

FINAL Framework and Approach for Powerlink

For the regulatory control period commencing 2017

June 2015

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Shortened forms

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Shortened Form | Extended Form |
| AEMC | Australian Energy Market Commission |
| AEMO | Australian Energy Market Operator |
| AER | Australian Energy Regulator |
| CCP | Customer Consultative Panel |
| CESS | capital expenditure sharing scheme |
| capex | capital expenditure |
| current regulatory control period | 1 July to 2012 to 30 June 2017 |
| EBSS | efficiency benefit sharing scheme |
| F&A | Framework and approach |
| MAR | maximum allowable revenue |
| MIC | market impact component |
| NCC | network capability component |
| NECF | National Energy Customer Framework |
| NEM | National Electricity Market |
| NER or the rules | National Electricity Rules |
| NCIPAP | network capability incentive parameter action plan |
| opex | operating expenditure |
| RAB | regulatory asset base |
| next regulatory control period | 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2022 |
| TNSP | transmission network service provider |

About the framework and approach paper

The Australian Energy Regulator (AER) is the economic regulator for transmission and distribution services in Australia's national electricity market (NEM). We are an independent statutory authority, funded by the Australian Government. Our powers and functions are set out in the National Electricity Law (NEL) and National Electricity Rules (the rules or NER).

The framework and approach (F&A) paper is the first step in a process to determine efficient prices for electricity transmission services. The F&A determines the broad nature of any regulatory arrangements that will apply in this process. It also facilitates early public consultation and assists network service providers to prepare revenue proposals.

Powerlink is a licensed, regulated operator of the monopoly high voltage electricity transmission network in Queensland. The network comprises the poles, wires and transformers used for transporting high voltage electricity from remote generators to population centres. Powerlink designs, constructs, operates and maintains the transmission network for Queensland electricity consumers. The current five year Queensland transmission regulatory control period concludes on 30 June 2017.

On 29 November 2013, the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) published changes to the rules governing network regulation. The new rules require us to set out our approach to network regulation under the new framework in a series of guidelines. We commenced the Better Regulation program on 18 December 2012 to consult on our approach and published our final guidelines in November and December 2013. We will apply these guidelines in the upcoming revenue determination process.

Powerlink wrote to the AER on 31 October 2014 to ask the AER to establish an initial F&A for the transmission business. The rules require us to publish an F&A paper for Powerlink Services by 31 July 2015. In their letter Powerlink raised an issue with their intended approach to forecasting expenditure being based on a 'Top down' approach. We respond to this issue in attachment 4. We consulted on the draft F&A positions. At the close of submissions on 2 April 2015 we received two submissions: one from Powerlink and another from the Consumer Consultative Panel (sub-panel 4). We discuss these submissions in the attachments.

As required under the rules, this F&A paper sets out our approach for the next regulatory control period on the application of the following:

* service target performance incentive scheme
* operating expenditure efficiency benefit sharing scheme
* capital expenditure sharing scheme
* expenditure forecast assessment guidelines, and
* whether depreciation will be based on forecast or actual capital expenditure in updating the regulatory asset base.

Following release of the final F&A paper, Powerlink Services will submit its revenue proposal by 31 January 2016, as set out below.

Table 1 summarises the transmission determination process as it relates to Powerlink.

Table Powerlink transmission determination process

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Step | Date |
| AER to publish F&A paper for Powerlink | By 31 July 2015 |
| Powerlink to submit revenue proposal to AER | 31 January 2016 |
| AER to publish issues paper | March 2016 \* |
| AER to hold public forum on issues paper | April 2016 \* |
| Submissions on revenue proposal close | May 2016 \* |
| AER to publish draft transmission determination | 30 September 2016 \*\* |
| AER to hold public forum on draft transmission determination | October 2016 \* |
| Powerlink to submit revised revenue proposal to AER | December 2016 |
| Submissions on revised revenue proposal and draft determination close | January 2017 |
| AER to publish transmission determination for next regulatory control period | 30 April 2017 |

Source: NER, chapter 6A, Part E

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Notes: |  |  |
|  | \* | The dates provided for submissions and the public forum is based on the AER receiving compliant proposals. These dates may alter if the AER receives non-compliant proposals. |
|  | \*\* | The NER does not provide specific timeframes in relation to publishing draft decisions. Accordingly, this date is indicative only. |

Part A: Overview

This F&A covers how we propose to apply a range of incentive schemes and other guidelines to Powerlink, as well as our approach to calculating depreciation.[[1]](#footnote-2) The positions we set out in this F&A paper in relation to the regulatory control period are not binding on the AER or Powerlink.[[2]](#footnote-3) This means it is open to the AER to change its position on matters set out in this F&A for the regulatory control period where there is reason to change, for example, because of changed circumstances.

Incentive schemes encourage TNSPs to manage their businesses in a safe, reliable manner that benefits the long term interests of consumers. The schemes also provide TNSPs with incentives to spend efficiently and to meet or exceed service quality/reliability targets. In some instances, TNSPs may incur a financial penalty if they fail to meet set targets. The overall objectives of the schemes are to:

* encourage appropriate levels of service quality
* maintain network reliability as appropriate
* incentivise TNSPs to spend efficiently on capital expenditure (capex) and operating expenditure (opex)
* share efficiency gains and losses between TNSPs and consumers
* incentivise TNSPs to consider economically efficient alternatives to augmenting their networks.

We summarise the specific schemes below and provide an overview of our expenditure forecast assessment guideline and approach to calculating depreciation. We have based our preliminary positions on a five year regulatory control period. Please note that should we determine a longer regulatory control period is to apply we may need to adjust the operation of the schemes described herein to apply to the longer regulatory control period.

Service target performance incentive scheme

Our national service target performance incentive scheme (STPIS) provides a financial incentive to TNSPs to maintain and improve service performance. The STPIS aims to safeguard service quality for customers that may otherwise be affected as TNSPs seek out cost efficiencies.

For the next regulatory control period we propose to apply version 4.1 of the STPIS. As noted in attachment 1, the AER will review the transmission STPIS in 2015. If the AER further revises version 4.1 of the STPIS before the commencement of the next regulatory control period, subject to the submissions received in consultation, we intend to apply that revision to Powerlink.

Efficiency benefit sharing scheme

The operating expenditure efficiency benefit sharing scheme (EBSS) aims to provide a continuous incentive for TNSPs to pursue efficiency improvements in opex, and provide for a fair sharing of these between TNSPs and network users. Consumers benefit from improved efficiencies through lower regulated prices in the future.

As part of our Better Regulation program we consulted on and published version 2 of the EBSS. We propose to apply this new EBSS to Powerlink.

Capital expenditure sharing scheme

The capital expenditure sharing scheme (CESS) provides financial rewards for TNSPs whose capex becomes more efficient and financial penalties for those that become less efficient. Consumers benefit from improved efficiency through lower regulated prices in the future.

As part of our Better Regulation program we consulted on and published version 1 of the capital expenditure incentive guideline for electricity network service providers (capex incentive guideline) which sets out the CESS. We propose to apply the CESS to Powerlink in the next regulatory period. This guideline also outlines our approach to ex post reviews of any over-spends in the next regulatory period. Under amendments to the NER in 2012, Powerlink will be subject to these ex post prudency reviews for any expenditure over-spends in their next period. The assessment will be undertaken as part of the AER’s revenue determination process for the subsequent period.

Expenditure forecast assessment guidelines

As part of our Better Regulation program we consulted on and published our expenditure forecast assessment guideline for electricity transmission (expenditure assessment guideline). The expenditure assessment guideline is based on a nationally consistent reporting framework allowing us to compare the relative efficiencies of TNSPs and decide on efficient expenditure allowances. Our proposed approach is to apply the expenditure assessment guideline, including the information requirements to the TNSPs in the next regulatory control period. However, Powerlink proposed a different approach. We discuss this further in attachment 4.

The guideline outlines a suite of assessment/analytical tools and techniques to assist our review of Powerlink’s revenue proposal. We intend to apply the assessment techniques set out in the guideline relating to TNSPs.

Depreciation

As part of the roll forward methodology, when a TNSPs regulatory asset base (RAB) is updated from forecast capex to actual capex at the end of a regulatory period, it is also adjusted for depreciation. The depreciation we use to roll forward the RAB can be based on either actual capex incurred during the regulatory control period, or the capex allowance forecast at the start of the regulatory control period. The choice of depreciation approach is one part of the overall capex incentive framework. The incentive based regulatory framework provides benefits to consumers from improved efficiencies through lower regulated prices.

We propose to use forecast depreciation to establish the RAB at the commencement of the 2022–27 regulatory control period for Powerlink.

Small-scale incentive scheme

The rules provide that we may develop small-scale incentive schemes.[[3]](#footnote-4) At this stage, we have not developed any such schemes to encourage more efficient investment or operation of networks, as may be envisaged under this provision of the NER. For this reason, we do not propose to apply a small-scale incentive scheme to Powerlink in the next regulatory control period.

We note, however, changes to the STPIS (since version 4) introduce new incentives for TNSPs to improve the capability of existing assets to provide greater value to generators and consumers and avoid the need for asset augmentation.

Part B: Attachments

# Service target performance incentive scheme

This attachment sets out our proposed approach and reasons on how we intend to apply the service target performance incentive scheme (STPIS) to Powerlink in the next regulatory control period.

The AER creates, administers and maintains the STPIS in accordance with the requirements of the National Electricity Rules (NER). The purpose of the STPIS is to provide incentives to TNSPs to provide greater transmission network reliability when network users place greatest value on reliability, and improve and maintain the reliability of the elements of the transmission network most important to determining spot prices.[[4]](#footnote-5) The STPIS can result in a maximum revenue increment or decrement of up to five per cent of the TNSP’s MAR in a regulatory year.[[5]](#footnote-6)

The STPIS works as part of the building block determination.[[6]](#footnote-7) As part of the revenue determination, we make a decision on the application of the STPIS to a TNSP for the regulatory control period and the values associated with the applicable STPIS parameters.[[7]](#footnote-8) In each regulatory year the TNSP’s MAR is adjusted based on its performance against the STPIS parameters in the previous calendar year.

The STPIS is part of incentive based regulation we use across all energy networks we regulate. The CESS and EBSS provide incentives to incur efficient capex and opex. The incentives provided by the CESS and EBSS for cost efficiencies are balanced with the incentive to improve service standards provided by the STPIS.

The STPIS must:

* provide incentives for each TNSP to:[[8]](#footnote-9)
* provide greater reliability of the transmission system that is owned, controlled or operated by it at all times when transmission network users place greatest value on the reliability of the transmission system
* improve and maintain the reliability of those elements of the transmission system that are most important to determining spot prices
* result in a potential adjustment to the revenue TNSP may earn, from the provision of prescribed transmission services, in each regulatory year in respect of which the STPIS applies
* ensure that the maximum revenue increment or decrement as a result of the operation of the STPIS will fall within a range that is between 1 per cent and 5 per cent of the MAR for the relevant regulatory year
* take into account the regulatory obligations or requirements with which TNSPs must comply
* take into account any other incentives provided for in the rules that TNSPs have to minimise capital or operating expenditure; and
* take into account the age and ratings of the assets comprising the relevant transmission system.

Version 3 of the STPIS currently applies to Powerlink. The AER published version 4 of the STPIS on 20 December 2012, after the commencement of Powerlink's current regulatory control period. Version 4 introduced the network capability component of the scheme and refined a number of the existing parameters of the scheme. In developing version 4 of the STPIS we had regard to the requirements of the rules, as set out in our final decision on the STPIS, also published in December 2012.[[9]](#footnote-10)

Under an incentive based regulation framework, TNSPs have an incentive to reduce costs. Cost reductions are beneficial to TNSP’s and customers where service performance in maintained or improved. However, cost efficiencies achieved at the expense of service performance standards are not desirable. Version 4 of the STPIS seeks to ensure that increased financial efficiency does not result in deterioration of service performance for customers.

An update to the STPIS, version 4.1, was published in September 2014. Compared to version 4, the further changes made to the scheme in version 4.1 apply only to Directlink.

## Proposed approach

We propose to apply version 4.1 of the STPIS to Powerlink in the next regulatory control period. For Powerlink, adopting version 4.1 of the STPIS will introduce the application of the network capability component of the scheme for the first time.

Please note that the following discussion is based on the application of version 4.1 of the STPIS. As noted in the Overview, a review of the STPIS is planned for 2015. If the AER revises the STPIS following that review, we intend to apply that revision to Powerlink.

In summary:

* For the next regulatory control period we will apply the STPIS as follows.
* The parameters for each service component for Powerlink and the maximum revenue increment or decrement that Powerlink can receive for a given level of performance will be those prescribed in the latest version of the scheme. The applicable parameter values will be set out in Powerlink’ transmission determination.
* The MIC annual performance target will be the rolling average of performance history over the three previous calendar years. Actual performance will be measured as a rolling average of the most recent two years of actual performance.[[10]](#footnote-11)
* The maximum allowed revenue that Powerlink can earn in each regulatory year will be adjusted according to its performance against the values included in its transmission determination, as assessed by us in accordance with the scheme.

## Reasons for proposed approach

In general we consider the amendments to the STPIS as incorporated in version 4.1 improve the scheme’s incentives for TNSPs to:

* provide greater reliability of the transmission system that is owned, controlled or operated by it at all times when network users place greatest value on the reliability of the transmission system; and
* improve and maintain the reliability of those elements of the transmission system that are most important to determining spot prices.

For these reasons, we consider that version 4.1 of the STPIS should apply to Powerlink in the next regulatory period. This will benefit both transmission network users and consumers of electricity, in line with the NEO.

## Reasons for applying the STPIS in the next period

In this section we discuss each component of version 4.1 of the STPIS, and how each component will apply to Powerlink in the next regulatory control period.

Service component

The service component of the STPIS incentivises TNSPs to maintain and improve network availability and reliability by measuring performance against certain parameters. Under this component of the scheme, a TNSP can receive a revenue increment or decrement of up to one per cent of its MAR for the regulatory year.

A TNSP receives a financial incentive (reward) in proportion to the extent its annual performance exceeds its performance target (calculated as the s-factor). If the TNSP fails to meet its performance target, it incurs a financial penalty in proportion to the extent its annual performance does not meet the performance target.

Version 4 of the STPIS amended the service component parameters to focus more on unplanned outages, including a new parameter focusing on proper operation of equipment. Performance against these parameters can be used as a lead indicator of a deterioration of network reliability.[[11]](#footnote-12)

The scheme contains definitions for each parameter. The definitions specify the applicable sub-parameters, unit of measure, source of performance data, the formula for measuring performance, definitions of relevant terms, inclusions (which specify particular equipment or events which are to be measured) and exclusions.

For the next regulatory control period we will assess whether Powerlink’ proposed performance targets, caps, collars and weightings comply with the version 4.1 STPIS requirements for:[[12]](#footnote-13)

* average circuit outage rate, with six sub-parameters:
* line outage – fault
* transformer outage – fault
* reactive plant – fault
* line outage – forced outage
* transformer outage – forced outage
* reactive plant – forced outage
* loss of supply event frequency, with two loss of supply event sub-parameters:
* frequency of events when loss of supply exceeds 0.1 system minutes
* frequency of events when loss of supply exceeds 0.75 system minutes
* average outage duration
* proper operation of equipment, with three sub-parameters:
* failure of protection system
* material failure of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system
* incorrect operational isolation of primary or secondary equipment.

We must accept Powerlink’ proposed parameter values if they comply with the requirements of the STPIS.[[13]](#footnote-14) We may reject them if they are inconsistent with the objectives of the STPIS.[[14]](#footnote-15)

Market impact component

The market impact component (MIC) provides financial rewards to TNSPs for improvements in their performance measured against a performance target. A TNSP may earn an additional revenue increment of up to 2 per cent of its MAR. Unlike the service and network capability components, the market impact component has no financial penalty.

The MIC provides an incentive to TNSPs to minimise the impact of transmission outages that can affect the NEM spot price. It measures performance against the market impact parameter, which is number of dispatch intervals where an outage on the TNSP’s network results in a network outage constraint with a marginal value greater than $10/MWh.[[15]](#footnote-16)

In version 4 of the STPIS, we made significant amendments to the way the performance target and actual performance were determined. In version 4, the annual performance target is the rolling average of performance history over the three previous calendar years. Thus, unlike the MIC of version 2, the annual performance target is not fixed at the time of the revenue determination but is adjusted each year based on the most recent three years of performance. Actual performance is measured annually and is the rolling average of performance of the two most recent calendar years. This continues to apply in version 4.1.

A rolling target and actual performance measure provides a tighter incentive to ensure outages on prescribed assets have limited impact on wholesale spot market outcomes. Further, a rolling target ensures the target is relevant to the TNSP's current maintenance and construction activities and limits the incentive for TNSPs to engage in strategic behaviour to influence the outcomes of the scheme.

Similarly, in version 4.1, exclusion clause 3 strengthens the incentive for TNSPs to influence the timing of third party planned outages to reduce the likelihood of wholesale market impacts.[[16]](#footnote-17) Exclusion clause 3 allows TNSP’s to exclude the impact of outages from the market impact parameter if they are caused by a third party system. Third party outages are outages taken or caused by third party owners of non-prescribed assets that are connected to a TNSP’s prescribed network. In version 4.1, planned outages caused by a third party are no longer excluded.

Non-prescribed assets owned by a third party connected to a TNSP’s prescribed network are usually governed by connection agreements between the parties. When undertaking maintenance of their non-prescribed asset, third parties frequently request connected prescribed assets are taken out of service. We consider that, where third parties request a TNSP to take a planned outage of its prescribed asset associated with the party's non-prescribed asset, the TNSP has significant influence over the timing of that outage. Accordingly, the MIC operates to ensure these outages occur during periods when there is less likely to be a market impact.

Network capability component

The network capability component (NCC) was introduced in version 4 of the STPIS. This continues to apply in version 4.1. It promotes the NEO by incentivising TNSPs to identify and implement low cost incremental changes to their networks that deliver substantial benefits to consumers. It does this by requiring TNSPs to reveal their existing network capability and identify low cost projects that will:

* improve network capability when most valued by customers or
* improve wholesale market outcomes at least cost.

We recognise TNSPs are best placed to identify limitations in their networks and to implement low cost solutions to ameliorate those limitations. Prior to the introduction of the NCC, TNSPs were not incentivised to engage in this type of behaviour.

Improved wholesale market outcomes should ultimately be passed onto consumers through reduced wholesale energy costs. The NCC also promotes reliability, safety and security priorities in the NEO by incentivising increases in the capability of existing assets in the network when most needed while maintaining adequate levels of reliability.[[17]](#footnote-18)

As part of its revenue proposal, Powerlink must submit a network capability incentive parameter action plan (NCIPAP).[[18]](#footnote-19) The NCIPAP must identify the key network capability limitations on each transmission circuit or load injection point on the TNSPs network.[[19]](#footnote-20) It must also include a ranked list of priority projects proposed by Powerlink to improve the network capability for some of the circuits or injection points.[[20]](#footnote-21) These priority projects must be shown to result in material benefits for customers or on wholesale market outcomes. Powerlink must consult AEMO in developing the NCIPAP. The total annual average expenditure of the proposed priority projects may not exceed 1 per cent of the average MAR proposed by the TNSP in its revenue proposal.

We must approve a priority project if it is consistent with the NCC requirements of the STPIS.[[21]](#footnote-22) Once we have approved a priority project, we may only amend the priority project improvement targets proposed by Powerlink in limited circumstances.[[22]](#footnote-23)

In each annual STPIS compliance review, Powerlink is required to report on the steps it has taken towards reaching the priority project improvement target against each project in the NCIPAP approved by us for each year or part year of the regulatory control period. Under the NCC, Powerlink receives a financial payment equal to 1.5 per cent of its MAR as follows:

* for each regulatory year, except the final year in the next regulatory control period, Powerlink will receive an incentive payment equal to 1.5 per cent of its MAR.
* for the final year, Powerlink will receive an incentive payment of 1.5 per cent of its MAR but only if it achieves its priority project improvement target for each priority project.

In the final year, we will assess whether Powerlink has achieved each priority project target for each priority project. If it has not then we may reduce the incentive payment in the final year. We can reduce the final payment to – 2 per cent of MAR if Powerlink does not achieve any of its priority project improvement targets.[[23]](#footnote-24)

## Submissions

Powerlink accepted the AER's position. However, Powerlink disagreed that the Network Capability Component is necessary to provide an incentive for transmission network service providers to implement measures that improve network capability at times which customers valued. Powerlink said:

Powerlink disagrees with this claim and has a history of implementing such projects without application of the new NCC.[[24]](#footnote-25)

The CCP submitted that it was concerned that the STPIS scheme might not deliver outcomes that are in consumers’ long-term interests.[[25]](#footnote-26) They also said:

…CCP4 notes that the AER has committed to undertaking a review of the transmission STPIS during 2015 and that the review will be completed prior to the commencement of Powerlink’s next regulatory control period. We also note … that the AER has committed to applying those revisions to Powerlink during the 2017-22 period.

Therefore, …CCP4 will provide a detailed submission to the AER’s formal review of the transmission STPIS scheme.[[26]](#footnote-27)

## AER Response

The AER will examine these matters in detail in reviewing the Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme.

In the 2017–22 regulatory control period the AER will apply the new Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme, in its amended form.

# Efficiency benefit sharing scheme

This attachment sets out our proposed approach and reasons on how we intend to apply the efficiency benefit sharing scheme (EBSS) to Powerlink in the next regulatory control period.

The EBSS aims to provide a continuous incentive for TNSPs to pursue efficiency improvements in opex, and provide for a fair sharing of these between TNSPs and network users. Consumers benefit from improved efficiencies through lower regulated prices in the future.

## ­Proposed approach

We propose to apply the new EBSS in the 2017–22 regulatory control period.

The EBSS must provide for a fair sharing between TNSPs and network users of opex efficiency gains and efficiency losses.[[27]](#footnote-28) We must also have regard to the following factors in developing and implementing the EBSS:[[28]](#footnote-29)

* the need to ensure that benefits to electricity consumers likely to result from the scheme are sufficient to warrant any reward or penalty under the scheme
* the need to provide service providers with a continuous incentive to reduce opex
* the desirability of both rewarding service providers for efficiency gains and penalising service providers for efficiency losses
* any incentives that service providers may have to capitalise expenditure
* the possible effects of the scheme on incentives for the implementation of non-network alternatives.

## Reasons for proposed approach

The current EBSS applies to Powerlink in the current regulatory control period.[[29]](#footnote-30) As part of our Better Regulation program we consulted on and published the new EBSS, taking into account the requirements of the rules.

The new EBSS retains the same form as the current EBSS, and merges the distribution and transmission schemes. Changes in the new EBSS relate to the criteria for adjustments and exclusions under the scheme.[[30]](#footnote-31) We may also exclude categories of opex not forecast using a single year revealed cost approach from the scheme on an ex post basis if doing so better achieves the requirements of the rules. We also amended the scheme to provide flexibility to account for any adjustments made to base year opex to remove the impacts of one-off factors. The new EBSS also clarifies how we will determine the carryover period. These revisions affect how we will calculate carryover amounts for future regulatory control periods.[[31]](#footnote-32)

In this attachment we set out why we propose to apply the new EBSS to the next period.

## Reasons for applying the EBSS in the next period

We propose to apply the new EBSS to the next period. In developing the new EBSS we had regard to the requirements under the rules, as set out in the scheme and accompanying explanatory statement.[[32]](#footnote-33) This reasoning extends to the factors we must have regard to in implementing the scheme.

The EBSS must provide for a fair sharing of efficiency gains and losses.[[33]](#footnote-34) Under the scheme, TNSPs and consumers receive a benefit where a TNSP reduces its costs during a regulatory control period and both bear some of any increase in costs.

Under the EBSS, positive and negative carryovers reward and penalise TNSPs for efficiency gains and losses respectively.[[34]](#footnote-35) The EBSS provides a continuous incentive for TNSPs to achieve opex efficiencies throughout the next period. This is because the TNSP receives carryover payments so it retains any efficiency gains or losses it makes within the regulatory period for the length of the carryover period. This is regardless of the year in which it makes the gain or loss.[[35]](#footnote-36)

This continuous incentive to improve efficiency encourages efficient and timely opex throughout the regulatory control period, and reduces the incentive for a TNSP to inflate opex in the expected base year. This provides an incentive for TNSPs to reveal their efficient opex which, in turn, allows us to better determine efficient opex forecasts for future regulatory control periods.

The EBSS also leads to a fair sharing of efficiency gains and losses between TNSPs and consumers. For instance the combined effect of our forecasting approach and the EBSS is that opex efficiency gains or losses are shared approximately 30:70 between TNSPs and consumers. This means for a one dollar efficiency saving in opex the TNSP keeps 30 cents of the benefit while consumers keep 70 cents of the benefit.

Example 2.1 shows how the EBSS operates. It illustrates how the benefits of a permanent efficiency improvement are shared approximately 30:70 between a network service provider and consumers.

In implementing the EBSS we must also have regard to any incentives TNSPs may have to capitalise expenditure.[[36]](#footnote-37) Where opex incentives are balanced with capex incentives, a TNSP does not have an incentive to favour opex over capex, or vice-versa. The CESS is a symmetric capex scheme with a 30 per cent incentive power. This is consistent with the incentive power for opex when we use an unadjusted base year approach in combination with an EBSS. During the next period when the CESS and EBSS are applied, incentives will be relatively balanced, and TNSPs should not have an incentive to favour opex over capex or vice versa. The CESS is discussed further in attachment 3.

We must also consider the possible effects of implementing the EBSS on incentives for non-network alternatives:[[37]](#footnote-38)

* Expenditure on non-network alternatives generally takes the form of opex rather than capex. Successful non-network alternatives should result in the TNSP spending less on capex than it otherwise would have.
* It is proposed both the CESS and EBSS will apply in the next regulatory control period. As a result a TNSP has an incentive to implement a non-network alternative if the increase in opex is less than the corresponding decrease in capex. In this way, the TNSP will receive a net reward for implementing the non-network alternative.[[38]](#footnote-39) This is because the rewards and penalties under the EBSS and CESS are balanced and symmetric. In the past where the EBSS operated without a CESS, we excluded expenditure on non-network alternatives when calculating rewards and penalties under the scheme. This was because TNSPs may otherwise receive a penalty for increasing opex without a corresponding reward for decreasing capex.[[39]](#footnote-40)

## Submissions

Powerlink did not comment on the AER's position.

The Consumer Consultative Panel (sub-panel4) expressed reservations about the application of the EBSS to Powerlink, based on AER benchmarking indicating that Powerlink may be less efficient than its peers. The sub-panel said:

The AER’s transmission benchmarking results demonstrate that Powerlink is consistently in the lowest productivity cost range for transmission networks and well removed from the efficiency frontier. Consequently, CCP4 considers that the outcomes of benchmarking will be essential in the determination of the efficient base-year opex for Powerlink.

In light of the AER’s decision not to apply the EBSS to the NSW/ACT distribution networks, we consider that the AER should outline within the Final Powerlink Framework and Approach, the conditions under which the EBSS might not be applied to Powerlink[[40]](#footnote-41).

## AER Response

We agree with the CCP that the establishment of an efficient base year operating expenditure is a critical step in the revenue reset determination process. However, we have also noted in the Overview that under the NER the positions in this F&A are not binding on the AER or Powerlink.

We consider it would be premature to set out here the circumstances which may lead to the AER exercising the discretion to amend our approach available under rule 6A10.1A(f). As the CCP has noted, if the circumstances of the NSW/ACT distribution determination were to be repeated this need may arise. However, that example is but one of a wide range of matters which will be considered in the context of an actual regulatory proposal. As the revenue determination will be an open consultative process there will be ample opportunity to fully consider whether the circumstances warrant a different approach to the EBSS or to any other aspect of this F&A.

Therefore, subject to the discretion available under rule 6A.10.1A.(f), the AER will apply the new Efficiency Benefit Sharing Scheme in the 2017–22 regulatory control period.

On the following pages we provide a theoretical example of how the EBSS will operate.

Example 2.1 How the EBSS operates

Assume that in the first regulatory period, a network service provider's forecast opex is $100 million per annum (p.a.).

Assume that during this period the service provider delivers opex equal to the forecast for the first three years. Then, in the fourth year of the regulatory period, the service provider implements a more efficient business practice for maintaining its assets. As a result, the service provider will be able to deliver opex at $95 million p.a. for the foreseeable future.

This efficiency improvement affects regulated revenues in two ways:

1. Through forecast opex. If we use the penultimate year of the regulatory period to forecast opex in the second regulatory period, the new forecast will be $95 million p.a. If the efficiency improvement is permanent, all else being equal, forecast opex will also be expected to be $95 million p.a. in future regulatory periods.
2. Through EBSS carryover amounts. The service provider receives additional carryover amounts so that it receives exactly six years of benefits from an efficiency improvement. Because the service provider has made an efficiency improvement of $5 million p.a. in Year 4, to ensure it receives exactly six years of benefits, it will receive annual EBSS carryover amounts of $5 million in the first four years (Years 6 to 9) of the second regulatory period.

As a result of these effects, the service provider will benefit from the efficiency improvement in Years 4 to 9. This is because the annual amount the service provider receives through the forecast opex and EBSS building blocks ($100 million) is more than what it pays for opex ($95 million) in each of these years.

Consumers benefit from Year 10 onwards after the EBSS carryover period has expired. This is because what consumers pay through the forecast opex and EBSS building blocks ($95 million) is lower from Year 10 onwards.

Table 2 provides a more detailed illustration of how the benefits are shared between service providers and consumers over time.

(Example 2.1 continued)

Table 2 Example of how the EBSS operates

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Reg. period 1 | | | | | Reg. period 2 | | | | | Future |
| Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |  |
| Forecast (Ft) | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 p.a. |
| Actual (At) | 100 | 100 | 100 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 p.a. |
| Underspend (Ft – At = Ut) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 p.a. |
| Incremental efficiency gain (It = Ut – Ut–1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0\* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 p.a. |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Carryover (I1) |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Carryover (I2) |  |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |
| Carryover (I3) |  |  |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |
| Carryover (I4) |  |  |  |  | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |  |  |
| Carryover (I5) |  |  |  |  |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Carryover amount (Ct) |  |  |  |  |  | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 p.a. |
| Benefits to NSP (Ft – At +Ct) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 p.a. |
| Benefits to consumers (F1 – (Ft +Ct)) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 p.a. |
| Discounted benefits to NSP\*\* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 0 | 0 |
| Discounted benefits to consumers\*\* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3.5 | 58.8\*\*\* |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Notes: |  |  |
|  | \* | At the time of forecasting opex for the second regulatory period we don’t know actual opex for year 5. Consequently this is not reflected in forecast opex for the second period. That means an underspend in year 6 will reflect any efficiency gains made in both year 5 and year 6. To ensure the carryover rewards for year 6 only reflect incremental efficiency gains for that year we subtract the incremental efficiency gain in year 5 from the total underspend. In the example above, I6 = U6 – (U5 – U4). |
|  | \*\* | Assumes a real discount rate of 6 per cent. |
|  | \*\*\* | As a result of the efficiency improvement, forecast opex is $5 million p.a. lower in nominal terms. The estimate of $58.7m is the net present value of $5 million p.a. delivered to consumers annually from year 11 onwards. |

Table 3 sums the discounted benefits to NSPs and consumers from the bottom two rows of Table 2. As illustrated below, the benefits of the efficiency improvement are shared approximately 30:70 in perpetuity between the service provider and consumers.

Table 3 Sharing of efficiency gains—Year 4 forecasting approach, with EBSS

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | NPV of benefits of efficiency improvement | Percentage of total benefits |
| Benefits to service provider | $26.1 million | 30 per cent |
| Benefits to consumers | $62.3 million | 70 per cent |
| Total | $88.3 million | 100 per cent |

# Capital expenditure sharing scheme

This attachment sets out our proposed approach and reasons for how we intend to apply the CESS to Powerlink in the next regulatory control period.

The capital expenditure sharing scheme (CESS) provides financial rewards for TNSPs whose capex becomes more efficient and financial penalties for those that become less efficient. Consumers benefit from improved efficiency through lower regulated prices in the future.

The CESS approximates efficiency gains and efficiency losses by calculating the difference between forecast and actual capex. It shares these gains or losses between TNSPs and network users.

The CESS works as follows:

* We calculate the cumulative underspend or overspend for the current regulatory control period in net present value terms.
* We apply the sharing ratio of 30 per cent to the cumulative underspend or overspend to work out what the TNSP's share of the underspend or overspend should be.
* We calculate the CESS payments taking into account the financing benefit or cost to the TNSP of underspends or overspends.[[41]](#footnote-42) We can also make further adjustments to account for deferral of capex and ex post exclusions of capex from the RAB.
* The CESS payments will be added or subtracted to the TNSP's regulated revenue as a separate building block in the next regulatory control period.

Under the CESS a TNSP retains 30 per cent of an underspend or overspend, while consumers retain 70 per cent of the underspend on overspend. This means that for a one dollar saving in capex the TNSP keeps 30 cents of the benefit while consumers keep 70 cents of the benefit.

Under the CESS an ex post review for any overspends in the next regulatory control period also applies, but this assessment will be undertaken in the subsequent control period. As noted in the introduction, Powerlink has queried whether in the next regulatory control period the AER will undertake an ex post review in relation to the current regulatory control period. Our preliminary view is that as we intend to apply the CESS we should undertake the review as mandated within the Guideline. However, we recognise that in this unique circumstance this review would be confined to a single year. In such circumstances any particular observed outcome may not merit treatment as significant.

## Proposed approach

We propose to apply the CESS as set out in our capex incentives guideline to Powerlink in the next regulatory control period.[[42]](#footnote-43)

In deciding whether to apply a CESS to a TNSP in the next regulatory control period, and the nature and details of any CESS we apply to a TNSP, we must:[[43]](#footnote-44)

* make that decision in a manner that contributes to the capex incentive objective[[44]](#footnote-45)
* consider the CESS principles,[[45]](#footnote-46) capex objectives,[[46]](#footnote-47) other incentive schemes, and where relevant the opex objectives, as they apply to the particular TNSP, and the circumstances of the TNSP.

Broadly, the capex incentive objective is to ensure that only capex that meets the capex criteria enters the RAB used to set prices. Therefore, consumers only fund capex that is efficient and prudent.

## Reasons for proposed approach

TNSPs are currently not subject to a CESS. As part of our Better Regulation program we consulted on and published version 1 of the capex incentives guideline which sets out the CESS.[[47]](#footnote-48) The guideline specifies that in most circumstances we will apply a CESS, in conjunction with forecast depreciation to roll-forward the RAB.[[48]](#footnote-49) We also propose to apply forecast depreciation, which is discussed further in attachment 5 below.

In developing the CESS we took into account the capex incentive objective, capex criteria, capex objectives, and the CESS principles. We also developed the CESS to work alongside other incentive schemes that apply to TNSPs, including the EBSS and STPIS.

For capex, the sharing of underspends and overspends happens at the end of each regulatory period when we update a TNSP’s RAB to include new capex. If a TNSP spends less than its approved forecast during a period, it will benefit within that period. Consumers benefit at the end of that period when the RAB is updated to include less capex compared to if the TNSP had spent the full amount of the capex forecast. This leads to lower prices in the future.

Without a CESS the incentive for a TNSP to spend less than its forecast capex declines throughout the period.[[49]](#footnote-50) Because of this a TNSP may choose to spend capex earlier, or on capex when it may otherwise have spent on opex, or less on capex at the expense of service quality—even if it may not be efficient to do so.

With the CESS a TNSP faces the same reward and penalty in each year of a regulatory control period for capex underspends or overspends. The CESS will provide TNSPs with an ex ante incentive to spend only efficient capex. TNSPs that make efficiency gains will be rewarded through the CESS. Conversely, TNSPs that make efficiency losses will be penalised through the CESS. In this way, TNSPs will be more likely to incur only efficient capex when subject to a CESS, so any capex included in the RAB is more likely to reflect the capex criteria. In particular, if a TNSP is subject to the CESS, its capex is more likely to be efficient and to reflect the costs of a prudent TNSP.

When the CESS, EBSS and STPIS apply to TNSPs the incentives for improvements in opex, capex and service outcomes are more balanced. This encourages businesses to make efficient decisions on when and what type of expenditure to incur, and to efficiently trade off expenditure reductions with service quality and reliability.

## Submissions

Powerlink accepted the AER's position. However, they queried the reference in the preliminary positions to the review of capex applying to a single year and sought an explanation of how the AER would conduct its review.[[50]](#footnote-51) The CCP commented that they consider the use of benchmarking will be critical in determining Powerlink's efficient capex allowance.[[51]](#footnote-52)

## AER Response

We note that the reference to a single year was a drafting error. The initial review of historical capex for Powerlink (if there is an overspend) will be for three years. This is the relevant period specified in schedule 6A.2.2 of the NER.

In response to the queries of Powerlink and the CCP, in the following passages we provide an outline of the process we will apply to assess the capital expenditure proposals of Powerlink. This is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of the our approach to assessing capital expenditure. We will provide a detailed explanation of our assessment process in the determinations we make in response to Powerlink's regulatory proposal.

Our review of past expenditure will apply the requirements set out in schedule 6A.2.2. To the extent over–expenditure is apparent relative to the forecasts contained in the current determination, we will seek a detailed explanation for any the deviation from the forecasts. In making our decisions on past expenditure (and the future expenditure proposals) we will consider any submissions made by stakeholders and the CCP or by Powerlink. For any past over–expenditure we will assess whether the explanations proffered are sufficient to explain the deviation and demonstrate that the deviation was prudent and efficient. We may seek further information if we are not satisfied.

For all expenditure we will undertake our own analysis of what we consider to be a prudent and efficient amount. Our decision will be made in accordance with the NER and the NEL. In particular, we will have regard to the Revenue and Pricing Principles and the National Electricity Objective and to the capital expenditure factors. We note that the capital expenditure factors include a specific consideration of benchmarks.[[52]](#footnote-53) Our view will compare our assessments of prudent and efficient expenditure with the reported costs and the proposed expenditure and take into account the views of all stakeholders. These assessments will be conducted in a manner consistent with our approach to assessing the capital expenditure requirements of other network service providers, taking into account the specific circumstances of Powerlink and their regulatory proposal.

The AER will to apply the new Capital Expenditure Sharing Scheme in the 2017–22 regulatory control period.

# Expenditure forecast assessment guideline

This attachment sets out our intention to apply our expenditure forecast assessment guideline (guideline)[[53]](#footnote-54) including the information requirements to Powerlink for the 2017–22 regulatory control period. We propose applying the guideline as it sets out our new expenditure assessment approach developed and consulted upon during the Better Regulation program. The guideline outlines for TNSPs and interested stakeholders the types of assessments we will do to determine efficient expenditure allowances, and the information we require from the businesses to do so.

We were required to develop the guideline under the rules.[[54]](#footnote-55) The guideline is based on a nationally consistent reporting framework allowing us to compare the relative efficiencies of TNSPs and decide on efficient expenditure allowances. The rules required Powerlink to advise us by 30 June 2015 of the methodology it proposes to use to prepare forecasts.[[55]](#footnote-56) In the F&A we must set out our proposed approach to application of the guideline.[[56]](#footnote-57) This will provide clarity to Powerlink and assist it with the information it should include in its revenue proposal.

## Powerlink submission

Powerlink wrote to the AER on 31 October 2014. Powerlink states it is investigating the potential to apply a 'top–down' approach to capital expenditure forecasting to establish their requirements for the next period.[[57]](#footnote-58) A top–down approach relies on historical information and established trends to forecast future needs. The conventional approach to forecasting capital is to form detailed project plans which are costed and summed to give the total capital requirement. This approach is often called a 'bottom–up build'. Powerlink cite as the advantages of the top–down approach that it may greatly reduce the time, resources and costs for Powerlink to produce a regulatory proposal. Similarly, Powerlink also suggest it may offer the same advantage to the AER and stakeholders in assessing their proposal. Powerlink is liaising with the AER on this proposal. We expect this liaison will continue to take place as Powerlink prepares its expenditure forecasting methodology.

## Reasons for proposed approach

The guideline contains a suite of assessment/analytical tools and techniques to assist our review of revenue proposals by network service providers. We intend to apply the assessment techniques set out in the guideline. The techniques include:[[58]](#footnote-59)

* benchmarking (economic techniques and category analysis)
* methodology review
* governance and policy review
* predictive modelling
* trend analysis
* cost benefit analysis
* detailed project review (including engineering review).

We exercise our judgement in determining the extent to which we use a particular technique in assessing a regulatory proposal. Powerlink has explained to the AER that their intention would be to use a bottom–up build for projects that are known and/or underway in the early years of the next regulatory control period and a top–down approach for projects later in the period, with a proportion of the latter projects also supported by a bottom up build.

Our expenditure forecasting assessment guideline is flexible and recognises that a range of different estimating techniques may be employed to develop an expenditure forecast. For high capital value projects we would generally expect there to be sufficient information available to construct a bottom–up build. We also recognise that greater uncertainty will be associated with project estimates as they arise further in the future. A top–down estimating approach calibrated by reference to a sample of supporting bottom–up builds may offer scope to reduce the cost of preparing a regulatory proposal without sacrificing accuracy.

It is important that the estimating techniques employed give an accurate assessment of the prudent and efficient future capital expenditure required by Powerlink. Our concern is to ensure Powerlink employs forecasting techniques that achieve a balance between cost and accuracy, having regard to the factors advanced by Powerlink and the further factors discussed above. At this early stage it is not possible to determine the extent to which Powerlink might rely on a top–down estimating approach. Therefore, whilst we remain open to further consideration of Powerlink's proposal, we have not adopted it for the purpose of setting out our position in this F&A. We will continue to discuss the proposal with Powerlink.

We developed the guideline to apply broadly to all electricity transmission and distribution businesses. However, some customisation of the data requirements contained in the guideline might be required. While we do not anticipate any such requirements at present, any data customisation issues would be addressed through the RIN that we will issue to Powerlink for the next regulatory control period.

## Submissions

Powerlink accepted the AER's position.[[59]](#footnote-60) However, Powerlink sought to clarify its intentions as to the extent of its proposed use of top–down forecasting.

For clarification, Powerlink currently intends to apply a top–down capex forecasting approach to only:

• Replacement expenditure using the AER's repex model and other information;

• Security/compliance and other using a form of top–down trending; and

• Business IT using a form of top–down trending

Powerlink currently intends to support its top–down forecast approach with bottom–up testing from actual expenditure which is possible in the early years of the revenue proposal. All other capex category forecasts are intended to be bottom-up.

The Powerlink letter sets out further details of their approach to expenditure forecasting. It is available on our website for downloading. The Powerlink proposal attracted a detailed response from CCP4. Their submission is also available for downloading from our website.

The CCP submission objects strongly to the use of top–down forecasting by Powerlink. However, we note that Powerlink's clarification above may address some of the concerns expressed by the CCP in their submission below. In particular, that the application of top–down forecasting by Powerlink is not intended to be Powerlink's main approach to forecasting capital expenditure. Powerlink has submitted that it would be selectively applied. This distinction was not clear in the preliminary positions paper.

The CCP cited its principal concerns as follows:

It would inappropriately and unnecessarily restrict the AER’s ability to exercise its judgement in determining the extent to which it applies the techniques outlined in its forecasting assessment guideline

It would not provide the AER with sufficient information to enable an accurate assessment of the prudent and efficient capital expenditure required by Powerlink

In particular, the CCP$ is concerned that using a top down assessment will not provide sufficient information as to the governance behind the development of the capex allowance, the risk assessments made underpinning the capex forecasts, the structure of the cost inputs and the rationale for the need for the capex claimed (eg such as would be included in a RIT-T).

Use of a top down assessment in isolation for repex would not factor in a detailed assessment of the risk assumptions used for replacement of assets, nor of the risk inherent in deferring such replacements.

The application of a range of assessment techniques (including top down and bottom up techniques) is essential for properly assessing the prudency and efficiency of the networks’ proposed capital expenditure

Various elements of Powerlink’s capex are largely non-recurrent and require the application of bottom up assessment techniques

It would result in an over-reliance on the use of Powerlink’s historical capex costs and trends, which have not been demonstrated to be efficient

Powerlink’s claims regarding the reduced costs associated with its proposed forecasting methodology are questionable

We consider that the boards of prudent asset intensive entities would not allow their capital investment decisions to be developed on the basis of ‘top down’ assessments, and would ensure that effective governance arrangements are in place that also require bottom–up assessments to be applied

The CCP went on to suggest that the Powerlink approach may fetter the AER's application of our expenditure forecasting guideline.

## AER Response

The AER guideline describes a wide range of techniques that may be applied in forecasting expenditure. Each technique has its place. Some techniques (or combinations of techniques) are better suited to certain situations than other techniques. In relation to expenditure in the distant future we recognise that estimation techniques can be subject to significant uncertainty, which makes their application difficult. This is typically the situation we must address in making revenue determinations that stretch out into the future. Consequently, we accept that there is a need to balance the competing needs for accuracy and detail with cost and uncertainty. There is flexibility built into our guideline to accommodate these considerations.

We continue to expect that the major technique used in forecasting capex will be the "bottom–up build". AER staff have communicated this view to Powerlink in our preliminary discussions. We note that Powerlink acknowledges this will be the case in their submission to this F&A process. We note that Powerlink has stated it intends limiting its use of the "top–down" technique to certain specific categories of expenditure. We are continuing to discuss this subject with Powerlink and have yet to reach a final position in those discussions.

With regard to the CCP submission, we agree with the CCP that potential could exist for the inappropriate application of the "top–down" approach to limit the quality of information available to the AER. We agree that would be unacceptable. We also note their concern that we may compromise our ability to robustly assess a proposal if we endorse an inappropriate cost estimation methodology.

The AER will not compromise its ability to assess any proposal. We do not endorse expenditure forecasting methodologies. We reserve the right to apply the technique or combination of techniques we consider best suits the discharge of our duties. It will remain the task of the TNSP to justify its proposal to the AER. If we judge that information is inaccurate, incomplete or insufficient to assess a proposed expenditure we will use the regulatory tools at our disposal to address that deficiency. Therefore, we believe that our current approach to expenditure forecasting is sound.

Powerlink may make use of "top–down" forecasting but if we consider it is inappropriate to a particular expenditure Powerlink will be at risk of that proposal being rejected or substantially amended. Based on Powerlink's public discussion of this topic with us, we believe Powerlink understand this risk. Through these discussions we believe Powerlink are seeking to ensure their future regulatory proposal is appropriately justified with a commensurate degree of effort.

The AER will to apply the expenditure forecasting assessment guideline in the 2017–22 regulatory control period.

# Depreciation

As part of the roll forward methodology, when the RAB is updated from forecast capex to actual capex at the end of a regulatory control period, it is also adjusted for depreciation. This attachment sets out our proposed approach to calculating depreciation when the RAB is rolled forward to the commencement of the 2022–27 regulatory control period.[[60]](#footnote-61)

The depreciation we use to roll forward the RAB can be based on either:

* Actual capex incurred during the regulatory control period (actual depreciation). We roll forward the RAB based on actual capex less the depreciation on the actual capex incurred by the TNSP; or
* The capex allowance forecast at the start of the regulatory control period (forecast depreciation). We roll forward the RAB based on actual capex less the depreciation on the forecast capex approved for the regulatory control period.

The choice of depreciation approach is one part of the overall capex incentive framework.

Consumers benefit from improved efficiencies through lower regulated prices. Where a CESS is applied, using forecast depreciation provides the incentives for TNSPs to pursue continuous capex efficiencies. Using actual depreciation increases these incentives. There is more information on depreciation as part of the overall capex incentive framework in our capex incentives guideline.[[61]](#footnote-62) In summary:

* If there is a capex overspend, actual depreciation will be higher than forecast depreciation. This means that the RAB will increase by a lesser amount than if forecast depreciation were used. So, the TNSP will earn less revenue into the future (i.e. it will bear more of the cost of the overspend into the future) than if forecast depreciation had been used to roll forward the RAB.
* If there is a capex underspend, actual depreciation will be lower than forecast depreciation. This means that the RAB will increase by a greater amount than if forecast depreciation were used. Hence, the TNSP will earn greater revenue into the future (i.e. it will retain more of the benefit of an underspend into the future) than if forecast depreciation had been used to roll forward the RAB.

The incentive from using actual depreciation to roll forward the RAB also varies with the life of the asset. Using actual depreciation will provide a stronger incentive for shorter lived assets compared to longer lived assets. Forecast depreciation, on the other hand, leads to the same incentive for all assets.

## Proposed approach

We propose to use the forecast depreciation approach to establish the RAB at the commencement of the 2022–27 regulatory control period for Powerlink. We consider this approach will provide sufficient incentives for Powerlink to achieve capex efficiency gains over the 2017–22 regulatory control period.

In the F&A paper we must set out our proposed approach as to whether we will use actual or forecast depreciation to establish a TNSP's RAB at the commencement of the following regulatory control period.[[62]](#footnote-63)

We are required to set out in our capex incentives guideline our process for determining which form of depreciation we propose to use in the RAB roll forward process.[[63]](#footnote-64) Our decision on whether to use actual or forecast depreciation must be consistent with the capex incentive objective. We must have regard to:[[64]](#footnote-65)

* any other incentives the service provider has to undertake efficient capex
* substitution possibilities between assets with different lives
* the extent of overspending and inefficient overspending relative to the allowed forecast
* the capex incentive guideline
* the capital expenditure factors.

## Reasons for proposed approach

Consistent with our capex incentives guideline, we propose to use the forecast depreciation approach to establish the RAB at the commencement of the 2022–27 regulatory control period.

We had regard to the relevant factors in the rules in developing the approach to choosing depreciation set out in our capex incentives guideline.[[65]](#footnote-66)

Our approach is to apply forecast depreciation except where:

* there is no CESS in place and therefore the power of the capex incentive may need to be strengthened, or
* a TNSP’s past capex performance demonstrates evidence of persistent overspending or inefficiency, thus requiring a higher powered incentive.

In making our decision on whether to use actual depreciation in either of these circumstances we will consider:

* the substitutability between capex and opex and the balance of incentives between these
* the balance of incentives with service outcomes
* the substitutability of assets of different asset lives.

We have chosen forecast depreciation as our proposed approach because, in combination with the CESS, it will provide a 30 per cent reward for capex underspends and 30 per cent penalty for capex overspends, which is consistent for all asset classes. In developing our capex incentives guideline, we considered this to be a sufficient incentive for a TNSP to achieve efficiency gains over the regulatory control period in most circumstances.

Powerlink is not currently subject to a CESS but we propose to apply the CESS in the next regulatory control period.

For Powerlink, at this stage, we consider the incentive provided by the application of the CESS in combination with the use of forecast depreciation and our other ex post capex measures should be sufficient to achieve the capex incentive objective.[[66]](#footnote-67)

## Submissions

Powerlink did not comment on the AER's position.

## AER Response

The AER will to apply forecast depreciation in the 2017–22 regulatory control period.

# Small scale incentive scheme

The rules provide that we may develop small-scale incentive schemes to test innovative approaches to incentives.[[67]](#footnote-68) Small scale incentive schemes are intended to provide for incentives for improved performance not already covered by the existing incentive schemes in the rules and may cover matters not related to expenditure by TNSPs.[[68]](#footnote-69)

We have not yet developed any such schemes. Therefore, in this F&A paper we are not proposing to apply any such schemes to Powerlink in the next regulatory control period.

We note, however, that changes to the STPIS (version 4.1) introduce new incentives for TNSPs to improve the capability of existing assets to provide greater value to generators and consumers and avoid the need for asset augmentation.

1. NER, S6A.10.1A [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. NER, clause 6A.10.1A(f). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. NER, clause 6A.7.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. NER, clause 6A.7.4(b)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. NER, clause 6A.7.4(b)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. NER, clause 6A.5.4(a)(5) and (b)(5). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. NER, clause 6A.4.2(5); 6A.14.1(1)(iii). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. NER clause 6A.7.4(b). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. AER, Final decision, TNSP service target performance incentive scheme, version 4, 19 December 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. AER, Final – Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme, September 2014, clause 4.2(d) and Appendix F. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. AER, Final – Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme, September 2014, p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. AER, Final – Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme, September 2014, clause 3.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. AER, Final – Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme, September 2014, clause 3.2(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. AER, Final – Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme, September 2014, clause 3.2(m). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. AER, Final – Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme, September 2014, appendix C [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. AER. Draft decision – early application of version 4 of the STPIS, August 2013, p.22-23. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. NER, clause 6A.7.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. AER, Final – Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme, September 2014, clauses 5.2(b). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. AER, Final – Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme, September 2014, clauses 5.2(b)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. AER, Final – Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme, September 2014, clauses 5.2(b)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. AER, Final – Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme, September 2014, clause 5.2(k). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. We amend the priority project improvement targets proposed by Powerlink only if either Powerlink agrees to the amendment or AEMO considers the amendment will result in a material benefit and can be achieved by Powerlink in the subsequent regulatory control period. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. AER, Final – Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme, September 2014, clause 5.2(k) [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Powerlink letter, Draft Powerlink Framework and Approach - Preliminary Positions, 2 April 2015, p.1 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. CCP4 Sub-Panel, Submission Draft Powerlink Framework and Approach (F&A), 3rd April 2015, p.2 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. NER, clause 6A.6.5(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. NER, clause 6A.6.5(b). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. AER, Electricity transmission network service providers, efficiency benefit sharing scheme, September 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. We will no longer allow for specific exclusions such as uncontrollable opex or for changes in opex due to unexpected increases or decreases in network growth. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. AER, Efficiency benefit sharing scheme, 29 November 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. AER, Efficiency benefit sharing scheme, 29 November 2013. AER, Explanatory statement, Efficiency benefit sharing scheme for electricity network service providers, 29 November 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. NER, clause 6A.6.5(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. NER, clauses 6A.6.5(b) and 6A.6.5(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. NER, clause 6A.6.5(b)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. NER, clause 6A.6.5(b)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. NER, clause 6A.6.5(b)(4). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. When the TNSP spends more on opex it receives a 30 per cent penalty under the EBSS. However, when there is a corresponding decrease in capex the TNSP receives a 30 per cent reward under the CESS. So where the decrease in capex is larger than the increase in opex the TNSP receives a larger reward than penalty, a net reward. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. Without a CESS the reward for capex declines over the regulatory period. If an increase in opex corresponded with a decrease in capex, the off-setting benefit of the decrease in capex depends on the year in which it occurs. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. CCP4 Sub-Panel, Submission Draft Powerlink Framework and Approach (F&A), 3rd April 2015, p.2 [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. We calculate benefits as the benefits to the TNSP of not financing the underspend since the amount of the underspend can be put to some other income generating use during the period. Losses are similarly calculated as the financing cost to the TNSP of the overspend. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. AER, Capital expenditure incentive guideline for electricity network service providers, pp. 5–9. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. NER, clause 6A.6.5A. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. NER, clause 6A.5A(a); the capex criteria are set out in clause 6A.6.7(c)(1)-(3) of the NER. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. NER, clause 6A.6.5A(c). [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. NER, clause 6A.6.7(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. AER, Capital expenditure incentive guideline for electricity network service providers, pp. 5–9. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. AER, Capital expenditure incentive guideline for electricity network service providers, pp. 10–11. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. As the end of the regulatory period approaches, the time available for the TNSP to retain any savings gets shorter. So the earlier a TNSP incurs an underspend in the regulatory period, the greater its reward will be. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. Powerlink letter, Draft Powerlink Framework and Approach - Preliminary Positions, 2 April 2015, p.2 [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. CCP4 Sub-Panel, Submission Draft Powerlink Framework and Approach (F&A), 3rd April 2015, p.5 [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. NER, clause 6A.6.7(e)(4). [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. We published this guideline on 29 November 2013. It can be located at www.aer.gov.au/node/18864. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. NER, clauses 6.4.5, 6A.5.6, 11.53.4 and 11.54.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. NER, clauses 6A.10.1B(b)(1) and 11.58.4(n). [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. NER, clause 6A.10.1A(b)(5). [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
57. Powerlink later explained that this approach would only apply to some sub-categories of expenditure and would be calibrated by supporting bottom-up builds for a significant sample of projects. This is discussed below under 'Submissions' [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
58. AER, Expenditure assessment guideline for electricity transmission, 29 November 2013, pp. 12-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
59. Powerlink letter, Draft Powerlink Framework and Approach - Preliminary Positions, 2 April 2015, p.2-4 [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
60. NER, clause 6A.10.1A(b)(6). [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
61. AER, Capital expenditure incentive guideline for electricity network service providers, 29 November 2013, pp. 10–11. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
62. NER, clause S6A.2.2B. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
63. NER, clause 6A.5A(b)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
64. NER, clause S6A.2.2B. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
65. AER, Capital expenditure incentive guideline for electricity network service providers, 29 November 2013, pp. 12–13. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
66. Our ex post capex measures are set out in the capex incentives guideline, AER capex incentives guideline, pp. 13–19; the guideline also sets out how all our capex incentive measures are consistent with the capex incentive objective, AER capex incentives guideline, 29 November 2013, pp. 20–21. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
67. NER, clause 6A.7.5. AEMC, Final determination, National Electricity Amendment (Economic Regulation of Network Service Providers) Rule, November 2012, p. 13 [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
68. AEMC, Final determination, National Electricity Amendment (Economic Regulation of Network Service Providers) Rule, November 2012, p. 212. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)