c)(2) of the Rules and have taken adequate steps to ensure compliance in the future.

Given the significance of this information in assessing the good faith rebidding provisions, the AER reminds all participants of the requirements of this obligation. The AER intends:

- writing to all generators to remind them of their obligations in this regard;
- monitoring closely over the coming quarters the quality of rebid reasons; and
- pursuing any further breaches, including through the use of infringement notices where appropriate.

3.1.3 Routine testing of equipment by network service providers

The AER sought information from Transend regarding the obligations of a Network Services Provider in relation to routine testing of protection equipment in accordance with clause 5.7.4 of the Rules. This followed a review in June 2006 of the arrangements established by ElectraNet. The AER will continue to review these provisions with the remaining network service providers over the coming quarters.

Clause 5.7.4(a1) requires that:

“A Network Service Provider must institute and maintain a compliance program to ensure that its facilities of the following types, to the extent that the proper operation of a facility listed in this clause may affect power system security, operate reliably and in accordance with their performance requirements under schedule 5.1:

- (1) protection systems;*
- (2) control systems for maintaining or enhancing power system stability;*
- (3) control systems for controlling voltage or reactive power; and*
- (4) control systems for load shedding.”*

Clauses 5.7.4(a2) to 5.7.4(a4) specify the requirements of the compliance program and the steps to be taken when advising NEMMCO that a facility does not comply with the performance standards.

The AER wrote to Transend seeking information with respect to the requirements of clause 5.7.4(a1) of the Rules. Specifically the AER requested the following information:

- details of the compliance program instituted by Transend in accordance with clause 5.7.4(a1);
- the steps taken to monitor, test and provide a reasonable assurance of ongoing compliance of the various facilities in accordance with clause 5.7.4 (a2); and
- how Transend assesses whether its compliance program is in accordance with good electricity industry practice.

Review outcome

Transend outlined the steps taken to establish and carry out the protection systems compliance program including:

- undertaking a compliance audit of all protection systems;
- routine maintenance of all protection systems in accordance with its Transmission System Management Plan, which assesses the performance of every system against the original design specifications; and
- details of steps taken to address protection system non-compliance identified through the compliance program.

A compliance program for control facilities has been implemented which satisfies the NEMMCO Standard for Power System Data Communication requirements. Status reports are provided to NEMMCO every six months.

Transend audited its Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system in 2005. Audits of the SCADA system are scheduled every two years.

Transend believes that the establishment of an Asset Management Information System, which reports on key performance indicators related to the reliability and security of its protection systems with monthly and six monthly reporting ensures that the compliance program conforms with good electricity industry practice. Transend indicated that results from the 2005 International Transmission Operations and Maintenance Study concluded that its routine testing practices were consistent with international best practice.

AER assessment

Based on the information provided by Transend, the AER is satisfied that the practices and procedures in place provide a reasonable assurance of ongoing compliance of the various facilities in accordance with clause 5.7.4. The AER will continue to review these provisions with the remaining network service providers over the coming quarters.

3.2 Jurisdictional derogations

Chapter 9 of the Rules preserves certain jurisdiction-specific arrangements. These are known as jurisdictional derogations and exempt participants from compliance with specified provisions in the Rules.

A series of chapter 9 derogations provide exemptions for Smelter Traders, Power Traders and Nominated Generators from complying with the Rules:

- to the extent that there is any inconsistency between the Rules and a contractual requirement under the relevant agreement; and
- any other specified exemption the jurisdictional derogations.

Power Traders must give notice to the AER of any act or omission, which partly or wholly constitutes non-compliance with the Rules. In accordance with clauses 9.4.4, 9.12.3 and 9.34.6 of the Rules, the relevant participants have notified the AER that there were no matters of non-compliance for the December quarter.

Enertrade advised the AER that from 31 December 2006, the Exempted Generator Agreement of clause 9.34.6 of the Rules would no longer cover Mt Stuart Power Station. The registration of Mt Stuart has since been transferred to Origin Energy.

AER assessment

The AER is satisfied that there were no instances where the actions of a participant classified as a Smelter Trader, Power Trader or Nominated Generator materially affected the efficient operation of the market during the quarter.

3.3 Technical standards compliance

The NGF and NEMMCO, in conjunction with the AER and AEMC, have jointly determined a transition process to register the actual capability of all incumbent generators, and to ensure all compliance programs are in place for those generators, by 30 June 2007.

On 4 September 2006 the NGF, with the support of NEMMCO, submitted a Rule change proposal to the AEMC to establish arrangements for resolving the performance standards for generators that were connected, or in the process of connecting, at the date the current performance standards regime came into force in their region of the NEM. The Rule change proposal provided a process for determining the content of the standards, including reference to an independent expert where the generator and NEMMCO cannot agree. The proposal also required that all performance standards be resolved by 30 June 2007.

On 7 December 2006, the AEMC approved the Rule change

The NGF and NEMMCO are continuing to progress the development of the technical performance standards for incumbent generators to ensure the matter is resolved by the June 2007 deadline. The AER will continue to monitor the progress of this matter.

4 Investigations

4.1 Investigation into the events of 31 October 2005

The market was significantly disrupted by a forced network outage on one of the major transmissions lines between Wallerawang and South Sydney on 30 October 2005 and the need for a further network outage to facilitate repairs the following day. The AER completed its review of this event in late September and published its findings on 12 October 2006.

Following its investigation, the AER committed to issuing a compliance bulletin to the market relating to the non-conformance provisions of clause 3.8.23 of the National Electricity Rules (Rules), and the responsibilities of participants to follow dispatch instructions as required by clause 4.9.8(a) of the Rules. The objective of the compliance bulletin was to clarify the AER's expectations, including the approach the AER intends to take with respect to monitoring compliance with these provisions of the Rules. The compliance bulletin was published on 21 December 2006.

The AER is also developing options to address the use of generator ramp rates for commercial reasons. The AER will, after seeking the views of industry, develop a Rule change proposal in the first half of 2007.

To prevent recurrence of the events of 31 October, the AER sought undertakings from NEMMCO with respect to:

- its procedures for managing market or market systems failures and outage management;
- regularly reviewing all key constraints; and
- its obligations with respect to providing information to the market.

NEMMCO provided the undertaking to the AER in early January 2007.

4.2 Investigation into the events of 15 April 2006

On Saturday 15 April 2006, an earth fault on the Kincaig Penola West 132 kV transmission line resulted in the disconnection of Ladbroke Grove Power Station No 2 generating unit. NEMMCO published a power system incident report on 27 July 2006 outlining the circumstances of the trip. According to the NEMMCO report:

“The tripping of the generating unit was...due to insufficient time discrimination between the transmission line auto-reclose and the over current/earth fault protection.”

NEMMCO's report went on to state that:

“Origin Energy has advised that ... this relay serves no useful purpose ... and it is also likely the [protection] relay could trip on out-of-zone faults, as happened in this instance”

Schedule 5.2.3 to Chapter 5 of the Rules requires Network Service Providers and Generators to use all reasonable endeavours to agree upon relevant technical matters in respect of new or altered connection of a generating unit to a network including, among other things:

- (c) primary protection and backup protection (as outlined in clause S5.2.5);

This schedule recognises that certain technical matters need to be coordinated between generators and network service providers.

The AER wrote to both ElectraNet and Origin Energy seeking further information with respect to their compliance with the requirements of clause Schedule 5.2.3 of the Rules. Specifically the AER requested information to confirm:

- the extent to which the relevant protection system was agreed upon between Origin Energy and ElectraNet;
- whether the insufficient discrimination between the system and generator protection at Ladbroke Grove had been detected previously, and if not, why not;
- what steps have been taken by ElectraNet in conjunction with Origin Energy to ensure that this event and other similar incidents do not occur in the future;
- the process for determining and coordinating the technical matters for new connections, or alterations on existing connections; and
- whether this event has been incorporated into ElectraNet’s Safety, Reliability, Maintenance and Technical Management Plan

Both parties acknowledge that the protection system design for Ladbroke Grove was reviewed and approved by ElectraNet in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 5. Testing of the Ladbroke Grove protection across the interface with the transmission network was successful at the time of commissioning. Origin Energy indicated that the type of protection operation that occurred on 15 April, had not occurred previously. A review of the original protection settings by ElectraNet confirmed that the protection systems were stable for the network conditions at the time of connection, and that the scheme had not operated under the same or similar conditions since commissioning.

Following the events of 15 April, ElectraNet, Origin Energy and NEMMCO have worked closely to resolve the issue and to ensure the ongoing security risk associated with the protection scheme has been eliminated. Origin Energy has determined that the protection system was in excess of the requirements for plant protection and, following approval from both NEMMCO and ElectraNet, has had the protection scheme removed. Origin Energy has also checked its other power stations to ensure there are no similar issues.

ElectraNet outlined the process for dealing with new and altered connections and the extent of consultation to ensure the connection satisfies all current relevant technical obligations. ElectraNet indicated that if, as a result of this incident, deficiencies in the Safety, Reliability Maintenance and Technical Management Plan are identified, the amendments will be proposed as part of the annual review of that plan.

AER assessment

Based on the information provided by ElectraNet and Origin Energy, the AER is satisfied that both parties used reasonable endeavours to agree upon relevant technical matters in respect of the primary and backup protection between Ladbroke Grove and the network as part of the commissioning of Ladbroke Grove. Origin Energy, ElectraNet and NEMMCO have since taken reasonable steps to ensure the same situation will not occur in the future.

4.3 Investigation into the events of 23 May 2006

On Tuesday 23 May, the spot price for energy in Tasmania reached \$6 509/MWh for the 8 am trading interval. This resulted from a number of 5-minute dispatch prices of \$10 000/MWh from 7.25 am. At the same time, high ancillary service prices occurred in Tasmania. The requirement for some of these services was at times not met as a result of insufficient availability of such services in Tasmania.

At 7.50 am, NEMMCO directed National Grid to make Basslink available for flows from Victoria to Tasmania. Over the next few dispatch intervals, varying flows into and out of Tasmania and the frequency response of some generators saw 230 MW of generation at Butlers Gorge, Bastyan, Gordon and Wayatinah disconnect in quick succession. This led to around 240 MW of industrial load being interrupted.

NEMMCO published a power system incident report on 14 September 2006 and a Market Report on 18 September 2006. The AER published a \$5 000 pricing report in on 27 October 2006.

In its incident report, NEMMCO claimed that the main factors that contributed to the incident were difficulty in controlling Basslink manually, ineffective attempts to control Basslink flow through constraint equations, insufficient frequency control ancillary service delivery, failure to follow dispatch instructions and inappropriate tripping of generating units.

NEMMCO recommended eleven actions be taken to reduce the risk of further incidents of this type in the future.

The AER met with NEMMCO, Hydro Tasmania, National Grid and Transend in December 2006 to clarify the matters identified in the incident report and to assess the progress made by the parties identified in the report to resolve the outstanding issues. While participants have made significant progress with NEMMCO to resolve the outstanding issues, the AER is continuing its own investigation into the matter.

Appendix A

Summary of AER targeted provisions, investigations and rebidding inquiries

Quarter	Rule provision	Description	Participants targeted	Outcome
December 2005	2.3.4(h)	Market Customer – Local retailers classification of connection points	9	Review complete
	7.1.4(a)	Obligations of Market Participants to establish metering installations	9	Review complete
	7.2.2(a)	Responsibility of Local Network Service Provider – metering installations	12	Review complete
June 2006	3.7A	TNSP - Market information on planned network outages	7	Review complete – further work scheduled
	3.8.7A(k)	Market ancillary service offers	1	Review complete
	3.15.16	Late settlement payment by market participants – NEMMCO	1	Reporting arrangement established
	4.8.12	System restart plan and local black system procedures – NEMMCO	1	Review complete
	4.3.4	TNSP– General obligation to assist NEMMCO in its power system security obligations following the events of 22 March 2006	1	Review complete
	5.7.4	TNSP - Routine testing of protection equipment– following the events of 24 February 2006	1	Review complete
	September 2006	3.8.7A(k)	Market ancillary services offers	3
4.9.9B		Ancillary service plant changes	3	Review complete
3.15.16		Settlements payment by market participants	14	Review complete
4.8.12		System restart plan and local black system procedures	6	Review complete
5.2.1		Obligations of Registered Participants– following the events of 25 May 2006	1	Review complete
December 2006	3.8.22(c)(ii)	Rebidding audit	7	Review complete
	3.8.7A(k)	Market ancillary services offers	3	Review complete
	4.9.8(d)	General responsibilities of registered participants – ancillary services	3	Review complete
	4.9.9B	Ancillary service plant changes	3	Review complete
	Sch 5.2.5.3	Technical matters to be co-ordinated - 15 April 2006 event	2	Review complete
	5.7.4	TNSP - Routine testing of protection equipment	1	Review complete

Investigations				
31 October 2005		Investigation into the loss of telecommunications capability; power system security; generator rates of change; conformance with dispatch instructions; dispatch and pricing; and information provided to the market.		Final report published on 12 October 2006
22 March 2006	3.8.19/3.8.22	Inflexibility rebidding - infringement notice issued to AGL Hydro		notice issued on 28 July 2006
23 May 2006		\$5000 report issued on 27 October 2006 – investigations continuing		work in progress
20 July 2006		\$5000 report published – no further action		Review complete

Rebidding inquiries made in accordance with clause 3.8.22(c) (3) of the Rules

Rebidding inquiries	Company	Date of event	Outcome
September 2005	Delta Electricity	12 July 2005	Review complete
	TRUenergy	7 July 2005	Review complete
December 2005	Macquarie Generation	1 December 2005	Review complete
March 2006	NRG Flinders	16 February 2006	Review complete
September 2006	Macquarie Generation	19 July 2006	Review complete
	Macquarie Generation	20 July 2006	Review complete
	Callide Power Trading	20 July 2006	Review complete
	Callide Power Trading	24 July 2006	Review complete
	National Grid Australia	18 August 2006	Review complete
	Tarong Energy	21 June 2006	Review complete
	Tarong Energy	24 August 2006	Review complete