

FINAL DECISION

ActewAGL distribution determination

2015−16 to 2018−19

Attachment 12 – Demand management incentive scheme

April 2015

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1. Note
2. This attachment forms part of the AER's final decision on ActewAGL’s revenue proposal 2015–19. It should be read with other parts of the final decision.
3. The final decision includes the following documents:
4. Overview

Attachment 1 - Annual revenue requirement

Attachment 2 - Regulatory asset base

Attachment 3 - Rate of return

Attachment 4 - Value of imputation credits

Attachment 5 - Regulatory depreciation

Attachment 6 - Capital expenditure

Attachment 7 - Operating expenditure

Attachment 8 - Corporate income tax

Attachment 9 - Efficiency benefit sharing scheme

Attachment 10 - Capital expenditure sharing scheme

Attachment 11 - Service target performance incentive scheme

Attachment 12 - Demand management incentive scheme

Attachment 13 - Classification of services

Attachment 14 - Control mechanism

Attachment 15 - Pass through events

Attachment 16 - Alternative control services

Attachment 17 - Negotiated services framework and criteria

Attachment 18 - Connection policy

Attachment 19 - Pricing methodology

Attachment 20 - Analysis of Financial Viability

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1. Shortened forms

| 1. Shortened form | 1. Extended form |
| --- | --- |
| 1. AEMC | 1. Australian Energy Market Commission |
| 1. AEMO | 1. Australian Energy Market Operator |
| 1. AER | 1. Australian Energy Regulator |
| 1. ASRR | 1. aggregate service revenue requirement |
| 1. augex | 1. augmentation expenditure |
| 1. capex | 1. capital expenditure |
| 1. CCP | 1. Consumer Challenge Panel |
| 1. CESS | 1. capital expenditure sharing scheme |
| 1. CPI | 1. consumer price index |
| 1. DRP | 1. debt risk premium |
| 1. DMIA | 1. demand management innovation allowance |
| 1. DMIS | 1. demand management incentive scheme |
| 1. distributor | 1. distribution network service provider |
| 1. DUoS | 1. distribution use of system |
| 1. EBSS | 1. efficiency benefit sharing scheme |
| 1. ERP | 1. equity risk premium |
| 1. Expenditure Assessment Guideline | 1. expenditure forecast assessment Guideline for electricity distribution |
| 1. F&A | 1. framework and approach |
| 1. MRP | 1. market risk premium |
| 1. NEL | 1. national electricity law |
| 1. NEM | 1. national electricity market |
| 1. NEO | 1. national electricity objective |
| 1. NER | 1. national electricity rules |
| 1. NSP | 1. network service provider |
| 1. opex | 1. operating expenditure |
| 1. PPI | 1. partial performance indicators |
| 1. PTRM | 1. post-tax revenue model |
| 1. RAB | 1. regulatory asset base |
| 1. RBA | 1. Reserve Bank of Australia |
| 1. repex | 1. replacement expenditure |
| 1. RFM | 1. roll forward model |
| 1. RIN | 1. regulatory information notice |
| 1. RPP | 1. revenue and pricing principles |
| 1. SAIDI | 1. system average interruption duration index |
| 1. SAIFI | 1. system average interruption frequency index |
| 1. SLCAPM | 1. Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model |
| 1. STPIS | 1. service target performance incentive scheme |
| 1. WACC | 1. weighted average cost of capital |

# Demand management incentive scheme

1. The National Electricity Rules (NER) require us to develop and implement mechanisms to incentivise distributors to consider efficient alternatives to building more network.[[1]](#footnote-1) To meet this requirement, and motivated by the need to improve distributors' capability in the demand management area, we implemented a demand management incentive scheme (DMIS) in our NSW/ACT distribution determinations for the 2009–14 regulatory control period.[[2]](#footnote-2)
2. The current DMIS for ActewAGL includes two components—the demand management innovation allowance (DMIA)[[3]](#footnote-3) and the D-factor.[[4]](#footnote-4)
3. The DMIA is a capped allowance for distributors to investigate and conduct broad-based and/or peak demand management projects. It contains two parts:

* Part A provides for an innovation allowance to be incorporated into each distributor's revenue allowance for opex each year of the regulatory control period. Distributors prepare annual reports on their expenditure under the DMIA[[5]](#footnote-5) in the previous year, which we then assess against specific criteria.[[6]](#footnote-6)
* Part B compensates distributors for any foregone revenue demonstrated to have resulted from demand management initiatives approved under Part A. In the 2009–14 and 2014–15 regulatory control periods, ActewAGL was subject to an average revenue cap form of control. As the average revenue cap will continue in the 2015–19 regulatory control period, Part B is not relevant to ActewAGL.

1. Under the scheme, we return any underspend against the allowance to customers. Also, once we know the approved DMIA expenditure for each year of the current period, we compensate distributors for approved foregone revenue. We implement this as an adjustment to each distributor's innovation allowance in the following regulatory control period.

## Final decision

1. We have determined to continue Part A of the DMIA for ActewAGL in the 2015–19 regulatory control period. This is consistent with our draft decision[[7]](#footnote-7) and our proposed approach in the Stage 2 Framework and Approach (F&A).[[8]](#footnote-8)
2. The current innovation allowance amount of $0.1 million ($2014–15) per annum will continue in the 2015–19 regulatory control period.

## ActewAGL's revised proposal

1. ActewAGL supported the proposed approach set out in our Stage 2 F&A to continue applying Part A of the DMIA at the same scale as is currently applied.[[9]](#footnote-9)
2. Regarding anticipated changes to the DMIS, in its original revenue proposal, ActewAGL stated it was unclear how a new scheme could apply once the final revenue determination for the 2015–19 regulatory control period had been made. To address this concern, ActewAGL proposed that a pass through event be included in the final determination to allow recovery of any change in costs, including incentives, incurred by ActewAGL in implementing demand management projects under a new scheme.[[10]](#footnote-10)

## AER’s assessment approach

1. The rules require us to have regard to several factors in developing and implementing a DMIS for ActewAGL.[[11]](#footnote-11) These are:

* Benefits to consumers
* the need to ensure that benefits to electricity consumers likely to result from the scheme are sufficient to warrant any reward or penalty under the scheme
* the willingness of customers or end users to pay for increases in costs resulting from implementing DMIS.
* Balanced incentives
* the effect of a particular control mechanism (i.e. price as distinct from revenue regulation) on a distributor's incentives to adopt or implement efficient non-network alternatives
* the effect of classification of services on a distributor's incentive to adopt or implement efficient embedded generator connections
* the extent the distributor is able to offer efficient pricing structures
* the possible interactions between DMIS and other incentive schemes.

1. We had regard to these factors in considering the proposed approach to the DMIS for ActewAGL as set out in our draft decision[[12]](#footnote-12) and the Stage 2 F&A[[13]](#footnote-13) and we have again taken these factors into account in making our final decision.

## Reasons for final decision

1. Considering a significant proportion of ActewAGL's allowance remains for the current regulatory control period[[14]](#footnote-14), we have determined that the current innovation allowance amount of $0.1 million ($2014–15) per annum will continue in the 2015–19 regulatory control period.

Our Stage 2 F&A and draft decision stated that our intention to develop and implement a new DMIS for the 2015–19 regulatory control period was dependent on the progress of the rule change process arising from the AEMC’s Power of Choice review.[[15]](#footnote-15) On 19 February 2015, the AEMC commenced consultation on the rule change. Submissions closed on 19 March 2015. The AEMC is currently considering the rule amendments.

Regarding the innovation allowance amount, the CCP supported continuing the application of Part A of the DMIA to ActewAGL for the 2015–19 regulatory control period at its current scale of $0.1 million ($2014–15) per annum.[[16]](#footnote-16)

1. In response to submissions and consistent with our draft decision, we do not intend to pre-empt consultation on the AEMC’s review of the current demand management arrangements by commencing a separate consultation process on a new DMIS before the outcomes of the review are finalised. Quite apart from the unnecessary complications and inefficiencies that a parallel policy process would create, the confines of a distribution revenue review make it ill-suited to driving regulatory reform.
2. We acknowledge the need to reform the existing demand management incentive arrangements and the importance of demand management in deferring the need for network augmentation by alleviating network utilisation during peak usage periods. The move to a revenue cap form of control removes any disincentive for distributors to reduce the quantity of electricity sold by pursuing demand management initiatives. More robust obligations to consider non-network alternatives in order to satisfy RIT-D requirements provide distributors with opportunities to improve and expand their demand management programs.
3. Beyond increasing opportunities, we recognise the importance of strengthening demand management incentives in order to defer network augmentation. However, we do not consider it appropriate to develop an alternative incentive structure in parallel to the AEMC's review through ActewAGL's regulatory proposal. The AEMC will be able to consider how any changes to the NER can be implemented in the 2015–19 regulatory control period through transitional arrangements.
4. For these reasons, we have adopted the position proposed in the Stage 2 Framework and Approach and our draft decision and approved DMIA allowances consistent with their current scale. We will consider the introduction of a revised DMIS as soon as practicable following the AEMC's rule change process.
5. ActewAGL proposed demand management projects for the 2015–19 regulatory control period will be funded through the DMIS. ActewAGL did not propose any demand management projects as part of its opex or capex allowances.[[17]](#footnote-17) The DMIS provides for an ex post review of claims for funding through the DMIS.[[18]](#footnote-18) We do not need to make a decision at this time on whether ActewAGL's proposed projects are consistent with, or likely to be consistent with, the criteria for funding under the DMIS.
6. Our consideration of ActewAGL's proposed DMEGCIS pass through event is set out in attachment 15.

1. NER, cl. 6.6.3(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The rules have since changed the name to 'Demand Management and Embedded Generation Connection Incentive Scheme' (DMEGCIS) to explicitly cover innovation with respect to the connection of embedded generation. Our current and proposed DMIS includes embedded generation. We consider embedded generation to be one means of demand management, as it typically reduces demand for power drawn from a distribution network. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. AER, Demand management incentive scheme for the ACT and NSW 2009 distribution determinations—Demand management innovation allowance scheme, 28 November 2008. (AER, DMIA for ACT and NSW distributors, November 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. AER, Demand management incentive scheme for the ACT and NSW 2009 distribution determinations—D-factor scheme, 29 February 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The DMIA excludes the costs of demand management initiatives approved in our determination for the 2009–14 regulatory control period or under the D-factor scheme. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. AER, DMIA for ACT and NSW distributors, November 2008, pp. 4–5. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. AER, Draft decision: ActewAGL distribution determination 2015–19, November 2014, Attachment 12, p. 7 (AER, Draft Decision, November 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. AER, Stage 2 Framework and Approach paper for ActewAGL, January 2014, p. 32 (AER, Stage 2 Framework and Approach, January 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. ActewAGL, Revised Regulatory Proposal: 2015–19 regulatory control period – Distribution services provided by the ActewAGL Distribution electricity network in the Australian Capital Territory, 20 January 2015, pp. 621-624 (ActewAGL, Revised Regulatory Proposal, January 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. ActewAGL, Subsequent Regulatory Proposal: 2015–19 regulatory control period – Distribution services provided by the ActewAGL Distribution electricity network in the Australian Capital Territory, 2 June 2014, pp. 385–388. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. NER, cl 6.6.3(b). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. AER, Draft Decision, November 2014, Attachment 12, p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. AER, Stage 2 Framework and Approach, January 2014, pp. 33–35. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. AER, Applications by DNSPs for Demand Management Innovation Allowance for 2013 calendar year (Victorian DNSPs) and 2012–13 financial year (all other DNSPs), April 2015, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. AER, Stage 2 Framework and Approach, January 2014, p. 32. AER, Draft Decision, November 2015, Attachment 12, p. 9. For information regarding the AEMC's Power of Choice Review, see <http://www.aemc.gov.au/Major-Pages/Power-of-choice>. The AEMC received a proposed rule change from COAG Energy Ministers and the Total Environment Centre. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Consumer Challenge Panel, Submission to the AER: Response to AER Draft Determination: ActewAGL Regulatory Proposal 2014–19, 23 February 2015, p. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. ActewAGL, Regulatory Proposal, June 2014, pp. 144–148. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. AER, DMIA for ACT and NSW distributors, Nov 2008, pp. 3–4. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)