

*SP AusNet,  
Multinet  
Gas,  
Envestra,  
and APA  
Group:*  
Estimating  
the  
benchmark  
debt risk  
premium

*SP AusNet Limited*

*Multinet Gas*

*Envestra Limited*

*APA Group*

*Estimating the  
benchmark debt risk  
premium*

*March 2012*



**Mr. Thomas Hallam**  
Manager, Economic Regulation  
SP AusNet Limited  
L31, 2 Southbank Boulevard  
Southbank  
Victoria 3006

27 March 2012

Dear Thomas

***Methodology to estimate the debt risk premium***

I am pleased to present PricewaterhouseCoopers' (PwC's) report outlining the proposed methodology to calculate the debt risk premium. This report has been prepared in accordance with the Terms of Reference provided to PwC on 11 January, 2012 (reproduced at Appendix D.<sup>1</sup>

The report has been prepared in my capacity as adviser to SP AusNet, Envestra, APA Group and Multinet Gas (the Businesses) and as expert witness in this matter. I am an Economist and Principal in the PwC Economics & Policy team, and prior to this a Director at the Allen Consulting Group, where I have built a consulting practice specialising in the economic regulation of price and service. I have extensive experience across the electricity, gas, airports, rail, ports, water, telecommunications, post and banking industries in Australia and New Zealand, and have advised governments, regulators and major corporations on various issues in the capacity as an adviser and an expert witness. My detailed curriculum vitae is found below in Appendix E.

This report was produced with the assistance with the following PwC staff members:

- Matthew Santoro (Principal – Debt and Capital Markets)
- Michael Lawriwsky (Director – Economics & Policy)
- Sam Tsiaplis (Associate Director – Economics & Policy)
- Steven Hong (Senior Consultant – Economics & Policy)
- William Van (Consultant – Economics & Policy)

As a professional services firm, PwC has an ongoing relationship with each of the Businesses. This relationship includes advising on matters pertaining to the upcoming regulatory review; the subject of this report. Further details of PwC's relationship with the businesses can be provided if necessary.

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<sup>1</sup> Subsequently endorsed by APA Group.

I can confirm that, in preparing this report, I have made all the inquiries that I believe are desirable and appropriate and that no matters of significance that we regard as relevant have, to our knowledge, been withheld. I have been provided with a copy of the Federal Court's "Guidelines for Expert Witnesses in Proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia" and this report has been prepared in accordance with those Guidelines.

Should you wish to discuss this report in any way, please do not hesitate to contact myself on (03) 8603 4973.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "JJ Balchin". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Jeff Balchin  
Principal



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# *Executive summary*

## **1.1 Introduction**

SP AusNet, Multinet Gas, Envestra and APA Group (the businesses) engaged PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to provide advice on the estimation of the debt risk premium (DRP). The businesses' current regulatory control period is due to expire on 31 December 2012, and the next regulatory control period will commence on 1 January 2013 and run until 31 December 2017.

The scope of work provided to us by the businesses requested PwC to address the following matters:

- Advise whether the Bloomberg fair yield curve (extrapolated to 10 years) can be relied on to reasonably meet the legislative requirements;
- If not, propose an alternative methodology for calculating the DRP that best meets the legislative requirements; and
- Apply the Bloomberg and/or the alternative methodology during the 20 business days from 21 November to 16 December 2011.

In providing the advice, PwC was requested to take into consideration the outcomes of recent AER decisions and relevant judgements handed down by the Australian Competition Tribunal.

## **1.2 The debt risk premium – recent developments**

While the methodologies applied by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) to estimate a debt risk premium for a 10 year BBB+ bond have varied over recent years, the Bloomberg fair value curve has remained a continuous benchmark, which the Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT or the Tribunal) has endorsed due to its:<sup>2</sup>

- Widespread use by participants in the market for funds;
- Being representative of conditions in the market for funds; and
- Providing a 'good fit' to the available bond data.

### **The AER's methodologies for estimating the debt risk premium**

Prior to the global financial crisis, the estimation of the debt risk premium was based on a relatively straightforward application of the Bloomberg and/or the CBA Spectrum fair value curves, and the difference between these estimates lay in the range of 15 to 25 basis points. During the global financial crisis the differential between the estimates obtained from the Bloomberg and CBA Spectrum curves widened considerably, and the AER's methodology consisted of choosing between

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<sup>2</sup> See Application by Jemena Gas Networks (NSW) Ltd (No 5) [2011] ACompT 10 (9 June 2011), para. 86; and Application by United Energy Distribution Pty Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 1 (6 January 2012), para. 440.

the curves based on observations for as few as 5 fixed coupon bonds with terms to maturity greater than 2 years.

When the CBA Spectrum curve was withdrawn from the market in August 2010, the AER adopted the Australian Pipeline Trust (APA) bond as the counterweight to the extrapolated Bloomberg curve, and calculated a weighted average debt risk premium based on arbitrarily chosen weights. This approach was rejected by the Tribunal, after which the AER adopted a new methodology, which was to calculate the simple average of the debt risk premiums for a sample of bonds with terms to maturity between 7 and 13 years. Using its new methodology the AER estimated a debt risk premium of 319 basis points in its draft decision for Powerlink.

### **Our critique of the AER's new methodology**

In our recent report for Powerlink, we documented how the AER had misapplied its new methodology, and found that a correct application of its methodology would have derived a debt risk premium approximately 35 basis points higher. We also found that by applying an econometric analysis to a broad sample of bonds across a spectrum of terms to maturity for the AER and Powerlink averaging periods, an implied debt risk premium in the range of 378 to 380 basis points was obtained compared with the range of 391 to 408 basis points indicated by an extrapolated Bloomberg curve. We recommended that the AER adopt the upper end of the range of estimates, which is defined by the extrapolated Bloomberg curve, as the econometric evidence indicated a debt risk premium that was relatively closer to the extrapolated Bloomberg curve.<sup>3</sup>

### **The Tribunal's recent decisions**

The relative convergence of our regression-based estimates and the extrapolated Bloomberg curve comes as the Tribunal issued a number of decisions that have once again focussed attention on the extrapolated Bloomberg curve. In its decision on Jemena Gas Networks (JGN) the Tribunal found that when the Bloomberg and CBA Spectrum curves were compared against the relevant data, the former was found to provide the best fit.<sup>4</sup>

Subsequently, in its decision on a joint appeal by five Victorian electricity distribution businesses the Tribunal continued to express strong support for reliance on the Bloomberg fair value curve to estimate the debt risk premium:<sup>5</sup>

JEN submitted, and the Tribunal agrees, that it was unreasonable for the AER to reject its proposal to rely on the Bloomberg FV curve and instead to incorporate also the yield from a single bond which it had not demonstrated in any way to be a relevant benchmark or comparator bond. The AER appeared only to rely on the fact that the APT bond was appropriate because it was a 10-year bond issued by a company with infrastructure interests and that it had a lower yield than that predicted by the Bloomberg FV curve.

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<sup>3</sup> We originally reported that the econometric evidence provided an estimated debt risk premium range of 360 to 367 basis points, however we later discovered that we had inadvertently included three SP AusNet bonds, which we had held not to be appropriate due to their Singapore Government ownership. Hence, in a follow-up letter to the AER we recommended with greater conviction the adoption of a debt risk premium close to the extrapolated Bloomberg curve.

<sup>4</sup> Application by Jemena Gas Networks NSW Ltd (No 5) [2011] ACompT 10 (9 June 2011), paras. 88-90.

<sup>5</sup> Application by United Energy Distribution Pty Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 4 (6 January 2012), para. 434. This was a joint appeal including five parties: United Energy Distribution Pty Limited; SPI Electricity Pty Limited; Citipower Pty Limited and Powercor Australia Limited. Other similar Tribunal decisions at this time included: Application by Envestra Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 3 (11 January 2012); and Application by APT Allgas Energy Limited (no 2) [2012] A CompT 5 (11 January 2012)

Importantly, the Tribunal found that:<sup>6</sup>

In addition, there was evidence before the AER to show that the Bloomberg fair value curve provided an accurate representation of the yields on benchmark corporate bonds and that it was widely accepted by market practitioners.

As part of the appeals by five Victorian electricity distribution businesses, the Tribunal provided a debt risk premium of 434 basis points to Jemena Electricity Networks (based on the extrapolated Bloomberg fair value curve), with the Tribunal concluding that:<sup>7</sup>

The Tribunal emphasises that it is important for the AER to estimate the DRP and other WACC components with rigour and transparency, using comprehensive market-accepted data and offering some degree of certainty about the way in which it will apply the various estimating formulae (including the DRP formula) to a regulated company. Its estimating practices, data sources and reference periods must be well articulated, consistent and communicated to the parties and must, generally speaking, follow the precedents well-established in previous decisions made by the Tribunal in *Application by ActewAGL Distribution and Application by Jemena Gas Networks (NSW) Ltd (No5)*.

Alongside the Tribunal's endorsement of the Bloomberg fair value curve, these statements suggest that if an alternative methodology to the extrapolated Bloomberg fair value curve is proposed, it should be based on a rigorous and transparent approach, and sound reasons would need to be provided to depart from reliance on the Bloomberg curve.

Most recently Envestra Limited and APT Allgas Energy Limited sought review of the AER's approach to estimating the DRP in the 2011 and 2016 gas access arrangement decisions. In those appeals the Tribunal found that the AER's methodology of averaging the Bloomberg fair value curve with the APT bond was in error and directed the use of the Bloomberg fair value curve for estimating the debt risk premium. The Tribunal found that there was no reason shown from the available material why the use of the extrapolated Bloomberg fair value curve should not be adopted.<sup>8</sup>

### **1.3 Estimating the debt risk premium**

#### **Extrapolated Bloomberg fair value curve**

Noting the Tribunal's continuing endorsement of the extrapolated Bloomberg fair value curve, we have relied on this curve as the most comprehensive published embodiment of market opinion about the debt risk premium. In the current report we have estimated the debt risk premium for an averaging period that covers the 20 business days up to and including 16 December, 2011, which was the last date for which we had data from both AFMA and UBS, which could be cross-referenced to the Bloomberg data. For the defined averaging period the 7 year Bloomberg BBB fair value curve estimated a debt risk premium of 369 basis points.

The AER objected to our extrapolation of the Bloomberg curve in our earlier report for Powerlink, where we used an average annual increment in the debt risk premium observed among 9 (mostly 'A' credit rated) paired bonds. The basis for the AER's objection was that the terms to maturity of many of the longer bonds in

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<sup>6</sup> Application by United Energy Distribution Pty Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 4 (6 January 2012), para. 436.

<sup>7</sup> Application by United Energy Distribution Pty Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 4 (6 January 2012), para. 462.

<sup>8</sup> Application by Envestra Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 3 (11 January 2012), para. 123.



these pairs were much shorter than 10 years. We have responded to the AER's objection by limiting the sample of paired bonds to those where:

- the paired bonds were part of the wider sample that we used in our econometric analysis,
- the longer dated bond had a term to maturity that is close to 10 years,
- the shorter dated bond had a term that is closest to the shorter term that is of concern (i.e. closest to 7 years), and
- the match was between a pair of fixed coupon bonds, or a pair of floating rate bonds.

The three pairs of bonds were chosen on the basis of these selection criteria: a pair of 'A-' rated Stockland fixed coupon bonds, a pair of 'A' rated Telstra fixed coupon bonds, and a pair of 'BBB' rated Sydney Airport floating rate bonds. For the test averaging period ending 16 December, 2011, these paired bonds showed an average annual increment of 7.6 basis points.

By adding the observed 7.6 basis points annual increment to the 7 year Bloomberg BBB fair value curve estimate of 369 basis points, we derived an estimated 10 year BBB+ debt risk premium of **392 basis points**.

### **Structure of the underlying bond yield data**

While the extrapolated Bloomberg curve has provided an estimated debt risk premium of 392 basis points for our averaging period, our approach is to cross-reference this finding against an econometric analysis that incorporates data drawn from two additional bond yield data sources that are widely used by participants in the Australian bond market:

- the corporate bond yield data base of the Australian Financial Management Association (AFMA); and
- the daily term sheets issued by the investment bank UBS.

The guidance provided by the Australian Competition Tribunal has emphasised the importance of understanding the underlying bond yield data that is used in estimating the debt risk premium. Therefore, prior to undertaking our econometric analysis, the key questions we addressed were whether the yield data is:

- reflective of market opinion, and
- up-to-date (i.e. not 'stale').

It is important to first understand that the bond yields that are reported by the service providers such as Bloomberg and the Australian Financial Management Association (AFMA) and UBS are, in the vast majority of cases, not the yields that have resulted from actual trades of bonds. Rather, they are the opinions of the likely trading yield that would apply if the bonds were to be traded. On most days these yields are set to a fixed margin above a reference curve such as the Swap Curve or Asset Swap Curve (ASW), but from time to time the financial institutions that provide yield quotes to service providers such as Bloomberg and AFMA will adjust the yield margin above the reference curve based on new information. The new information could include actual trades of the bond in question or for comparable bonds, the pricing of a new issue of bonds, or specific information relating to the credit quality of the bond. Each day these financial institutions will report to the service provider a yield for each bond that they cover (we refer to

these quotes as the ‘bank feeds’), but for the vast majority of days for any single bond, this yield will be derived by adding the previous day’s margin to that day’s reference rate.<sup>9</sup>

Our sample was drawn from the population of 955 fixed coupon and floating rate corporate bonds in the Australian market and available between 8 April 2010 and 16 December 2011 within the data bases of Bloomberg, AFMA and UBS. We then filtered the sample to include only bonds that were:

- issued in Australia,
- rated BBB, BBB+ or A- by Standard & Poor’s,
- issued by a corporate (i.e. not a financial entity),
- not affected through significant ownership by a sovereign entity,
- senior debt (i.e. not subordinated),
- standard corporate bonds without special features such as call options, and
- had a term to maturity greater than one year.

We found that over the study period from 8 April 2010 and 16 December 2011 the total number of bonds with more than 7 years remaining to maturity has increased from 5 to 7, while the proportion of longer dated fixed coupon bonds increased from 0 per cent to 43 per cent. We also observed that for the full sample over the entire study period:

- UBS accounted for 44 per cent of the fixed coupon bond yield day observations and 74 per cent of the trading margin day observations for floating rate bonds;<sup>10</sup>
- Bloomberg accounted for 34 per cent of the fixed coupon bond yield day observations, and did not provide trading margins for floating rate bonds; and
- AFMA had the lowest proportion of the fixed coupon bond yield day observations (22 per cent), and only 26 per cent of the trading margin day observations for floating rate bonds.

It should also be noted that the number of bonds in our final sample varied over the 20 month study period, ranging from 66 at the start (20 business days beginning 8 April, 2010), reaching a maximum of 68 bonds and a minimum of 55 bonds. For the 20 business day averaging period to 16 December, 2011, there were 64 bonds.

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<sup>9</sup> Based on discussions with Michael Bush, Head of Fixed Interest Research, National Australia Bank, who confirmed that NAB references its bond yield margins to the Asset Swap Curve and undertakes pricing re-sets when new information such as a new bond issue is observed.

<sup>10</sup> That is, UBS accounted for 44 per cent of the total of bond yield day observations for all the bond yield days of observations from the three data sources. That is, for some bonds we found bond yield days of observations for all three data providers, for some bonds there were only two providers with observations for particular days, while for some bonds only one provider reported yields for particular days.

## Assessing the quality of the data

Our first consideration was to assess whether Bloomberg yields (BGNs) and UBS yields were reflective of the market's opinion over the study period. We did this by calculating for the entire study period the average difference (expressed in basis points) between the median of the Bloomberg bank feeds, and the yields reported by Bloomberg (i.e. Bloomberg BGNs) and UBS. The results were as follows:

- **Bloomberg BGNs** – on average over the entire study period Bloomberg BGNs were 2 basis points lower than the median of the Bloomberg bank feeds.
- **UBS yields** – on average over the entire study period UBS yields were 4 basis points lower than the median of the Bloomberg bank feeds.

As a general rule, therefore, over the whole study period, the data sources that we have relied on could be said to be reflective of market opinion, as represented by the Bloomberg bank feeds.

In order to test for potential staleness of the data, i.e. whether it can be considered to be reflective of current market conditions, we examined the daily UBS bond yield service. We could only apply this test to the bond yield opinions published by a single provider, and UBS presented by far the most comprehensive data set for this purpose. In 82 per cent of cases for the UBS data there was enough continuous daily yield data to apply the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test, which tests for whether there is a structural change in the relationship of the data with respect to time. That is, it tests whether there has been a sufficient jump in the margin at some points in time to be reasonably confident that there had been a major and sustained revision, which is consistent with UBS having revised its opinion of the pricing of the bond based on new information. We found that all 78 of the UBS bonds that could be tested had a structural break in their margins over the 6 months prior to 16 December, 2011.

Having established a degree of confidence that the yield data provided by the three service providers was reflective of the market for funds, and that UBS data (which we have found to be highly correlated with broader market opinions represented by Bloomberg feeds) is not stale or outdated, we used a simple average of the yields provided by all three services where available.<sup>11</sup> In some cases, however, this meant that the average of two, or a single provider's bond yields would be taken as the yield value. This provided the maximum possible source of data using these three services.

## The results of our econometric regression analysis

In order to undertake an econometric analysis to estimate the debt risk premium, we needed to specify the form of the relationship between debt risk premium and term to maturity, i.e. the functional form, or shape of the debt risk premium curve. At a theoretical level, Merton's 1974 theory of bond pricing proposed a humped relationship between the debt risk premium and term. However, this theory has been challenged in the literature due to a perceived inability to explain empirical findings. As noted by Covitz and Downing (2007):<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> UBS does not provide yield data to either of Bloomberg or AFMA (i.e. it is not one of the 'bank feeds' to these providers).

<sup>12</sup> Dan Covitz and Chris Downing (October, 2007), 'Liquidity or Credit Risk? The Determinants of Very Short-Term Corporate Yield Spreads', *Journal of Finance*, Vol. 62, No. 5, pp. 2303-2328.

...direct tests of Merton-style models find that the models seriously underpredict the level of long-term bond spreads.

In academic circles this tendency for Merton-style models to under-predict yield spreads has been called the 'credit puzzle'. In fixed interest markets, practitioners have observed that corporate bond spreads have almost always been upward sloping. In 1999 Helwege and Turner found that it is generally only the most credit worthy firms in a credit rating band issue long dated bonds, which can give the impression of a 'humped' relationship, but when paired bonds were tested (holding constant their credit worthiness) they found that the relationship is overwhelmingly upward sloping.<sup>13</sup> Litterman and Iben, of the Fixed Income Research Department of Goldman Sachs, noted this in their 1991 paper:<sup>14</sup>

...we find that the term structure of corporate spreads is generally upward-sloping, indicating a market perception of higher probabilities of default in the more distant future.

While it is generally accepted that the debt risk premium rises with term to maturity, a point of debate is whether the relationship is linear, or a concave function (i.e. where the premium increases with term but at a decreasing rate). Empirical research has provided evidence of both linear and non-linear relationship. To account for both linear and non-linear functional forms, we estimated regressions using various functional forms representing both shapes, and then tested for which functional form was superior. The following common non-linear functions were tested:

- quadratic
- exponential
- logarithmic, and
- power.

### **The results of our econometric regression analysis**

To test for the best functional form we applied the Schwatz Information Criterion (SIC), otherwise known as the 'Bayesian Information Criterion.' This test takes account of the number of variables a functional form requires to achieve its goodness of fit. The optimal functional form is one that fits the data best, and uses a minimum number of variables.

For each of the functional forms listed above, we undertook 411 regressions, i.e. one per day, where each day's regression was based on the debt risk premiums calculated for the previous 20 day averaging period. We found that in 340 of these regressions (82.7 per cent), the linear form had the best (lowest) SIC, while in 71 cases (17.3 per cent) the power function had the best (lowest) SIC. For the 20 day averaging period ending 16 December, 2011, the extrapolated Bloomberg curve (392 basis points), was positioned in between the linear function estimate (398 basis points) and the power function estimate (385 basis points).


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<sup>13</sup> Helwege, J. and C.M. Turner, (1999), 'The slope of the credit yield curve for speculative grade issuers, *Journal of Finance*, Vol. 54, pp.1869-1884.

<sup>14</sup> Robert Litterman and Thomas Iben (Spring, 1991), 'Corporate bond valuation and the term structure of credit spreads,' *Corporate Journal of Portfolio Management*, p.54.

These estimates are shown in Figure ES1 below. In observing this figure, it is noteworthy that of the 10 BBB+ rated bonds in the sample, only two lay below the extrapolated Bloomberg curve and linear function, and only three lay below the power curve. However, we have reservations about inferring the debt risk premium for a 10 year BBB+ bond with only 3 BBB+ bond yield observations with greater than 5 year terms to maturity. That is why we have placed greater emphasis on our broader ‘pooled’ analysis that includes bonds from the BBB, BBB+ and A- credit rating bands.

**Figure ES1 – Debt risk premium estimates for 20 business days to 16 December 2011 (basis points)**



Source: PwC’s analysis, Bloomberg, UBS, AFMA

**Conclusion on the debt risk premium**

For the 20 day averaging period to 16 December, 2011, we found a close correspondence between the extrapolated Bloomberg estimate of the 10 year BBB+ debt risk premium and our own econometric estimates (whether based on a linear or power function), which rely on a different sample of bonds, and have applied a different estimation methodology. Based on these findings, we recommend that the extrapolated Bloomberg curve be applied to estimate the debt risk premium (in this case 392 basis points).



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## **2 Scope and report outline**

### **2.1 Scope**

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) has been engaged to provide expert advice to SP AusNet, Multinet Gas, Envestra and APA Group (the businesses) in relation to the debt risk premium (DRP). The businesses' current regulatory control period is due to expire on 31 December 2012 and the next regulatory control period will commence on 1 January 2013 and run until 31 December 2017.

The businesses must submit their revised access arrangements, for the upcoming regulatory control period, to the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) by 30 March 2012. One of the considerations in preparing the respective revised access arrangements will be the proposed methodology to calculate the DRP. The legislative requirements for calculation of the DRP are contained in the National Gas Law and the National Gas Rules.

#### **Scope of works**

The scope of work requested PwC to address the following matters:

- Advise whether the Bloomberg fair yield curve (extrapolated to 10 years) can be relied on to reasonably meet the legislative requirements;
- If not, propose an alternative methodology for calculating the DRP that best meets the legislative requirements; and
- Apply the Bloomberg and/or the alternative methodology during the 20 business days from 21 November to 16 December 2011.

In providing the advice, PwC was requested to take into consideration the outcomes of recent AER decisions and relevant judgements handed down by the Australian Competition Tribunal.

### **2.2 Outline of report**

In undertaking our assessment of the above issues, we have structured the remainder of the report as follows:

- Chapter 3 provides an overview of recent regulatory decisions made by the AER in relation to the debt risk premium, how these decisions have been dealt with by the Australian Competition Tribunal in the course of appeals, with our views on the AER's most recent methodology.
- Chapter 4 presents our empirical analysis of alternative data sources for estimating the debt risk premium, establishing whether the data is reflective of the market for funds.
- Chapter 5 outlines a more sophisticated empirical analysis approach, which is used to estimate the debt risk premium for a 20 business day averaging period to 16 December, 2012.

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# 3 *Estimating the debt risk premium*

## 3.1 *Introduction*

In this chapter we examine how the debate about estimation of the debt risk premium has developed since the onset of the global financial crisis and how the AER's methodology to estimate the debt risk premium has evolved alongside the Australian Competition Tribunal's (ACT or Tribunal) decisions relating to this parameter. We then examine the AER's most recent methodology for determining the debt risk premium and summarise the critique that we provided in our recent advice to Powerlink. We conclude by describing the results obtained when we applied econometric analysis in our recent report for Powerlink.

The debt risk premium methodologies applied by the AER can be divided into the following three periods:

- Prior to August 2010 – Choosing which of the extrapolated Bloomberg and CBASpectrum curves provided the best performing fair value curve (i.e. best reflects the underlying bond yield data).
- Between September 2010 and November 2011 – Calculating the debt risk premium as the weighted average of the extrapolated Bloomberg BBB fair value curve and the yield on a single Australian Pipeline Trust (APA) bond.
- From December 2011 – Taking the simple average of a chosen sample of fixed and floating rate bonds with an average credit rating of BBB+, and an average term to maturity of approximately 10 years within a range of 5 to 15 years.

We consider the AER's approach in each of these periods in turn.

## 3.2 *Choosing between the extrapolated Bloomberg and CBASpectrum curves*

Throughout the global financial crisis, and up to September 2010, Bloomberg and CBASpectrum provided competing fair value curves. From the beginning of the global financial crisis late in 2008, CBASpectrum's fair value curve began to diverge from Bloomberg's, rising well above the latter, which stayed relatively flat in conditions of unprecedented financial markets risk. By the end of 2009 the Bloomberg curve and the CBASpectrum curve had converged. As Bloomberg had ceased providing yield estimates beyond 7 years from 18 August 2009, the Tribunal endorsed an extrapolation of the Bloomberg BBB curve by adding on the change in the Bloomberg AAA curve between 7 and 10 years.

ActewAGL proposed an averaging of the extrapolated Bloomberg and CBASpectrum curves. The AER rejected this and used a sample of bonds to test which of the curves was most accurate. The AER's sample of bonds included those with a term to maturity of more than 2 years, and excluded bonds with the following characteristics:

- not rated BBB+ by Standard & Poor's,

- do not have a yield estimate from all of CBASpectrum, Bloomberg and UBS, and
- excluded floating rate bonds, bonds not issued in Australia, and bonds issued in Australia by a foreign business.

After excluding a high yield DBCT bond from the sample, this left 5 bonds. The AER then compared to the predicted Bloomberg and CBASpectrum fair value curves to the yield on these bonds and selected the curve that had the lowest weighted sum of squared errors (WSSE). Applying its methodology, the AER found that the CBASpectrum curve lay closer to the 5 observed bond yields.

In its decision on Actew AGL in September 2010, the Tribunal upheld Actew AGL's proposal to average the Bloomberg and CBASpectrum curves and suggested that the AER undertake the following process:<sup>15</sup>

- a) assemble a representative population of observed yields of sufficient number and term to maturity. It is difficult for the Tribunal to provide any hard and fast rule for determining whether a population is 'representative'. A representative population would contain many bonds after the point at which the bonds diverge. It should contain bonds with a term to maturity close to 10 years. The AER should include floating rate bonds and/or bonds with observations available from one or two sources in the population unless there is good reason to exclude them. The inclusion of these bonds may raise questions which the AER will need to address in the future, such as the weighting that should be given to them;
- b) only exclude bonds where there are sufficient qualitative reasons to consider that they are not correctly classed as being part of the relevant population;
- c) once a representative set of bonds has been chosen and refined in this way, select the fair value curve that most closely corresponds to the relevant set;
- d) use any other information, such as observed yields on other rated bonds, to check that the selected fair value curve remains likely to provide the best estimate.

While not wishing to discourage the AER from investigating other ways to estimate the debt risk premium, the Tribunal concluded that it was 'appropriate to average the yields provided by each curve, so long as the published curves are widely used and market respected.'<sup>16</sup> The Tribunal ordered that the average of CBA Spectrum's BBB+ and Bloomberg's extrapolated BBB fair value curves be calculated, consistent with ActewAGL's proposal, which raised the debt margin by 53 basis points to 3.89 per cent.<sup>17</sup>

### ***3.3 Averaging the Bloomberg curve and the APA bond***

CBASpectrum discontinued publication of its fair value curve from mid-August, 2010. It cited CBASpectrum's poor performance, increasing disparity of the data, and changing historical relationships due to the global financial crisis as the reasons for discontinuance.<sup>18</sup> This caused the AER to change its approach to debt premium estimation. The Australian Pipeline Trust (APA) had recently issued a 10 year BBB rated bond. The AER concluded that the debt risk premium should be calculated as a weighted average of the yield on the APA bond and the extrapolated

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<sup>15</sup> Application by ActewAGL Distribution [2010] ACompT4, para.77.

<sup>16</sup> Application by ActewAGL Distribution [2010] ACompT4, para.78.

<sup>17</sup> Application by ActewAGL Distribution [2010] ACompT 4

<sup>18</sup> From CBASpectrum website, accessed 8 September, 2010.

Bloomberg curve, albeit with the weights being determined by judgement, and varying between decisions. This method was appealed against to the Tribunal.

In 2010, the Victorian electricity distributors applied the extrapolated Bloomberg BBB fair value curve. Rejecting this, the AER proposed the weighted average of the yield of the Australian Pipeline Trust bond (25 percent), and the extrapolated Bloomberg BBB fair value curve (75 percent), resulting in margins of 374 basis points for Citipower, Powercor and United Energy, 405 basis points for SP Ausnet and 370 basis points for Jemena Electricity networks.<sup>19</sup> A subsequent appeal by Jemena, for technical errors in the AER's application of the methodology, resulted in its debt margin being raised further.

The Tribunal has provided strong endorsement to the Bloomberg fair value curve in several of its decisions. In Jemena's appeal it was noted that:<sup>20</sup>

The Tribunal has previously endorsed the Bloomberg fair value (FV) curve in Application by Jemena Gas Networks (NSW) Ltd (No 5) (2011) ATPR 42-360 as being the suitable benchmark for estimating the DRP in Australia. A major reason for this is that this curve appears to be accepted by the market as providing accurate estimates of the benchmark corporate bond rate.

The Tribunal expressed strong support for the businesses to propose reliance on the Bloomberg fair value curve to estimate the debt risk premium:<sup>21</sup>

JEN submitted, and the Tribunal agrees, that it was unreasonable for the AER to reject its proposal to rely on the Bloomberg FV curve and instead to incorporate also the yield from a single bond which it had not demonstrated in any way to be a relevant benchmark or comparator bond. The AER appeared only to rely on the fact that the APT bond was appropriate because it was a 10-year bond issued by a company with infrastructure interests and that it had a lower yield than that predicted by the Bloomberg FV curve.

Furthermore, the Tribunal found that:<sup>22</sup>

In addition, there was evidence before the AER to show that the Bloomberg fair value curve provided an accurate representation of the yields on benchmark corporate bonds and that it was widely accepted by market practitioners.

The Tribunal provided Jemena with a debt risk premium of 434 basis points (based on the extrapolated Bloomberg fair value curve), with the Tribunal concluding that:<sup>23</sup>

The Tribunal emphasises that it is important for the AER to estimate the DRP and other WACC components with rigour and transparency, using comprehensive market-accepted data and offering some degree of certainty about the way in which it will apply the various estimating formulae (including the DRP formula) to a regulated company. Its estimating practices, data sources and reference periods must be well articulated, consistent and communicated to the parties and must, generally speaking, follow the precedents well-established in previous decisions made by the Tribunal in *Application by ActewAGL Distribution and Application by Jemena Gas Networks (NSW) Ltd (No5)*.

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<sup>19</sup> AER (October, 2010), *Final Decision – Victorian electricity distribution network providers, Distribution determination, 2011-2015*.

<sup>20</sup> Application by United Energy Distribution Pty Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 4 (6 January 2012), para. 400.

<sup>21</sup> Application by United Energy Distribution Pty Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 4 (6 January 2012), para. 434.

<sup>22</sup> Application by United Energy Distribution Pty Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 4 (6 January 2012), para. 436.

<sup>23</sup> Application by United Energy Distribution Pty Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 4 (6 January 2012), para. 461.

Envestra proposed a debt risk premium based on the extrapolated Bloomberg fair value curve. Rejecting this, the AER applied equal weightings to the APT bond, and an extrapolated Bloomberg BBB fair value curve, resulting in a debt margin of 393 basis points. This was appealed by Envestra and APT Allgas.<sup>24</sup> While the Tribunal acknowledged that it is for the AER to determine whether to rely on the Bloomberg curve, the Tribunal stated that sound reasons would need to be provided for the AER to depart from its previous practice of accepting the Bloomberg fair value curve:<sup>25</sup>

The Tribunal, of course, accepts that in the first instance it is for the AER to determine whether to rely upon the Bloomberg curve, or to accept the extrapolation of that curve in the manner done in the past. It is not obliged to do so, although there were sound reasons to depart from that practice. For the future, that is a matter for the AER.

While the Tribunal also indicated that it is open for the AER to adopt a different methodology, this process would need to consider:<sup>26</sup>

...the proper composition of the comparison sample of bonds, the methodology for deciding on the appropriate sample of bonds and the relevance of these bonds to its task should be undertaken by the AER on consultation with interested parties across the spectrum of entities in the industries it regulates, consumers of their services and other interested parties.

The AER had placed considerable reliance on the Bloomberg curve in the past. As noted by the Tribunal in its Envestra decision:<sup>27</sup>

There had been identified to the AER a range of other bonds, some of which lay below the EBV and some above the EBV. Had the AER considered them, its caution about the limited use of the EBV may have been resolved. The hybrid position emerges from the fact that the AER nevertheless decided to rely on the EBV as one of the two significant inputs into its weighting process. It must have regarded the EBV as relevant and meaningful.

In its Envestra decision, the Tribunal concluded the following:<sup>28</sup>

Envestra provided to the AER strong evidence in support of the EBV, in particular by its response to the May 23 letter. The view of Dr Hird of CEG was that that material did not demonstrate any basis for the substitution of an alternative estimate for the EBV. As noted, the AER itself accepted the relevance of the EBV. Whilst the Tribunal accepts that the AER properly considered the reliability of the EBV, it has reached the view on the available material that there is no reason shown from the available material why the use of the EBV should not be adopted in this particular matter. There is no viable alternative methodology at present, other than making a decision on all the material. The observations of the Tribunal in ActewAGL at [74]-[78] suggest that, on the existing material, it is appropriate to vary the decision in the manner indicated.

In light of these Tribunal decisions, it became untenable for the AER's to continue advocating its hybrid approach of using a weighted average of the APA bond and the Bloomberg curve.

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<sup>24</sup> Application by Envestra Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 4 (11 January 2012), and Application by APT Allgas Energy Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 4 (11 January 2012).

<sup>25</sup> Application by Envestra Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 4 (11 January 2012), para. 120.

<sup>26</sup> Application by Envestra Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 4 (11 January 2012), para. 121.

<sup>27</sup> Application by Envestra Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 4 (11 January 2012), para. 103.

<sup>28</sup> Application by Envestra Limited (No 2) [2012] ACompT 3 (11 January 2012), para. 123.

## **3.4 A simple average of debt risk premiums**

### **3.4.1 The AER's revised methodology**

Even before the Tribunal published its findings on the Envestra and Jemena appeal decisions referenced above, the AER had revised its approach to estimating the debt risk premium. The AER's new approach was applied in its recent draft decisions relating to Powerlink's and Aurora Energy's 2012-13 to 2016-17 revenue determinations.<sup>29</sup> In these recent draft decisions, the AER's new methodology does not make use of the Bloomberg fair value curve as it had in the past. Instead, the AER's new methodology estimates the debt risk premium for a BBB+ rated 10 year bond by calculating a simple average of the debt risk premiums for bonds with a term to maturity between 7 and 13 years with the following characteristics:

- Australian issuance,
- rated BBB, BBB+ or A- by S&P,
- 7 to 13 year term,
- yield data observed by UBS or Bloomberg during the draft decision averaging period,
- fixed rate or floating rate converted reliably to a fixed rate equivalent,
- standard bonds (not callable or subordinated),
- no strong qualitative grounds that the bond is 'unrepresentative of a benchmark 10 year, BBB+ rated Australian corporate bond' (i.e. consistent with NER 6A.6.2e), and
- annualise yields and convert to spreads over CGS.

For the bonds in the sample, the AER's methodology is to take an average of the UBS yield and the Bloomberg value where both are available, or the yield provided by one supplier otherwise. For Bloomberg, the BGN value is used where available, with the BVAL used otherwise.<sup>30</sup>

In its draft decision for Powerlink, the AER concluded that a debt risk premium of 319 basis points was appropriate.

### **3.4.2 Comments on the AER's methodology and its application to Powerlink**

Powerlink engaged us to provide advice on the debt risk premium in the context of the AER's draft decision on Powerlink's revenue proposal 2012-13 to 2016-17. Our final report (our report) titled, 'Powerlink: Debt risk premium and equity raising

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<sup>29</sup> AER (November, 2011), *Draft decision, Powerlink Transmission determination, 2012-13 to 2016-17*; and AER (November, 2011), *Draft Distribution Determination, Aurora Energy Pty Ltd 2012-13 to 2016-17*.

<sup>30</sup> The Bloomberg BGN value is yield that is derived on the basis of the individual securities industry feeds to Bloomberg (i.e. a combination of the contributor opinions about the yield), while the BVAL value is Bloomberg's opinion of the yield.

costs', which was dated 16 January, 2012, identified a number of flaws in the AER's new methodology.<sup>31</sup>

First, by completely setting aside the Bloomberg fair value curve the AER is ignoring a respected source of market data. Secondly, we considered that the AER had misapplied its own approach in a number of ways. Thirdly, we also considered that if direct regard was going to be had to the market evidence, more sophisticated techniques should be applied. These concerns are outlined in more detail below.

### **The Bloomberg fair value curve should not be set aside**

The AER decided in Powerlink to implement an approach of directly interpreting available market data. We are of the view that this approach should not be applied without reference to the Bloomberg fair value curve, and a more sophisticated analysis of the underlying bond yield data (i.e. econometric analysis).

Bloomberg applies a series of tests in screening its data to ensure a robust and quality sample is available. Due to this approach, a number of bonds have been set aside by Bloomberg. The exclusion of this data has led the AER to form the opinion that Bloomberg has ignored information relevant to the AER's consideration. We are of the view that Bloomberg's rejection of many data points that have been used by the AER should have raised questions in the AER's mind about whether it is appropriate to include these bonds in its sample.

While the Bloomberg fair value curve has occasionally departed from providing debt risk premium information that is reflective of the current market, setting it aside completely overstates this issue given the advantages associated with the continued use of the Bloomberg fair value curve, including:

- the controls in place to ensure that data is of an acceptable quality,
- it is an observable benchmark which is simple to apply in practice, and
- repeated statements by the Australian Competition Tribunal that the Bloomberg fair value curve is an appropriate benchmark for estimating the debt risk premium, as the AER has applied it in the past, and it appears to be widely used and respected in the market.

### **Application of the AER's methodology to directly interpret market data**

We note the AER's new debt risk premium methodology is highly dependent on the quality of bonds available in the market at the time it undertakes its analysis. While Bloomberg's methodology filters the data and the outcome is reasonably predictable, regulated businesses have no certainty over the final application of the AER's approach and the nature of the bonds that would be included.

The AER's new methodology has the potential to introduce new information into the regulatory process without allowing the regulated business an opportunity to comment on its appropriateness due to the timing issues in the regulatory process. That is, the regulatory process allows businesses to have a final opportunity to comment on the WACC parameters 4 to 5 months prior to the AER handing down its determination, and while businesses can have reasonable confidence in a process under which, at the time of its final determination, the AER would apply a debt risk premium methodology based on the final averaging period, such confidence cannot be applied to the AER's methodology itself. With the AER's

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<sup>31</sup> PricewaterhouseCoopers (16 January, 2012), *Powerlink: Debt risk premium and equity raising costs*.

methodology it is possible that new bonds will have been issued in the market after the draft review and a business's response, and that these bonds will be included in the AER's sample and have a material impact on the result, without providing the business with any opportunity to respond.

In our Powerlink report we noted that the AER's adviser, Oakvale Capital had commented on the inappropriateness of the SPAusNet bonds as their yields are lower due to the fact that 'the risk is in fact the risk of the Government of Singapore.'<sup>32</sup>

The key feature supporting the bond was the parental support of the issuer's owners and the link to the Government of Singapore.

After removing the foreign issue Coca Cola bond, which the AER had erroneously included, removing SPAusNet's bonds due to the credit enhancement afforded by the Singapore Government's ownership,<sup>33</sup> and extending the range of terms to maturity considered from 7 to 13 years to 5 to 15 years, we concluded that this methodology estimated debt risk premiums in the range of 351 to 356 basis points for Powerlink's averaging period.

### **3.5 Applying more sophisticated econometric techniques**

#### **The extrapolated Bloomberg fair value curve**

In our recent report for Powerlink, we adopted the 7 year Bloomberg fair value curve as our key reference point, and extrapolated to 10 years using the average annual increment in the debt risk premium observed for two higher (A and A-) rated paired bonds where the longer dated bond had a term to maturity close to 10 years. This approach provided a debt risk premium estimate of 408 basis points (391 basis points) using the AER's draft decision (Powerlink's) averaging period.<sup>34</sup>

#### **Our econometric approach**

We also applied econometric techniques to estimate the BBB+ fair value curve. We identified a sample of 68 bonds across the three credit rating bands of BBB, BBB+ and A- (with an average rating close to BBB+), with terms to maturity greater than 1 year. Linear and quadratic (i.e. curvilinear) functional forms were applied, and the latter was found to provide a superior fit to the data.

Our quadratic regression equations predicted a 10 year BBB+ debt risk premium of 378 basis points (380 basis points) using the AER's draft decision (Powerlink's) averaging period. Our estimates using econometrics were higher than those we obtained by correctly applying the AER's methodology of taking a simple average of debt risk premiums. Indeed, our econometric estimates were found to be closer to the extrapolated Bloomberg debt risk premium (391 basis points) than to the 351 to 356 basis points estimated using the AER's methodology adjusted for the errors that we identified in it. We concluded that a debt risk premium at the top of the

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<sup>32</sup> Oakvale Capital, Report on the cost of debt during the averaging period: *The impact of callable bonds*, February, 2011, p. 24

<sup>33</sup> See Oakvale Capital (February, 2011), *Report on the cost of debt during the averaging period: The impact of callable bonds*, p.25.

<sup>34</sup> The AER's averaging period extended over the 40 business days ending 14 October, 2011, while Powerlink's averaging period was the 40 business days ending 9 December, 2011.



range is appropriate, as two of the three methodologies would have been indicating a debt risk premium in the range of 380 to 391 basis points.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> We originally reported that the econometric evidence provided an estimated debt risk premium range of 360 to 367 basis points, however we later discovered that we had inadvertently included three SP AusNet bonds, which we had held not to be appropriate due to their Singapore Government ownership. Hence, in a follow-up letter to the AER we recommended application of a debt risk premium close to the extrapolated Bloomberg curve estimate. We also found that by removing the three SPAusNet bonds, the goodness of fit of the estimate (adjusted R-squared) was improved.

# ***4 Establishing reliable data sources to estimate the debt risk premium***

## ***4.1 Introduction***

The strength of any data analysis is contingent upon the quality of the underlying data. For the purposes of our analysis, ‘quality’ refers to the extent to which the data is reflective of the price or yield at which a bond would trade at any point in time, and therefore about the debt risk premium. We have obtained bond yield data from three providers: Bloomberg, the Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA), and UBS. This section sets out the tests we have performed on this data to assess its quality.

To address this issue, in this chapter we:

- describe the process by which published bond yields are determined,
- assemble a representative sample of bond yields by applying a number of filters, and
- report the results of a number of tests of the quality of the data.

## ***4.2 How published bond yields are determined in the market***

In the vast majority of cases the yields supplied by market providers like Bloomberg and UBS do not represent trades of bonds. Instead, they may be characterised as the opinions of financial institutions engaged in bond market issue and trading. These opinions are not adjusted via executive decision making on a daily basis. Instead, daily bond yields are determined by pegging a bond’s yield to a benchmark reference rate, which is most commonly the Bank Bill Swap Rate. For example, the yield of a particular bond may be set at a margin of 120 basis points to the benchmark reference rate.

At various times, which could be weeks or months apart, executives of the price making institution will consider whether specific information relating to the bond in question justifies a yield revision. This decision will be made on the basis of recent market activity, including:

- any actual trades in the bonds or comparable bonds,
- the pricing of newly issued bonds,
- comparative yields for the bond in question,
- other comparable bonds that are being priced by other institutions (for example, through benchmarking syndicates, AFMA, Bloomberg or the circulation of the institutions’ daily ‘rate sheets’), and

- any other specific information that has come to hand about the relative risk characteristics of the bond in question.

Since most bonds will have been issued some years previously, and many would have been infrequently or possibly never traded, it is possible that for some bonds the setting of the margin relative to the benchmark will not be updated for a long period. In this case the observed margin can be said to be 'stale', that is, not reflective of the current market for funds. Testing for the extent to which the bond yield data may be stale, and therefore not market reflective, is one of the key objectives of the data quality analysis undertaken in this chapter.

### **4.3 Assembling a representative sample**

Our initial task was to assemble a sample of observed bond yields. In the first instance this required a decision about the source of the information.

As discussed above, we obtained bond yield data from three providers: Bloomberg, AFMA, and UBS. Before applying tests to the data, it is important to understand the specific characteristics of these three major bond data providers, and how they derive the daily bond yields that they supply.

#### **Bloomberg**

Bloomberg is the world's largest supplier of financial market information, with over 300,000 subscribers around the world receiving data from terminals on a daily basis. Bloomberg currently publishes a number of fair value curves, including a 7 year curve for the BBB credit rating band. Bloomberg receives daily 'feeds' of bond yields from a number of Australian banks and other financial institutions.<sup>36</sup> Bloomberg's 'Bloomberg Generic Price' (also known as the BGN) is its 'market consensus view' of the yields supplied to it. While Bloomberg does not reveal the process by which it derives the consensus number, it appears that the number is not a mechanical formula, and involves analyst judgement. Bloomberg also provides its own estimate of the yield from its Bloomberg Valuation Service, which is known as the BVAL yield. In this report we have focussed on the BGNs, which are represented as being reflective of the market's opinion of the bonds.

We collected each BGN yield observation and have accessed the individual bank 'feeds' that Bloomberg used in deciding on that BGN yield.

#### **AFMA**

AFMA is a highly regarded and representative body in the Australian financial market. In February, 2011, the AER's own adviser, Oakvale Capital, has noted that 'AFMA pricing sources are increasingly used by market practitioners'.<sup>37</sup> Unlike Bloomberg, AFMA's criteria for selection, and the method applied in deriving its yields, are available on its website.<sup>38</sup> In order to be included the bonds must be Australian denominated and:

- They are issued by a bank, corporate or other non-government entity, acceptable to the AFMA Debt Capital Markets Committee,
- The Issue has a minimum face value greater than AUD 100 million outstanding,

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<sup>36</sup> Bloomberg obtains 'feeds' from between 2 and generally less than 5 or 6 bond yield suppliers on a daily basis.

<sup>37</sup> Oakvale Capital (February, 2011), *Report on the cost of debt during the averaging period: The impact of callable bonds*, p.25.

<sup>38</sup> <http://www.afmadata.com.au/markets/bonds2.asp>

- The Issue has more than twelve (12) months to run to maturity at time of issue, and
- At least three Contributing Price Makers are willing to provide regular Reference Rates.

The current contributing AFMA price makers are 11 significant Australian financial institutions.<sup>39</sup> AFMA publishes a daily yield for each bond that it covers, and the yield estimate is derived by a process that:

- calculates the standard deviation of the distribution of the mid yields provided by contribution financial institutions,
- removes ‘outlier’ yield observations that are more than  $\pm 1$  standard deviations away from the mean, and
- calculates the average yield based on the sample of bond yields that remain after removing the outliers.<sup>40</sup>

While providing the daily average yield for each bond covered by its service, AFMA does not provide the individual bond yields of its contributing price making institutions. However, since we know the process applied by AFMA to estimate the average yields, we can have some confidence that it reflects the average opinion of its contributing institutions.

### **UBS**

Bond yields supplied by UBS represent its own opinion about the end of day yield. These are yields are provided by UBS on a daily basis and disseminated electronically to its clients. Unlike the Bloomberg and AFMA data sources, which represent the average of the opinions of several institutions, the UBS service is the opinion of one institution. However, we would expect that fixed interest market analysts at UBS, like those at Bloomberg, take account of other comparable bond data sources when making their own decisions about yields.

### ***Bond selection criteria***

We have used the three data sources described above for our bond yields because we consider that yields based on multiple sources will result in a data base that is more reflective of the market for funds. The bond yields that we apply in our analysis are based on, where available, the average of the yields reported by the three data sources listed above<sup>41</sup>.

Our initial sample was based on the population of fixed and floating corporate bonds available between 8<sup>th</sup> April 2010 and 16 December 2011. This 20 month period was defined by the longest period over which we had access to daily yield

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<sup>39</sup> AFMA’s current list of contributors is: Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Limited; Citigroup Global Markets, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Deutsche Bank AG, Macquarie Bank Limited, National Australia Bank Limited, Royal Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Scotland, Societe Generale, Australia, TD Securities, and Westpac Banking Corporation.

<sup>40</sup> <http://www.afmadata.com.au/markets/bonds2.asp>, accessed 13/02/2011

<sup>41</sup> It is worthwhile noting that we have expanded upon the traditionally used data sources, being Bloomberg and UBS, to also include AFMA data. We consider AFMA is a reputable provider of bond yields and the inclusion of its data is likely to increase the overall accuracy of bond yield estimates.

observations from all three services.<sup>42</sup> From the initial sample of bonds, we filtered the data to only include corporate bonds with the following characteristics:

- Australian issuance,
- credit rating of either BBB, BBB+ or A- by Standard and Poors,
- the issuing entity is not a financial entity,
- the corporate bond is senior (i.e. not subordinated),
- standard corporate bonds without special features such as call options attached, and
- a term to maturity greater than one year.

The above criteria were applied with an aim of estimating a debt risk premium curve for Australian issued BBB+ rated corporate bonds with a range of terms to maturity including 10 years. We have included bonds with credit ratings half a notch higher and half a notch lower than BBB+ (i.e. to cover the range BBB to A-) in order to increase the sample of bonds analysed.

Bonds that had less than one year to maturity were eliminated. The yields on bonds with less than a year to maturity remaining are influenced by monetary policy, and their inclusion would be likely to distort the shape of the debt risk premium curve. We understand from discussion with market price makers that bonds with less than a year to maturity are ignored when the yield relativities of bonds with longer terms to maturity are being considered.

Finally, we have eliminated the bonds that were issued by SP AusNet. These bond are distinguished from the others due to a majority holding by Temasek, which is the investment arm of the Singapore Government. When assessing this bond the AER's adviser, Oakvale Capital, noted that a key issue impacting the yield of these bonds is that 'the risk is in fact the risk of the Government of Singapore.'<sup>43</sup>

The key feature supporting the bond was the parental support of the issuer's owners and the link to the Government of Singapore.

### ***Description of the bond sample***

Our initial sample comprised 955 bonds which was the population of bonds available from the three sources over our study period.<sup>44</sup> Filtering this raw sample based on the criteria outlined above resulted in a sample of 92 bonds, which included 48 fixed coupon bonds, and 44 floating coupon bonds<sup>45</sup>. This reduced sample was subjected to further analysis, for which the key findings are presented below.

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<sup>42</sup> The study period was constrained by the first date from which we had UBS daily term sheets (4 April, 2010) and the last day for which we had AFMA daily yield data (18 November, 2011).

<sup>43</sup> Oakvale Capital, Report on the cost of debt during the averaging period: *The impact of callable bonds*, February, 2011, p. 24

<sup>44</sup> This was the total number of bonds that were included in the data base of one or more of the yield providers (i.e. Bloomberg, AFMA and UBS).

<sup>45</sup> The trading margins reported by floating coupon bonds were converted to yield to maturity estimates for equivalent fixed coupon bonds using an appropriate interest rate swap yield.

### The relative number of bonds covered by the yield providers


Figure 1 below shows that the number of daily yield observations varied significantly between the three data sources. The vertical axis, denotes ‘observations’, which is the total number of bond yield days that were available in the data base. The main reasons for variations in the number of daily bond yield observations are:

- Gaps in coverage – the bond yield providers do not cover the same group of bonds; and
- Gaps in the available days of observations– even if two bond yield providers had the same sample of bonds, there could be differences in the number of days that yields are available for these bonds.

For the population of fixed coupon bonds approximately 44 per cent of the total daily bond yield observations came from UBS, compared with 34 per cent coming from Bloomberg, and 22 per cent coming from AFMA. For the population of floating coupon rate bonds (and associated trading margins), approximately 74 per cent of daily bond yield observations came from UBS, compared with only 26 per cent coming from AFMA. Bloomberg provides no trading margin data for floating rate bonds. The total data set for the sample of 92 bonds comprised close to 55,000 daily bond yield observations.

Since there is an unequal distribution of daily bond yield observations from the three data sources, our approach of taking the average of the three sources (if available), means that many of the yields often represented an average of the yields of two service providers, and sometimes only one service provider (often UBS) . For floating coupon bonds, in the vast majority of cases the yields was the UBS yield.

**Figure 1 –Proportion of daily bond yield observations from each data source (Fixed and floating coupon bonds)**




Source: Bloomberg, UBS, AFMA

### Composition of bonds greater than seven years to maturity

We found that while the total number of long term bonds decreased over the 20 month study period, at the end of the period there were relatively more fixed coupon bonds than previously.

**Figure 2 –Number of fixed and floating coupon bonds with greater than 7 years to maturity**



Source: Bloomberg, UBS, PwC

The estimation of a 10 year term for the debt risk premium will be heavily influenced by the number of bonds that exceed a 7 year term to maturity.<sup>46</sup> The quality of data for bonds which fall into this category will also be relevant. We found that the number of bonds with term greater than 7 years increased from 5 to 7. Figure 2 shows how the number of bonds with a term greater than 7 years has changed over time. We note that during the study period the number of fixed coupon bonds with greater than 7 years to maturity increased from zero to 3, while the number of floating coupon bonds reduced from 5 to 4.

**Coverage of bonds with greater than 5 years to maturity**


For longer term bonds,<sup>47</sup> and particularly for new issuances, only UBS and Bloomberg produce yields. Table 1 and 2 below show which provider’s yields are available for dates within the study period (with UBS, AFMA and Bloomberg data availability denoted as maroon, red and grey bars or dots respectively). From an inspection of these tables, it is apparent that AFMA has not produced bond yield observations for a majority of the long term bonds.

Of particular note is the fact that as at December 2011, AFMA did not provide bond yield observations for any bonds issued after mid 2011. It is possible that this is an outcome of AFMA’s cautious approach to the inclusion of bonds in its coverage portfolio based on the inclusion criteria outlined above.

<sup>46</sup> The starting date for the calculation of term to maturity was 8/4/2010 because this is the first date of our observation period.


<sup>47</sup> For the purposes of the analysis in this chapter, a long term bond is defined as a bond with a term to maturity greater than 5 years from 8 April 2010.

**Table 1 – Bond yield observations for long term bonds (Fixed coupon bonds)**





**Table 2 – Bond yield observations for long term bonds (Floating coupon bonds)**



#### 4.4 Assessing the quality of the data

Having selected the core sample of bonds, we considered whether the bond yields are reflective of the current market for funds. We also addressed the question of whether the yields (i.e. market opinions) derived from the data providers might be ‘stale’, in the sense that they represent outdated market information. Stale bond yields (i.e. out of date yields) are of concern because they are not representative of the most up to date market opinion and would bias the estimated debt risk premium in unknown ways.

##### 4.4.1 Does the yield data reflect market opinion?

By definition, AFMA yields are representative of the market for funds. As discussed above, AFMA undertakes a process which produces approximately an average bank feed estimate based on 11 bank feed contributors.

As discussed above, Bloomberg receives bond yields from banks (bank feeds) on a daily basis, which they convert into yields that are presented as reflecting the market’s consensus. UBS yields are the opinion of one bank, and since it provides the most comprehensive coverage of bond yields, these yields will be an important determinant of an average bond yield calculated by reference to three providers. Therefore, it is important to assess to what extent Bloomberg BGNs and UBS yields

are reflective of the market’s opinion. We did this by calculating for the entire study period the average difference (expressed in basis points) between the median of the Bloomberg bank feeds, and the yields reported by Bloomberg (i.e. Bloomberg BGNs) and UBS.<sup>48</sup> The results were as follows:

- **Bloomberg BGNs** – on average over the entire study period Bloomberg BGNs were 2 basis points lower than the median of the Bloomberg bank feeds.
- **UBS yields** – on average over the entire study period UBS yields were 4 basis points lower than the median of the Bloomberg bank feeds.


As a general rule, therefore, over the whole study period, the data sources that we have relied on, could be said to be reflective of market opinion, as represented by the Bloomberg bank feeds.

#### 4.4.2 Testing for staleness of bond yields

Since reported bank feeds and UBS yields are typically set to follow a benchmark curve, it is possible that some of the yields are ‘stale’ (i.e. out of date) if they have not been updated for a considerable period of time.

If the bank’s opinion of a bond yield has been updated for new information, we would expect to see an immediate and material shift in the yield. An example is provided in Figure 3 below, which shows how the debt risk premiums for two bonds, Goodman Australian Industrial Fund, and Sydney Airport, appeared to track the same reference curve over a period extending from the start of June 2011 to November 2011. On 2 November 2011, however, there was a significant uplift in the UBS debt risk premium for the Goodman Australian Industrial Fund, which persisted in the period following the shift. This re-pricing of the bond relative to the Sydney Airport bond is likely to have occurred as a result of a change in UBS’s assessment of the bond. We define such a shift as a ‘structural break’, which we distinguish from a temporary shift, since the latter may merely reflect outlier observations that are less likely to be due to a re-pricing of the bond.

**Figure 3 – Example of an update in debt risk premium (UBS data)**



Source: PwC

<sup>48</sup> This approach is similar to the analysis of Bloomberg BGN bond yields that we undertook in November, 2009. See PwC (November, 2009), *Victorian Distribution Businesses – Methodology to Estimate the Debt Risk Premium*. One of the tests that was applied in that study looked at the degree to which Bloomberg’s BGN’s reflected the bank feeds that were being provided to it. In the present study we have expressed this difference relative to the median of bank feeds (which is likely to be a good reflection of the market’s opinion as it minimises the influence of outliers). We have also elected to express the differential in terms of basis points rather than percentage points, as this can be related more easily to the scale of the BGN, which can also be expressed in terms of basis points.

As we are interested in identifying structural breaks in the individual yields over time, we applied the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test. The premise of the test is to analyse whether, in a particular set of historical time series data, there has been a structural change in the relationship of the data with respect to time.<sup>49</sup> That is, we wish to test whether UBS appears to update the prices and yields of the bonds it covers (and therefore their debt risk premiums) recently enough for the yields (and debt risk premiums) to be considered representative of the current market – that is, not stale.

We applied the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test to the UBS data only. We did not consider it appropriate to apply the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test to the AFMA data, as this service does not provide individual bank feeds, but rather the mean yield, which through its process of calculation (i.e. eliminating bank feed observations greater than two standard deviations from the average), will be close to the median of market opinion. Technically, we could have applied the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test to all of the Bloomberg bank feed data, however, these bank feeds were not individually as comprehensive as the UBS data. In addition, there would remain the question of how Bloomberg incorporates these updates into its own BGN yields.

For the purpose of identifying stale yield data we have defined ‘recent’ to be a period of six months up to the latest bond yield date (16 December 2011). It was felt that a shorter period would set an unrealistic target for a reassessment of all the bonds in the UBS data base. It was felt that a longer period, such as a year, would be too long to consider those opinions to be reflective of the current market.

### ***Results of applying the staleness test to UBS yield data***


Applying our bond staleness test, we found no reason to exclude any UBS data.

From the 92 series of UBS bond data, we found that 78 (82 per cent) could be tested. The Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test could only be applied if there are a sufficient number of consecutive daily observations. From the total sample of 92 series of data, we found that 14 could not be tested because the bond either matured before the six month period, or was recently issued, and therefore did not have enough observations for testing. The yields of newly issued bonds could not be considered to be stale.

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<sup>49</sup> The Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint Test tests for one or more unknown structural breakpoints in a sample for a specified equation. The idea behind the Quandt-Andrews test is that a single Chow Breakpoint Test is performed at every observation between two dates, or observations. The test statistics from these Chow tests (Likelihood ratio and Wald F statistic) are then summarised into one test statistic for a test against the null hypothesis of no breakpoints between two dates. For further explanation see: Donald W. K. Andrews, '(July, 1993), Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change With Unknown Change Point', *Econometrica*, Vol. 61, No. 4 pp. 821-856.

**Figure 4 – Relative staleness of bond yields - UBS data yet to pass Quandt Andrews breakpoint test (6 months of data to 16/12/2011)**



Source UBS data and PwC analysis

As displayed in Figure 4, for the data we could test, we did not find evidence of stale bond data. For each one of the 78 bond series tested, we found evidence of a structural break within the last six months, which demonstrates the likelihood that the bond yields were recently updated. The chart shows the proportion of the bonds that had not experienced structural breaks by a certain date. We found that a disproportionate number of breaks occurred over the period of August to September 2011, indicating that the vast majority of the bonds (approximately 70 per cent) had been re-assessed by UBS in the 4 month period prior to 16 December, 2011, and 100 per cent had been re-assessed in the 6 month period prior to 16 December, 2011. Figures 6 and 7 below show that during August-September 2011 the debt risk premium turned up, with higher debt risk premiums reflecting mounting European sovereign debt issues. It is likely that the structural breaks during that period were made in response to that market turmoil, and evidence of higher funding costs in new issues.

# ***5 Methodology for estimating a debt risk premium***

In this chapter we describe the methodology we have applied to estimate the 10 year BBB+ debt risk premium for a 20 day averaging period up to 16 December, 2011. We began by estimating the debt risk premium using an extrapolated Bloomberg fair value curve, as this curve is widely used in the market for funds, and supported by ACT decisions. As a cross-check to the extrapolated Bloomberg curve, we have directly examined the available market data using econometric techniques.

Hence, in this chapter we:

- derive a debt risk premium estimate using the extrapolated Bloomberg fair value curve methodology,
- estimate the debt risk premium based on a direct examination of market data applying econometric techniques, and
- cross-check the results of the two methodologies.

## ***5.1 Estimating the debt risk premium using Bloomberg***

### ***5.1.1 Extrapolated Bloomberg fair value curve***

We first estimate the debt risk premium based on the extrapolated Bloomberg fair value curve. The Bloomberg fair value curve offers many advantages in estimating a benchmark debt risk premium:

- the Australian Competition Tribunal has endorsed the Bloomberg fair value curve as an appropriate benchmark for estimating the debt risk premium, including because it appears to be accepted by the market as providing accurate yield estimates,
- the Bloomberg fair value curve is an observable benchmark, and is simple to apply, and
- the Bloomberg methodology imposes a series of tests to ensure that the data that it applies is of sufficient quality.

In a Gas Access Arrangement Review, the final opportunity for a business to comment on a debt risk premium is likely to be before it is locked in. During this time, financial markets can change significantly, presenting a material risk to the business. Since Bloomberg is cautious in introducing new evidence and exhibits a degree of stability over time, it has in the past allowed regulators to commit to using the Bloomberg curve in advance.

#### **Methodology used to extrapolate the Bloomberg fair value curve**

Since 9 October, 2007, when Bloomberg ceased to report a 10 year BBB fair value curve, a key methodological issue has been how to extrapolate the curve to 10 years. For a period of time the annual increment in the Bloomberg A rating fair

value curve out to 10 years was used, and when that was no longer published, the annual increment in the Bloomberg AAA rating fair value curve out to 10 years was applied. However, the Bloomberg AAA curve has not been published out to 10 years since 22 June, 2010, which raises questions about its continued relevance given the change in market conditions since that time. Currently the Bloomberg BBB fair value curve is only reported to 7 years.

In our April, 2011 report on the debt risk premium for Powerlink, we proposed extrapolation of the Bloomberg fair curve using the average annual increment observed across a sample where two bonds of differing maturity had been issued by the same company (paired bonds).<sup>50</sup> This approach was based on the logic that for two bonds issued by the same company, the difference in the debt risk premiums observed between the two bonds would be fully explained by term to maturity, rather than by other risk factors (unlike bonds of different issuers). Furthermore, provided the paired bonds are regularly priced by the market, the observed annual change in the debt risk premium between two bonds of the same issuer provides an estimate of the market's current opinion of how the debt risk premium varies with term.

The AER's recent draft decision on Powerlink's 2013-17 revenue proposal criticised our original paired bond methodology because the average difference in the terms to maturity of the 9 sets of paired bonds was considered too short.<sup>51</sup> In this report we have responded to the AER's objection by limiting the sample of paired bonds to those where:

- the paired bonds were part of the wider sample that we used in our econometric analysis,
- the longer dated bond had a term to maturity that is close to 10 years,
- the shorter dated bond had a term that is closest to the shorter term that is of concern (i.e. closest to 7 years), and
- the match was between a pair of fixed coupon bonds, or a pair of floating rate bonds.

### *5.1.2 Debt risk premium applying a Bloomberg extrapolation*

For the 20 business day average ending 16 December 2011, we estimated the extrapolated Bloomberg debt risk premium to be 392 basis points. The estimate of 392 basis points was obtained by adding a debt risk premium increment of 7.6 basis points per annum to the 7 year BBB debt risk of premium of 369 basis points based on the fair value curve reported by Bloomberg.

Three pairs of bonds were chosen on the basis of the selection criteria outlined above: a pair of 'A-' rated Stockland fixed coupon bonds, a pair of A rated Telstra fixed coupon bonds, and a pair of 'BBB' rated Sydney Airport floating rate bonds. For the test averaging period ending 16 December, 2011, these paired bonds showed an average annual increment of 7.6 basis points, as shown in Table 3 below.

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<sup>50</sup> PwC, *Methodology to estimate the debt risk premium*, April 2011

<sup>51</sup> AER, *Draft decision: Powerlink transmission determination 2012-13 to 2016-17*, November 2011, p.235

By adding the observed 7.6 basis points annual increment to the 7 year Bloomberg BBB fair value curve estimate of 369 basis points, we derived an estimated 10 year BBB+ debt risk premium of **392 basis points**.

**Table 3 –Average annual increment in the debt risk premium for the paired bonds - 20 business days to 16 December 2011**

Bond Issuer	Short Maturity (years)	Long Maturity (years)	Debt Risk Premium – Bloomberg (basis points)	Debt risk premium - UBS (basis points)	Debt risk premium increment per year (basis points)
Telstra	4.7	8.6	9.0	9.5	9.3
Stockland	4.6	9.0	7.1	4.8	5.9
Sydney Airport	4.0	10.0	n/a	7.7	7.7
<b>Average increment</b>			<b>8.1</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>7.6</b>

Source: Bloomberg, PwC

## 5.2 Estimating the debt risk premium by direct examination of the bond data

### 5.2.1 Econometric approach

Our econometric regression approach consisted of creating a data set of debt risk premiums, considering the previous theoretical and empirical evidence on the functional form, testing alternative functional forms, and then assessing which functional form is most robust and reliable.

#### Shape of the debt risk premium curve

To apply econometric analysis, an assumption is required about the form of the relationship between debt risk premium and term to maturity, i.e. the functional form, or shape of the debt risk premium curve. At a theoretical level, Merton’s 1974 theory of bond pricing proposed a humped relationship between the debt risk premium and term. That is, the debt risk premium was expected to rise with term at first, but then to peak, and subsequently fall with additional term. However, this theory has been challenged in the literature due to an inability to explain empirical findings. As noted by Covitz and Downing (2007):<sup>52</sup>

...direct tests of Merton-style models find that the models seriously underpredict the level of long-term bond spreads.

In academic circles this tendency for Merton-style models to under-predict yield spreads has been called the ‘credit puzzle’. Helwege and Turner (1999) found that it is generally only the most credit worthy firms in a credit rating band issue long dated bonds, which can give the impression of a ‘humped’ relationship, but when paired bonds were tested (holding constant the credit worthiness) they found that the relationship is overwhelmingly upward sloping.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Dan Covitz and Chris Downing (October, 2007), ‘Liquidity or Credit Risk? The Determinants of Very Short-Term Corporate Yield Spreads’, *Journal of Finance*, Vol. 62, No. 5, pp. 2303-2328.

<sup>53</sup> Helwege, J. and C.M. Turner, (1999), ‘The slope of the credit yield curve for speculative grade issuers’, *Journal of Finance*, Vol. 54, pp.1869-1884.

In fixed interest markets, practitioners have observed that corporate bond spreads have almost always been upward sloping. Litterman and Iben, of the Fixed Income Research Department of Goldman Sachs, noted this in their 1991 paper:<sup>54</sup>

...we find that the term structure of corporate spreads is generally upward-sloping, indicating a market perception of higher probabilities of default in the more distant future.

While it is generally accepted that debt risk premium rises with term to maturity, a point of debate is whether the relationship is linear, or a more complex curvilinear function. Empirical research has provided evidence of both linear and non-linear relationships:

- Jia He, Wenwei Hu, and Larry H.P. Lang, (2000), found that for BBB rated bonds in the US over the period 1993 to 1997, the credit spread was upward sloping for terms up to 10 years, and was humped only for very long terms to maturity (i.e. after a term of 25.7 years).<sup>55</sup>
- Elton et al (2001) demonstrated that for the BBB rating band in the US, the debt risk premium attributed to systematic risk factors was linearly related to term.<sup>56</sup>
- Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), found that the ‘term structure of bond spreads as estimated in regression (4a) can be fitted by an upwardly-sloping regression line with an  $R^2$  exceeding 0.95 (i.e. it is essentially linear)’.<sup>57</sup>

To account for both linear and non-linear functional forms, we estimated regressions using various functional forms, and then tested for which functional form was superior. The following common non-linear functions were tested:

- quadratic,
- exponential,
- logarithmic, and
- power.

The equations for these functional forms are provided in Appendix A.

### **Assessment of the appropriate functional form**

We employed the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), otherwise known as the ‘Bayesian Information Criterion’, to decide on the most appropriate functional form. The SIC value is used to rank and select a functional form based on the efficiency of the goodness of fit to the data. The best functional form is decided by the equation with the lowest SIC.

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<sup>54</sup> Robert Litterman and Thomas Iben (Spring, 1991), ‘Corporate bond valuation and the term structure of credit spreads,’ *Corporate Journal of Portfolio Management*, p.54.

<sup>55</sup> Jia He, Wenwei Hu, and Larry H.P. Lang, (11 August, 2000), ‘Credit Spread Curves and Credit Ratings’, Working Paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong.

<sup>56</sup> Edwin Elton, Martin J. Gruber, Deepak Agrawal, and Christopher Mann (February, 2001), ‘Explaining the Rate Spread on Corporate Bonds’, *Journal of Finance*, Vol. LVI, No. 1, pp. 247 -278.

<sup>57</sup> Marco Sorge and Blaise Gadanecz (2008), ‘The term structure of credit spreads in project finance,’ *International Journal of Finance and Economics*, Vol. 123, p.80.



The SIC is calculated as the negative of the goodness of fit that a given function has to the data through a likelihood value, taking account of the number of variables the function required to reach that goodness of fit.<sup>58</sup> The SIC therefore rewards a functional form (through a lower value) if it achieves a higher goodness of fit, and punishes (through a higher value) a functional form that uses more variables to achieve that higher goodness of fit. In other words, the SIC finds the optimal functional form: the one that fits the data best, while using a minimum number of variables. We applied the SIC test as:

- it is a robust, well established and widely used methodology for selecting the superior functional form, and
- it allows us to select functional forms based on their efficiency.

In econometric analysis ‘efficient’ functions are desirable because they minimise the problem of ‘over-fitting’, which arises when more variables are used than necessary to explain the underlying relationship. An over-fitted function has many undesirable qualities and is likely to be poor predictor.<sup>59</sup>

### **Bond yield estimates**

As discussed in Chapter 4, we use the average debt risk premium for each bond in our sample across the three data sources, when available. Otherwise, debt risk premiums were calculated on an average of two sources, or were based on a single source. For each day during the study period after the first 20 business days, we calculated rolling 20 day average debt risk premiums.

### **‘Pooled regressions’ and the weighting of BBB+ bonds**

As discussed in Chapter 4 above, the core sample of bonds consisted of bonds with BBB, BBB+ and A- credit rating. This was done in order to expand the sample of bonds that could be used in the analysis, and our core findings are based on this ‘pooled sample’.

However, the credit rating of interest is the BBB+ credit rating band. While regressions that include only BBB+ bonds might bias the results due to small sample effects, including BBB and A- bonds could also bias the results in unknown ways.

## **5.2.2 Debt risk premium estimated by regression analysis**

We undertook overlapping regressions, where the debt risk premium was estimated based on the average observed debt risk premium for the sample bonds over the 20 days prior to the running of each day’s regression (i.e. the analysis was repeated for 411 successive overlapping periods, which was 19 less than the total number of days of data that was collected). We found that the linear functional form was the most appropriate function, since it had a superior SIC in the overwhelming majority of cases. However, the power function was superior during most of the overlapping 20 day periods close to 16 December, 2011.

### **Average credit rating of the bond yield data**

Based on our filtering of the data, which we have described above, over the 20 month study period a total pool of 92 bonds was used in the regression analysis. Bonds entered and left this pool, due mainly to bonds falling below the 1 year term

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<sup>58</sup> See, G. Schwartz, (1978), ‘Estimating the Dimension of a Model’, *Annals of Statistics*, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 461 – 464.


<sup>59</sup> D. Hawkins, (2004), ‘The Problem of Overfitting’, *J. Chem. Inf. Comput. Sci.*, 44, 1-12

to maturity cut-off, or due to new bond issues being covered by one of the service providers.

Our objective is to estimate the debt risk premium for a 10 year BBB+ corporate bond, but the pool of BBB+ bonds is relatively small. We have increased the size of the sample by broadening the data base to include bonds with BBB and A- credit ratings. This raises the question of whether the sample is more biased toward one or other of the neighbouring credit rating bands around the BBB+ band. To investigate this, we calculated the average credit rating by assigning values (1, 2 and 3), to the three rating bands.

The results of the analysis, and the percentage of the bonds used in the regressions during the study period are shown in Figure 5 below. We found that throughout the study period the average credit rating lay very close to BBB+ (based on the values assigned). Over the whole period, the BBB+ ratings band was always less than one-third of the total sample, which justifies our pooling approach.

**Figure 5 – Average credit rating of the bond sample over the study period**



**Testing for the best functional form**

We tested each functional form by examining over our whole data set which functional form had the lowest SIC in each of the overlapping daily regressions. We determined that the linear functional form was the best by counting the number of times each functional form had the lowest SIC in the 411 regressions performed for each overlapping 20 day data set of the whole study period. For each 20 business day average over our whole data set, we regressed each functional form to estimate a group of SICs. These SICs were then ranked from lowest to highest (where lowest is the best), along with the matching functional forms. From the group of SIC values, we produced a list with the number of times each functional form had the lowest SIC.

As shown in Table 4 below, out of 411 regressions, the linear functional form had the lowest SIC in 340 (82.7 per cent) cases, followed by the power functional form (superior 71 times). The remaining functional forms did not have the lowest SIC for any 20 day averaging period.

**Table 4 – SIC functional form test: 20 months to 16 December, 2011**

	Linear	Quadratic	Exponential	Logarithmic	Power
<b>Number of times with lowest SIC</b>	340	0	0	0	71
<b>Proportion</b>	82.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	17.3%

Source: UBS, Bloomberg, AFMA, PwC

**Regression results for the most recent averaging period**

In Table 5 below, we show we have derived an estimated 10 year BBB+ debt risk premium of 398 basis points using linear regression, which implies an annual increment of 18 basis points per annum from the intercept of 204 basis points. This was 6 basis points higher than the 392 basis points debt risk premium we estimated by extrapolating the 7 year Bloomberg fair value curve to 10 years. While the linear functional form was found to be superior in most of our daily regressions, we have also reported the 385 basis points obtained using the power function, as this functional form was shown to be superior during the averaging period ending 16 December, 2011. This estimate of the debt risk premium was 7 basis points lower than the 392 basis point estimate derived with the extrapolated Bloomberg curve.


**Table 5 – Debt risk premium linear regression estimates for 20 business days to 16 December 2011 (basis points)**

Functional form	Regression constant	Debt risk premium increment per year	10 year debt risk premium
<b>Linear</b>	229.6	16.9	398.4
<b>Power</b>	n/a	n/a	384.8

Source: UBS, Bloomberg, AFMA, PwC

Our debt risk premium estimates using the alternative methodologies (and the sensitivity results) can be considered by reference to Figure 6 below.

**Figure 6 – Debt risk premium estimates for 20 business days to 16 December 2011 (basis points)**



Source: PwC's analysis, Bloomberg, UBS, AFMA

Figure 6 shows how our estimated straight line regression based on 'pooled' data for the three ratings bands lies below the Bloomberg curve over a range of terms to maturity between approximately 3.5 and 9.5 years. It is also noteworthy that of the 10 BBB+ rated bonds in the sample, only two lay below the extrapolated Bloomberg curve and linear function, and only three lay below the power curve. These relativities provide a degree of comfort that the estimated 10 year BBB+ debt risk premium of 398 (385) basis points using the 'pooled' regression under a linear (power) functional form is a reasonable estimate based on the current market for funds. Since these figures are not far away from the estimate of 392 basis points obtained by extrapolating the Bloomberg curve, we consider the findings to be consistent and reinforcing of each other.

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# Appendix A *Function equations*

The following equations demonstrate the equations for the five functional types using data for the 20 business days ending 16 December 2011.

## **1 *Linear function***

$$DRP = 2.296 + 0.169 * t$$

where:

- DRP refers to the debt risk premium
- $t$  is the term to maturity

## **2 *Quadratic function***

$$DRP = 2.094 + 0.263 * t - 0.008 * t^2$$

where:

- DRP refers to the debt risk premium
- $t$  is the term to maturity

## **3 *Exponential function***

$$DRP = 2.430 * \exp(0.048 * t)$$

where:

- DRP refers to the debt risk premium
- $t$  is the term to maturity

## **4 *Logarithmic function***

$$DRP = 2.129 + 0.707 * \text{Log}_e(t)$$

where:

- DRP refers to the debt risk premium
- $t$  is the term to maturity

## **5 *Power function***

$$DRP = 2.197 * t^{0.243}$$

where:

- DRP refers to the debt risk premium

- $t$  is the term to maturity

# Appendix B Regression outputs

## 1 Summary statistics – Linear functional form for the 20 business days to 16 December 2011

Dependent Variable: DRP

Method: Least Squares

Included observations: 64

DRP= C(1) +C(2)\*T

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C(1)	2.296445	0.147733	15.5446	0.0000
C(2)	0.168707	0.030869	5.465197	0.0000
R-squared	0.325121	Mean dependent var		2.971537
Adjusted R-squared	0.314236	S.D. dependent var		0.782825
S.E. of regression	0.648264	Akaike info criterion		2.001713
Sum squared resid	26.05525	Schwarz criterion		2.069178
Log likelihood	-62.05482	Hannan-Quinn criter.		2.028291
F-statistic	29.86838	Durbin-Watson stat		1.506061
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000001			

Source: Bloomberg, UBS, AFMA, PwC's analysis

## 2 Summary statistics – Quadratic functional form for the 20 business days to 16 December 2011

Dependent Variable: DRP

Method: Least Squares

Included observations: 64

DRP = C(1) + C(2)\*T + C(3)\*T^2

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C(1)	2.094379	0.241571	8.669831	0.0000
C(2)	0.263466	0.094837	2.778103	0.0073
C(3)	-0.007733	0.007319	-1.056609	0.2949
R-squared	0.337251	Mean dependent var		2.971537
Adjusted R-squared	0.315522	S.D. dependent var		0.782825
S.E. of regression	0.647656	Akaike info criterion		2.014827
Sum squared resid	25.58696	Schwarz criterion		2.116024
Log likelihood	-61.47445	Hannan-Quinn criter.		2.054694
F-statistic	15.52044	Durbin-Watson stat		1.474135
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000004			



Source: Bloomberg, UBS, AFMA, PwC's analysis

### **3 Summary statistics – Exponential functional form for the 20 business days to 16 December 2011**

Dependent Variable: DRP

Method: Least Squares

Included observations: 64

DRP = C(1)\*EXP(C(2)\*T)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C(1)	2.430278	0.119162	20.39474	0.0000
C(2)	0.048236	0.008439	5.716112	0.0000
R-squared	0.30933	Mean dependent var		2.971537
Adjusted R-squared	0.29819	S.D. dependent var		0.782825
S.E. of regression	0.655804	Akaike info criterion		2.024843
Sum squared resid	26.66492	Schwarz criterion		2.092308
Log likelihood	-62.79497	Hannan-Quinn criter.		2.051421
		Durbin-Watson stat		1.512106

Source: Bloomberg, UBS, AFMA, PwC's analysis

### **4 Summary statistics – Logarithmic functional form for the 20 business days to 16 December 2011**

Dependent Variable: DRP

Method: Least Squares

Included observations: 64

DRP = C(1) + C(2)\*LOG(T)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C(1)	2.129271	0.171041	12.44888	0.0000
C(2)	0.707128	0.126711	5.580651	0.0000
R-squared	0.334362	Mean dependent var		2.971537
Adjusted R-squared	0.323626	S.D. dependent var		0.782825
S.E. of regression	0.643811	Akaike info criterion		1.987927
Sum squared resid	25.69851	Schwarz criterion		2.055392
Log likelihood	-61.61366	Hannan-Quinn criter.		2.014505
F-statistic	31.14367	Durbin-Watson stat		1.400478
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000001			

Source: Bloomberg, UBS, AFMA, PwC's analysis

## **5 Summary statistics – Power functional form for the 20 business days to 16 December 2011**

Dependent Variable: DRP

Method: Least Squares

Included observations: 64

DRP = C(1)\*T^C(2)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C(1)	2.197372	0.142864	15.38088	0.0000
C(2)	0.243295	0.042877	5.674234	0.0000
R-squared	0.342055	Mean dependent var		2.971537
Adjusted R-squared	0.331443	S.D. dependent var		0.782825
S.E. of regression	0.640079	Akaike info criterion		1.976301
Sum squared resid	25.40148	Schwarz criterion		2.043766
Log likelihood	-61.24164	Hannan-Quinn criter.		2.002879
		Durbin-Watson stat		1.430763

Source: Bloomberg, UBS, AFMA, PwC's analysis

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# ***Appendix C Bond data from representative sample***

**Table 4 – Yields observations for fixed coupon bonds**

Name	Date of maturity	Issue date	
STOCKLAND	25/11/2020	25/11/2010	
APT	22/07/2020	22/07/2010	
BRISAIR	9/07/2019	4/04/2011	
Caltex aus	23/11/2018	23/11/2011	
SYDAIRPORT	6/07/2018	25/05/2011	
DB RREEF	21/04/2017	21/04/2010	
WESFARMERS	4/11/2016	4/11/2011	
ETSA	29/09/2016	29/03/2011	
ADLAIRPORT	20/09/2016	23/08/2006	
MIRVAC FIN	16/09/2016	29/09/2010	
MLBAIRPORT	25/08/2016	25/08/2010	
STOCKLAND	1/07/2016	13/12/2010	
BBIDBCTFIN	9/06/2016	9/06/2006	
TRANSURBAN	8/06/2016	8/06/2011	
GAIF	19/05/2016	19/05/2011	
WOOLWORTHS	22/03/2016	22/03/2011	
CPOF	11/03/2016	11/03/2011	
MLBAIRPORT	14/12/2015	14/12/2005	
SANTOS	23/09/2015	23/09/2005	
VWGN	14/07/2015	14/07/2011	
SYDAIRPORT	6/07/2015	6/07/2010	
MIRVAC FD	15/03/2015	26/03/2010	
STOCKLAND	18/02/2015	18/12/2009	
VWGN	28/01/2015	28/01/2011	
WESFARMERS	11/09/2014	11/09/2009	
MLBAIRPORT	25/08/2014	25/08/2010	
LEIGHTON	28/07/2014	28/07/2009	
QICF	7/07/2014	28/04/2011	
VWGN	31/03/2014	31/03/2010	
TRANSURBAN	24/03/2014	24/03/2010	
GPT	22/08/2013	22/08/2003	
VWGN	17/08/2013	17/08/2010	
STOCKLAND	15/05/2013	4/07/2003	
SNOWYHYDRO	25/02/2013	25/02/2003	
VODAFONE	10/01/2013	10/08/2006	
VWGN	26/11/2012	26/11/2009	
CLPAUST	16/11/2012	16/11/2005	
Southern cross	11/10/2012	11/10/2002	
HOLCIM	7/08/2012	7/08/2009	
COLESMYER	25/07/2012	25/07/2005	
SYDAIRPORT	21/11/2011	8/12/2006	
TABCORP	13/10/2011	13/10/2004	
ORIGINERGY	6/10/2011	6/10/2006	
TRANSURBAN	15/09/2011	15/09/2006	
CPOF	28/06/2011	28/06/2006	
VWGN	24/06/2011	24/06/2009	
STOCKLAND	16/06/2011	16/06/2005	
PBL	6/05/2011	6/05/2005	

**Table 5 – Trading margins observations for floating coupon bonds**

Name	Date of maturity	Issue date
BBIDBCTFIN	9/06/2026	9/06/2006
SYDAIRPORT*	11/10/2022	15/12/2006
SYDAIRPORT*	20/11/2021	8/12/2006
BBIDBCTFIN	9/06/2021	9/06/2006
TRANSB (W)	10/11/2017	11/10/2005
ADLAIRPORT	20/09/2016	23/08/2006
BRISAIR	1/07/2016	29/06/2006
BBIDBCTFIN	9/06/2016	9/06/2006
MLBAIRPORT	14/12/2015	14/12/2005
SYDAIRPORT	20/11/2015	10/09/2004
CLPAUST	16/11/2015	16/11/2005
POWERCOR*	15/11/2015	15/11/2005
TRANSB (W)	10/11/2015	10/11/2005
SYDAIRPORT	20/11/2014	10/09/2004
UNITE EN W	23/10/2014	31/10/2005
WESFARMERS	11/09/2014	11/09/2009
DB RREEF	28/07/2014	27/07/2009
ADLAIRPORT	15/06/2014	9/04/2010
TAHHA	1/05/2014	30/04/2009
TABCORP	1/05/2014	19/06/2009
BACL	11/12/2013	30/06/2004
SYDAIRPORT	20/11/2013	8/12/2006
GPT	22/08/2013	22/08/2003
COCACOLA	8/03/2013	8/03/2006
CPOWER (W)	28/02/2013	28/02/2003
SNOWYHYDRO	25/02/2013	25/02/2003
SNOWY (W)	25/02/2013	25/02/2003
CLPAUST	16/11/2012	16/11/2005
SYDAIRPORT	11/10/2012	11/10/2002
BROADCAST	9/07/2012	9/07/2002
MERIDIAN	9/02/2012	26/02/2002
BBIDBCTFIN	12/12/2011	12/12/2006
STOCKLAND^	15/05/2013	4/07/2003
SYDAIRPORT^	21/11/2011	8/12/2006
TABCORP	13/10/2011	13/10/2004
ORIGINERGY	6/10/2011	6/10/2006
SANTOS	23/09/2011	23/09/2005
TRANSURBAN	15/09/2011	15/09/2006
PACPRO	15/08/2011	
EPG (W)	29/07/2011	29/07/2004
CPOF	28/06/2011	28/06/2006
STOCKLAND	16/06/2011	16/06/2005
MLBAIRPORT	11/06/2011	30/05/2001
QICF	7/06/2011	3/11/2005

Source: Bloomberg, AFMA, UBS, PwC.

\* trading margins began reporting after issue date

^ trading margins stopped being reported before maturity date

# ***Appendix D Terms of Reference***

## **PURPOSE**

The purpose of this brief is to set out the nature, scope and purpose of work that SP AusNet, Multinet Gas and Envestra (the businesses) are seeking PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia (PwC) to undertake in relation to the debt risk premium (DRP).

## **Background**

The businesses' current regulatory control period is due to expire on 31 December 2012 and the next regulatory control period will commence on 1 January 2013 and run until 31 December 2017.

The businesses must submit their revised access arrangements, for the upcoming regulatory control period, to the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) by 30 March, 2012. One of the considerations in preparing the respective revised access arrangements will be the proposed methodology to calculate the DRP.

The legislative requirements for calculation of the DRP are contained in the National Gas Law and the National Gas Rules.

The National Gas Law requires that:

- a regulated network service provider should be provided with a reasonable opportunity to recover at least the efficient costs the operator incurs in providing reference services; and
- A reference tariff should allow for a return commensurate with the regulatory and commercial risks involved in providing the reference service to which that tariff relates.

The National Gas Rules require that the rate of return on capital is:

- to be commensurate with prevailing conditions in the market for funds and the risks involved in providing reference services; and
- In determining a rate of return on capital;
  - it will be assumed that the service provider meets benchmark levels of efficiency and uses a financing structure that meets benchmark standards as to gearing and other financial parameters for a going concern and reflects in other respects best practice; and
  - a well accepted approach that incorporates the cost of equity and debt, such as the Weighted Average Cost of Capital, is to be used; and a well accepted financial model, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model, is to be used.

For the calculation for the DRP this has been interpreted in previous regulatory decisions as meaning:

- it must be determined using the 'observed annualised Australian benchmark corporate bond rate for corporate bonds' or some proxy thereof;
- the bonds must have a BBB+ credit rating;
- the bonds must have a maturity period of 10 years; and
- it is the margin over the annualised nominal risk free rate and by implication is measured over the same period as the nominal risk free rate.

## **Scope of works for PwC**

### **Preparation of the Report**

The businesses are seeking PwC to:

- Advise whether the Bloomberg fair yield curves (extrapolated to 10 years) can be relied on to reasonably meet the legislative requirements;

- If not, propose an alternative methodology for calculating the DRP that best meets the legislative requirements; and
- Apply the Bloomberg and/or the alternative methodology during the 20 business days from 21 November to 16 December 2011.

In providing the advice, PwC should take into consideration the outcomes of recent AER decisions and relevant judgements handed down by the Australian Competition Tribunal.

The report must contain the following:

1. The terms of reference;
2. The qualifications of the person(s) preparing the report;
3. Identify any pre-existing relationship the person(s) and/or PwC has with the businesses;
4. Clearly and fully set out all the relevant facts;
5. Explain the person(s) process of reasoning;
6. Reference any documents relied on by the person(s);
7. Include specified wording at the end of the report stating that “[the person(s)] has made all the inquiries that [the person(s)] believes are desirable and appropriate and that no matters of significance that [the person(s)] regards as relevant have, to [the person(s)] knowledge, been withheld”; and
8. State that the person(s) have been provided with a copy of the Federal Court’s “Guidelines for Expert Witnesses in Proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia” (Attachment 1) and that the Report has been prepared in accordance with those Guidelines.

The businesses emphasise that the report prepared by PwC will be provided to the AER in support of the businesses’ revised access arrangements. Accordingly the report may become a public report.

### **Expert Witness**

As noted, the businesses intend to provide a copy of PwC’s report to the AER in support of their regulatory proposals. The person(s) may be required to act as an expert witness in relation to the advice provided in the report.

The businesses have attached a copy of the Federal Court’s “Guidelines for Expert Witnesses in Proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia”. These Guidelines contain useful direction regarding the steps that should be taken by potential witnesses to ensure the appropriate level of objectivity.

### **Contact**

Tom Hallam will be the day to day contact for PwC in preparing its report. PwC should direct all of its queries to:

(03) 9695 6617 or tom.hallam@sp-ausnet.com.au.

### **Timing**

A draft report should be provided by 31 January 2012, and finalised by 15 February 2012.



# ***Appendix E Curriculum vitae***

# Jeff Balchin

## Principal, Economics and Policy

Phone: 03 8603 4973

Fax: 03 8613 5576

jeff.balchin@au.pwc.com

Jeff is an economist in the PwC Economics and Policy team. Jeff has almost 20 years of experience in relation to economic regulation issues across the electricity, gas and airports sectors in Australia and New Zealand and experience in relation to water, post and telecommunications. He has advised governments, regulators and major corporations on issues including the development of regulatory frameworks, regulatory price reviews, licensing and franchise bidding and market design. Jeff has also undertaken a number of expert witness assignments. His particular specialities have been on the application of finance principles to economic regulation, the design of tariff structures, the design of incentive compatible regulation and the drafting and economic interpretation of regulatory instruments.

In addition, Jeff has led a number of analytical assignments for firms to understand the responsiveness of consumers to changes to prices or other factors (like promotional activities) and to use this information to inform pricing strategy.

### Relevant experience

*Prior to joining the PwC, Jeff held a number of policy positions in the Commonwealth Government.*

- **Commonwealth representative on the secretariat of the Gas Reform Task Force** (1995-1996) - Played a lead role in the development of a National Code for third party access to gas transportation systems, with a particular focus on market regulation and pricing.
- **Infrastructure, Resources and Environment Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet** (1994-1995) - Played a key role in the creation of the Gas Reform Task Force (a body charged with implementing national gas reform that reports to the Heads of Government). During this time he also had responsibility for advising on primary industries, petroleum and mining industry issues, infrastructure issues, government business enterprise reform and privatisation issues.
- **Structural Policy Division, Department of the Treasury** (1992-94). Worked on environment policy issues in the lead up to the UN Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de Janeiro, as well as electricity and gas reform issues.

### Relevant experience - Economic Regulation of Price and Service

#### A. **Periodic Price Reviews – Major Roles for Regulators**

- **South Australian default gas retail price review (Client: the Essential Services Commission, SA, (2007-2008)** - Directed a team that derived estimates of the benchmark operating costs for a gas retailer and the margin that should be allowed. This latter exercise included a bottom-up estimate of the financing costs incurred by a gas retail business.

- **South Australian default electricity retail price review (Client: the Essential Services Commission, SA, 2007)** - Directed a team that estimated the wholesale electricity purchase cost for the default electricity retail supplier in South Australia. The project involved the development of a model for deriving an optimal portfolio of hedging contracts for a prudent and efficient retailer, and the estimate of the expected cost incurred with that portfolio. Applying the principles of modern finance theory to resolve issues of how the compensation for certain risk should be quantified was also a central part of the project.
- **South Australian default gas retail price review (Client: the Essential Services Commission, SA, 2005)** - As part of a team, advised the regulator on the cost of purchasing gas transmission services for a prudent and efficient SA gas retailer, where the transmission options included the use of the Moomba Adelaide Pipeline and SEAGas Pipeline, connecting a number of gas production sources.
- **Victorian Gas Distribution Price Review (Client: the Essential Services Commission, Vic, 2006 2008)** - Provided advice to the Essential Service Commission in relation to its review of gas distribution access arrangements on the treatment of outsourcing arrangements, finance issues, incentive design and other economic issues.
- **Envestra Gas Distribution Price Review (Client: the Essential Services Commission, SA, 2006)** - Provided advice on several finance related issues (including 'return on assets' issues and the financial effect of Envestra's invoicing policy), and the treatment of major outsourcing contracts when setting regulated charges.
- **Victorian Electricity Distribution Price Review (Client: the Essential Services Commission, Vic, 2003 2005)** - Provided advice to the Essential Service Commission on a range of economic issues related to current review of electricity distribution charges, including issues related to finance, forecasting of expenditure and the design of incentive arrangements for productive efficiency and service delivery. Was a member of the Steering Committee advising on strategic regulatory issues.
- **Victorian Water Price Review (Client: the Essential Services Commission, Vic, 2003 2005)** - Provided advice to the Essential Services Commission on the issues associated with extending economic regulation to the various elements of the Victorian water sector. Was a member of the Steering Committee advising on strategic regulatory issues, and also provided advice on specific issues, most notably the determination of the initial regulatory values for the water businesses and the role of developer charges.
- **ETSA Electricity Distribution Price Review (Client: the Essential Services Commission, SA, 2002 2005)** - Provided advice on the 'return on assets' issues associated with the review of ETSA's regulated distribution charges, including the preparation of consultation papers. The issues covered include the valuation of assets for regulatory purposes and cost of capital issues. Also engaged as a quality assurance adviser on other consultation papers produced as part of the price review.
- **Victorian Gas Distribution Price Review (Client: the Essential Services Commission, Vic, 2001 2002)** - Economic adviser to

the Essential Services Commission during its assessment of the price caps and other terms and conditions of access for the three Victorian gas distributors. Was responsible for all issues associated with capital financing (including analysis of the cost of capital and assessment of risk generally, and asset valuation), and supervised the financial modelling and derivation of regulated charges. Also advised on a number of other issues, including the design of incentive arrangements, the form of regulation for extensions to unreticulated townships, and the principles for determining charges for new customers connecting to the system. Represented the Commission at numerous public forums during the course of the review, and was the principal author of the finance related and other relevant sections of the four consultation papers and the draft and final decisions.

- **ETSA Electricity Distribution Price Review (Client: the South Australian Independent Industry Regulator, 2000 2001)** - As part of a team, prepared a series of reports proposing a framework for the review. The particular focus was on the design of incentives to encourage cost reduction and service improvement, and how such incentives can assist the regulator to meet its statutory obligations. Currently retained to provide commentary on the consultation papers being produced by the regulator, including strategic or detailed advice as appropriate.
- **Dampier to Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline Access Arrangement Review (Client: the Independent Gas Pipelines Access Regulator, WA, 2000 2002)** - Provided economic advice to the Office of the Independent Regulator during its continuing assessment of the regulated charges and other terms and conditions of access for the gas pipeline, including a review of all parts of the draft decision, with particular focus on the sections addressing the cost of capital (and assessment of risk generally), asset valuation and financial modelling. Represented the Office on these matters at a public forum, and provided strategic advice to the Independent Regulator on the draft decision.
- **Goldfield Gas Pipeline Access Arrangement Review (Client: the Independent Gas Pipelines Access Regulator, WA, 2000 2004)** - Provided economic advice to the Office of the Independent Regulator during its continuing assessment of the regulated charges and other terms and conditions of access for the gas pipeline, including a review of all parts of the draft decision, with particular focus on the sections addressing the cost of capital (and assessment of risk generally), asset valuation and financial modelling. Represented the Office on these matters at a public forum, and provided strategic advice to the Independent Regulator on the draft decision.
- **Victorian Electricity Distribution Price Review (Client: the Office of the Regulator General, Vic, 1999 2000)** - Economic adviser to the Office of the Regulator General during its review of the price caps for the five Victorian electricity distributors. Had responsibility for all issues associated with capital financing, including analysis of the cost of capital (and assessment of risk generally) and asset valuation, and supervised the financial modelling and derivation of regulated charges. Also advised on a range of other issues, including the design of incentive regulation for cost reduction and service improvement, and the principles for determining charges for new customers connecting to the

system. Represented the Office at numerous public forums during the course of the review, and was principal author of the finance related sections of three consultation papers, and the finance related sections of the draft and final decision documents.

- **Victorian Ports Corporation and Channels Authority Price Review (Client: the Office of the Regulator General, Vic, 2000)** - Advised on the finance related issues (cost of capital and the assessment of risk generally, and asset valuation), financial modelling (and the derivation of regulated charges), and on the form of control set over prices. Principal author of the sections of the draft and final decision documents addressing the finance related and price control issues.
- **AlintaGas Gas Distribution Access Arrangement Review (Client: the Independent Gas Pipelines Access Regulator, WA, 1999 2000)** - Provided economic advice to the Office of the Independent Regulator during its assessment of the regulated charges and other terms and conditions of access for the gas pipeline. This advice included providing a report assessing the cost of capital associated with the regulated activities, overall review of all parts of the draft and final decisions, with particular focus on the sections addressing the cost of capital (and assessment of risk generally), asset valuation and financial modelling. Also provided strategic advice to the Independent Regulator on the draft and final decisions.
- **Parmelia Gas Pipeline Access Arrangement Review (Client: the Independent Gas Pipelines Access Regulator, WA, 1999 2000)** - Provided economic advice to the Office of the Independent Regulator during its assessment of the regulated charges and other terms and conditions of access for the gas pipeline, including a review of all parts of the draft and final decisions, with particular focus on the sections addressing the cost of capital (and assessment of risk generally), asset valuation and financial modelling. Also provided strategic advice to the Independent Regulator on the draft and final decisions.
- **Victorian Gas Distribution Price Review (Client: the Office of the Regulator General, Vic, 1998)** - Economic adviser to the Office of the Regulator General during its assessment of the price caps and other terms and conditions of access for the three Victorian gas distributors. Major issues addressed included the valuation of assets for regulatory purposes, cost of capital financing and financial modelling. Principal author of the draft and final decision documents.

**B. Periodic and Other Price Reviews – Other Activities**

- **Equity Betas for Regulated Electricity Transmission Activities (Client: Grid Australia, APIA, ENA, 2008)** - Prepared a report presenting empirical evidence on the equity betas for regulated Australian electricity transmission and distribution businesses for the AER's five yearly review of WACC parameters for these industries. The report demonstrated the implications of a number of different estimation techniques and the reliability of the resulting estimates. Also prepared a joint paper with the law firm, Gilbert+Tobin, providing an economic and legal interpretation of the relevant (unique) statutory guidance for the review.
-

- **Economic Principles for the Setting of Airside Charges (Client: Christchurch International Airport Limited, 2008 ongoing)** - Provided advice on a range of economic issues relating to its resetting of charges for airside services, including the valuation of assets and treatment of revaluations, certain inputs to the cost of capital (beta and the debt margin) and the efficiency of prices over time and the implications for the depreciation of assets and measured accounting profit.
- **Treatment of Inflation and Depreciation when Setting Landing Charges (Client: Virgin Blue, 2007 2008)** - Provided advice on Adelaide Airport's proposed approach for setting landing charges for Adelaide Airport, where a key issue was how it proposed to deal with inflation and the implications for the path of prices over time. The advice also addressed the different formulae that are available for deriving an annual revenue requirement and the requirements for the different formulae to be applied consistently.
- **Application of the Grid Investment Test to the Auckland 400kV Upgrade (Client: Electricity Commission of New Zealand, 2006)** - As part of a team, undertook a review of the Commission's process for reviewing Transpower's proposed Auckland 400kV upgrade project and undertook a peer review of the Commission's application of the Grid Investment Test.
- **Appropriate Treatment of Taxation when Measuring Regulatory Profit (Client: Powerco New Zealand, 2005 2006)** - Prepared two statements for Powerco New Zealand related to how the Commerce Commission should treat taxation when measuring realised and projected regulatory profit for its gas distribution business (measured regulatory profit, in turn, was a key input into the Commission's advice to the Minister as to whether there would be net benefits from regulating Powerco New Zealand's gas distribution business). A key finding was that care must be taken to ensure that the inputs used when calculating taxation expenses are consistent with the other 'assumptions' that a regulator adopts if it applies incentive regulation (most notably, a need for consistency between assumed tax depreciation and the regulatory asset value).
- **Application of Directlink for Regulated Status (Client: Directlink, 2003 2004)** - Prepared advice on the economic issues associated with the Directlink Joint Venture's request to be converted from an unregulated (entrepreneurial) interconnector to a regulated interconnector. As with the Murraylink application, the key issues included the implications for economic efficiency flowing from its application and the appropriate application of a cost benefit test for transmission investment (and the implications of that test for the setting of the regulatory value for its asset).
- **Principles for the 'Stranding' of Assets by Regulators (Client: the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, NSW, 2005)** - Prepared a report discussing the relevant economic principles for a regulator in deciding whether to 'strand' assets for regulatory purposes (that is, to deny any further return on assets that are partially or unutilised). An important conclusion of the advice is that the benefits of stranding need to be assessed with reference to how future decisions of the regulated entities are affected by the policy (i.e. future investment and pricing decisions), and that the

uncertainty created from 'stranding' creates real costs.

- **Principles for Determining Regulatory Depreciation Allowances (Client: the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, NSW, 2003)** - Prepared a report discussing the relevant economic and other principles for determining depreciation for the purpose of price regulation, and its application to electricity distribution. An important issue addressed was the distinction between accounting and regulatory (economic) objectives for depreciation.
- **Methodology for Updating the Regulatory Value of Electricity Transmission Assets (Client: the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2003)** - Prepared a report assessing the relative merits of two options for updating the regulatory value of electricity transmission assets at a price review - which are to reset the value at the estimated 'depreciated optimised replacement cost' value, or to take the previous regulatory value and deduct depreciation and add the capital expenditure undertaken during the intervening period (the 'rolling-forward' method). This paper was commissioned as part of the ACCC's review of its Draft Statement of Regulatory Principles for electricity transmission regulation.
- **Application of Murraylink for Regulated Status (Client: Murraylink Transmission Company, 2003)** - Prepared advice on the economic issues associated with Murraylink Transmission Company's request to be converted from an unregulated (entrepreneurial) interconnector to a regulated interconnector. The key issues included the implications for economic efficiency flowing from its application and the appropriate application of a cost benefit test for transmission investment (and the implications of that test for the setting of the regulatory value for its asset).
- **Proxy Beta for Regulated Gas Transmission Activities (Client: the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2002)** - Prepared a report presenting the available empirical evidence on the 'beta' (which is a measure of risk) of regulated gas transmission activities. This evidence included beta estimates for listed firms in Australia, as well as those from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. The report also included a discussion of empirical issues associated with estimating betas, and issues to be considered when using such estimates as an input into setting regulated charges.
- **Treatment of Working Capital when setting Regulated Charges (Client: the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2002)** - Prepared a report assessing whether it would be appropriate to include an explicit (additional) allowance in the benchmark revenue requirement in respect of working capital when setting regulated charges.
- **Pricing Principles for the South West Pipeline (Client: Esso Australia, 2001)** - As part of a team, prepared a report (which was submitted to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission) describing the pricing principles that should apply to the South West Pipeline (this pipeline was a new asset, linking the existing system to a new storage facility and additional gas producers).
- **Relevance of 'September 11' for the Risk Free Rate (Client: the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2001)** - Prepared a report assessing the relevance (if any) of the events of September 11 for the proxy 'risk free rate' that is



included in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (this is a model, drawn from finance theory, for estimating the required return for a particular asset).

- **Victorian Government Review of Water Prices (Client: the Department of Natural Resources and the Environment, Vic, 2000 2001)** - Prepared a report discussing the principles regulators use to determine the capital related cost (including reasonable profit) associated with providing utility services, and how those principles would apply to the water industry in particular. The report also provided an estimate of the cost of capital (and assessment of risk in general) associated with providing water services. The findings of the report were presented to a forum of representatives of the Victorian water industry.
- **Likely Regulatory Outcome for the Price for Using a Port (Client: MIM, 2000)** - Provided advice on the outcome that could be expected were the dispute over the price for the use of a major port to be resolved by an economic regulator. The main issue of contention was the valuation of the port assets (for regulatory purposes) given that the installed infrastructure was excess to requirements, and the mine had a short remaining life.
- **Relevance of 'Asymmetric Events' in the Setting of Regulated Charges (Client: TransGrid, 1999)** - In conjunction with William M Mercer, prepared a report (which was submitted to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission) discussing the relevance of downside (asymmetric) events when setting regulated charges, and quantifying the expected cost of those events.

#### **C. *Licencing / Franchise Bidding***

- **Competitive Tender for Gas Distribution and Retail in Tasmania (Client: the Office of the Tasmanian Energy Regulator, 2001 2002)** - Economic adviser to the Office during its continuing oversight of the use of a competitive tender process to select a gas distributor/retailer for Tasmania, and simultaneously to set the regulated charges for an initial period. The main issues concern how the tender rules, process and future regulatory framework should be designed to maximise the scope for 'competition for the market' to discipline the price and service offerings. Principal author of a number of sections of a consultation paper, and the regulator's first decision document.
- **Issuing of a Licence for Powercor Australia to Distribute Electricity in the Docklands (Client: the Office of the Regulator General, Vic, 1999)** - Economic adviser to the Office during its assessment of whether a second distribution licence should be awarded for electricity distribution in the Docklands area (a distribution licence for the area was already held by CitiPower, and at that time, no area in the state had multiple licensees). The main issue concerned the scope for using 'competition for the market' to discipline the price and service offerings for an activity that would be a monopoly once the assets were installed. Contributed to a consultation paper, and was principal author of the draft and final decision documents.

#### **D. *Market Design***

- **Options for the Development of the Australian Gas Wholesale Market (Client: the Ministerial Committee on Energy, 2005)** - As part of a team, assessed the relative



merits of various options for enhancing the operation of the Australian gas wholesale markets, including by further dissemination of information (through the creation of bulletin boards) and the management of retailer imbalances and creation of price transparency (by creating short term trading markets for gas).

- **Review of the Victorian Gas Market (Client: the Australian Gas Users Group, 2000 2001)** - As part of a team, reviewed the merits (or otherwise) of the Victorian gas market. The main issues of contention included the costs associated with operating a centralised market compared to the potential benefits, and the potential long term cost associated with having a non commercial system operator.
- **Development of the Market and System Operation Rules for the Victorian Gas Market (Client: Gas and Fuel Corporation, 1960)** - Assisted with the design of the 'market rules' for the Victorian gas market. The objective of the market rules was to create a spot market for trading in gas during a particular day, and to use that market to facilitate the efficient operation of the system.

#### ***E. Development of Regulatory Frameworks***

- **Implications of greenhouse policy for the electricity and gas regulatory frameworks (Client: the Australian Energy Market Commission, 2008 ongoing)** - Providing ongoing advice to the AEMC in its review of whether changes to the electricity and gas regulatory frameworks is warranted in light of the proposed introduction of a carbon permit trading scheme and an expanded renewables obligation. Issues addressed include the framework for electricity connections, the efficiency of the management of congestion and locational signals for generators and the appropriate specification of a cost benefit test for transmission upgrades in light of the two policy initiatives.
- **Application of a 'total factor productivity' form of regulation (Client: the Victorian Department of Primary Industries, 2008)** - Assisted the Department to develop a proposed amendment to the regulatory regime for electricity regulation to permit (but not mandate) a total factor productivity approach to setting price caps – that is, to reset prices to cost at the start of the new regulatory period and to use total factor productivity as an input to set the rate of change in prices over the period.
- **Expert Panel on Energy Access Pricing (Client: Ministerial Council on Energy, 2005 2006)** - Assisted the Expert Panel in its review of the appropriate scope for commonality of access pricing regulation across the electricity and gas, transmission and distribution sectors. The report recommended best practice approaches to the appropriate forms of regulation, the principles to guide the development of detailed regulatory rules and regulatory assessments, the procedures for the conduct of regulatory reviews and information gathering powers.
- **Productivity Commission Review of Airport Pricing (Client: Virgin Blue, 2006)** - Prepared two reports for Virgin Blue for submission to the Commission's review, addressing the economic interpretation of the review principles, asset valuation, required rates of return for airports and the efficiency effects of airport charges and presented the findings to a public forum.

- **AEMC Review of the Rules for Setting Transmission Prices (Client: Transmission Network Owners, 2005 2006)** - Advised a coalition comprising all of the major electricity transmission network owners during the new Australian Energy Market Commission's review of the rules under which transmission prices are determined. Prepared advice on a number of issues and assisted the owners to draft their submissions to the AEMC's various papers.
- **Advice on Energy Policy Reform Issues (Client: Victorian Department of Infrastructure/Primary Industries, 2003 ongoing)** - Ongoing advice to the Department regarding on issues relating to national energy market reform. Key areas covered include: reform of cross ownership rules for the energy sector; the reform of the cost benefit test for electricity transmission investments; and the reform of the gas access arrangements (in particular, the scope for introducing more light handed forms of regulation); and the transition of the Victorian electricity transmission arrangements and gas market into the national regulatory regime.
- **Productivity Commission Review of the National Gas Code (Client: BHPBilliton, 2003 2004)** - Produced two submissions to the review, with the important issues including the appropriate form of regulation for the monopoly gas transmission assets (including the role of incentive regulation), the requirement for ring fencing arrangements, and the presentation of evidence on the impact of regulation on the industry since the introduction of the Code. The evidence presented included a detailed empirical study of the evidence provided by the market values of regulated entities for the question of whether regulators are setting prices that are too low.
- **Framework for the Regulation of Service Quality (Client: Western Power, 2002)** - Prepared two reports advising on the framework for the regulation of product and service quality for electricity distribution, with a particular focus on the use of economic incentives to optimise quality and the implications for the coordination of service regulation coordinated with distribution tariff regulation.
- **Development of the National Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems Code (Client: commenced while a Commonwealth Public Servant, after 1996 the Commonwealth Government, 1994 1997)** - Was involved in the development of the Gas Code (which is the legal framework for the economic regulation of gas transmission and distribution systems) from the time of the agreement between governments to implement access regulation, through to the signing of the intergovernmental agreements and the passage of the relevant legislation by the State and Commonwealth parliaments. Major issues of contention included the overall form of regulation to apply to the infrastructure (including the principles and processes for establishing whether an asset should be regulated), pricing principles (including the valuation of assets for regulatory purposes and the use of incentive regulation), ring fencing arrangements between monopoly and potentially contestable activities, and the disclosure of information. Was the principal author of numerous issues papers for the various government and industry working groups, public discussion papers, and sections of the Gas Code.

#### **F. Other Finance Work**

- **Private Port Development (Client: Major Australian Bank, 2008)** - Prepared a report on the relative merits of different governance and financing arrangements for a proposed major port development that would serve multiple port users.
- **Review of Capital Structure (Client: major Victorian water entity, 2003)** - Prepared a report (for the Board) advising on the optimal capital structure for a particular Victorian water entity. The report advised on the practical implications of the theory on optimal capital structure, presented benchmarking results for comparable entities, and presented the results of detailed modelling of the risk implications of different capital structures. Important issues for the exercise were the implications of continued government ownership and the impending economic regulation by the Victorian Essential Services Commission for the choice of – and transition to – the optimal capital structure.

#### **G. Expert Witness Roles**

- **Consultation on Major Airport Capital Expenditure – Judicial Review (Client: Christchurch International Airport, 2008)** - Prepared an affidavit for a judicial review on whether the airport consulted appropriately on its proposed terminal development. Addressed the rationale, from the point of view of economics, of separating the decision of ‘what to build’ from the question of ‘how to price’ in relation to new infrastructure.
- **New Zealand Commerce Commission Draft Decision on Gas Distribution Charges (Client: Powerco, 2007 08)** - Prepared an expert statement about the valuation of assets for regulatory purposes, with a focus on the treatment of revaluation gains, and a memorandum about the treatment of taxation for regulatory purposes and appeared before the Commerce Commission.
- **Sydney Airport Domestic Landing Change Arbitration (Client: Virgin Blue, 2007)** - Prepared two expert reports on the economic issues associated with the structure of landing charges (note: the evidence was filed, but the parties reached agreement before the case was heard).
- **New Zealand Commerce Commission Gas Price Control Decision – Judicial Review to the High Court (Client: Powerco, 2006)** - Provided four affidavits on the regulatory economic issues associated with the calculation of the allowance for taxation for a regulatory purpose, addressing in particular the need for consistency in assumptions across different regulatory calculations.
- **Victorian Electricity Distribution Price Review – Appeal to the ESC Appeal Panel: Service Incentive Risk (Client: the Essential Services Commission, Vic, 2005 2006)** - Prepared expert evidence on the workings of the ESC’s service incentive scheme and the question of whether the scheme was likely to deliver a windfall gain or loss to the distributors (note: the evidence was filed, but the appellant withdrew this ground of appeal prior to the case being heard).
- **Victorian Electricity Distribution Price Review – Appeal to the ESC Appeal Panel: Price Rebalancing (Client: the Essential Services Commission, Vic, 2005 2006)** - Prepared expert evidence on the workings of the ESC’s tariff basket

form of price control, with a particular focus on the ability of the electricity distributors to rebalance prices and the financial effect of the introduction of 'time of use' prices in this context (note: the evidence was filed, but the appellant withdrew this ground of appeal prior to the case being heard).

- **New Zealand Commerce Commission Review of Information Provision and Asset Valuation (Client: Powerco New Zealand, 2005)** - Appeared before the Commerce Commission for Powerco New Zealand on several matters related to the appropriate measurement of profit for regulatory purposes related to its electricity distribution business, most notably the treatment of taxation in the context of an incentive regulation regime.
- **Duke Gas Pipeline (Qld) Access Arrangement Review – Appeal to the Australian Competition Tribunal (Client: the Australia Competition and Consumer Commission, 2002)** - Prepared expert evidence on the question of whether concerns of economic efficiency are relevant to the non price terms and conditions of access (note: the evidence was not filed as the appellant withdrew its evidence prior to the case being heard).
- **Victorian Electricity Distribution Price Review – Appeal to the ORG Appeal Panel: Rural Risk (Client: the Office of the Regulator General, Vic, 2000)** - Provided expert evidence (written and oral) to the ORG Appeal Panel on the question of whether the distribution of electricity in the predominantly rural areas carried greater risk than the distribution of electricity in the predominantly urban areas.
- **Victorian Electricity Distribution Price Review – Appeal to the ORG Appeal Panel: Inflation Risk (Client: the Office of the Regulator General, Vic, 2000)** - Provided expert evidence (written and oral) to the ORG Appeal Panel on the implications of inflation risk for the cost of capital associated with the distribution activities.
- **Major Coal Producers and Ports Corporation of Queensland Access Negotiation (Client: Pacific Coal, 1999)** - Provided advice to the coal producers on the outcome that could be expected were the dispute over the price for the use of a major port to be resolved by an economic regulator. The main issues of contention were the valuation of the assets for regulatory purposes, whether the original users of the port should be given credit for the share of the infrastructure they financed, and the cost of capital (and assessment of risk generally). Presented the findings to a negotiation session between the parties.

#### ***Qualifications and memberships***

- Bachelor Economics (First Class Honours) University of Adelaide
- CEDA National Prize for Economic Development



