

Demand Management Incentive Scheme

Electricity distribution network service providers

December 2017

© Commonwealth of Australia 2017

This work is copyright. In addition to any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, all material contained within this work is provided under a Creative Commons Attributions 3.0 Australia licence, with the exception of:

* the Commonwealth Coat of Arms
* the ACCC and AER logos
* any illustration, diagram, photograph or graphic over which the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission does not hold copyright, but which may be part of or contained within this publication. The details of the relevant licence conditions are available on the Creative Commons website, as is the full legal code for the CC BY 3.0 AU licence.

Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be addressed to the:

Director, Corporate Communications
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
GPO Box 4141, Canberra ACT 2601

or publishing.unit@accc.gov.au.

Inquiries about this publication should be addressed to:

Australian Energy Regulator
GPO Box 520
Melbourne Vic 3001

Tel: (03) 9290 1444
Fax: (03) 9290 1457

Email: AERInquiry@aer.gov.au
AER reference: 58882

Amendment record

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Version | Date |
| 01 | 14 December 2017 |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |

Contents

[1 Nature and authority 4](#_Toc500852183)

[1.1 Introduction 4](#_Toc500852184)

[1.2 Authority 4](#_Toc500852185)

[1.3 NER requirements 4](#_Toc500852186)

[1.4 AER objectives 5](#_Toc500852187)

[1.5 Confidentiality 5](#_Toc500852188)

[1.6 Definitions and interpretation 5](#_Toc500852189)

[1.7 Processes for revision 5](#_Toc500852190)

[1.8 Version history and effective date 5](#_Toc500852191)

[2 The demand management incentive scheme 6](#_Toc500852192)

[2.1 Application of the scheme 7](#_Toc500852193)

[2.2 Identifying and committing eligible projects 8](#_Toc500852194)

[2.2.1 Minimum project evaluation requirements 8](#_Toc500852195)

[2.2.2 Committed projects 10](#_Toc500852196)

[2.3 Determining project incentives 10](#_Toc500852197)

[2.4 Compliance reporting 12](#_Toc500852198)

[2.5 Accruing of project incentives 14](#_Toc500852199)

[2.6 Application of the total financial incentive 16](#_Toc500852200)

[A Glossary 18](#_Toc500852201)

# ****Nature and authority****

## ****Introduction****

1. In accordance with the requirements of clause 6.6.3 of the NER, this publication sets out the AER's demand management incentive scheme for distribution network service providers.

## Authority

1. Clause 6.6.3 of the **NER** requires the **AER** to develop a **scheme** in accordance with the **distribution consultation procedures**.

## NER requirements

1. Clause 6.6.3 of the **NER** requires the **AER** develop a **scheme** consistent with the demand management incentive scheme objective.
2. The **demand management incentive scheme objective** is to provide **distributors** with an incentive to undertake efficient expenditure on relevant **non-network options** relating to **demand management** (the **scheme objective**).
3. In developing, and applying, any **scheme**, the **AER** must take into account the following:
4. the scheme should be applied in a manner that contributes to the achievement of the **scheme objective**;
5. the scheme should reward **distributors** for implementing relevant **non-network options** that deliver net cost savings to **retail customers**;
6. the scheme should balance the incentives between expenditure on **network options** and **non-network options** relating to **demand management**. In doing so, the **AER** may take into account the net economic benefits delivered to all those who produce, consume and transport electricity in the **market** associated with implementing relevant **non-network options**;
7. the level of the incentive:
8. should be reasonable, considering the long term benefit to **retail customers**;
9. should not include costs that are otherwise recoverable from any other source, including under a relevant distribution determination; and
10. may vary by **distributor** and over time;
11. penalties should not be imposed on **distributors** under any scheme;
12. the incentives should not be limited by the length of a **regulatory control period**, if such limitations would not contribute to the achievement of the **scheme objective**; and
13. the possible interaction between the scheme and:
14. any other incentives available to the **distributor**  in relation to undertaking efficient expenditure on, or implementation of, relevant **non-network options**;
15. particular control mechanisms and their effect on a **distributor**'s available incentives referred to in sub-paragraph (i); and
16. meeting any **regulatory obligation or requirement**.
17. The **AER**:
18. must develop and **publish** the **scheme**; and
19. may, from time to time, amend or replace the **scheme** developed and **published** under clause 6.6.3 of the NER,

In accordance with the **distribution consultation procedures**.

## AER objectives

1. The **AER**'sobjectives for this scheme are that it:
2. contributes to the achievement of the **National Electricity Objective**.
3. is consistent with the principles in clause 6.6.3 of the **NER**.

## Confidentiality

1. The **AER**'sobligations regarding confidentiality and the disclosure of information provided to it by a **distributor** are governed by the **Competition and Consumer Act 2010,** the National Electricity Law and the **NER** including the **confidentiality guideline**. The **confidentiality guideline** is binding on the **AER** and each **distributor**.

## Definitions and interpretation

1. In this **scheme**, the words and phrases presented in bold have the meaning given to them in:
2. the glossary, or
3. if not defined in the glossary, the **NER**.
4. Any example, figure, or explanatory box in this **scheme** is for guidance only.

## Processes for revision

1. The **AER** may amend or replace this **scheme** from time to time in accordance with clause 6.6.3(d) of the **NER** and the **distribution consultation procedures**.

## Version history and effective date

1. A version number and an effective date of issue will identify every version of this **scheme**.

# The demand management incentive scheme

1. The steps involved in the operation of this **scheme** are the following:
2. The **AER** will determine how this **scheme** will apply to a **distributor** in accordance with section 2.1.
3. The **distributor** must identify **eligible projects** and must commit to those projects as **committed projects** in accordance with section 2.2.
4. The **distributor** must determine the **project incentive** for **committed projects** in accordance within section 2.3.
5. The **distributor** must prepare and submit a **compliance report** in accordance with section 2.4.
6. The **AER** will determine the **total financial incentive** available to the **distributor** under this **scheme** for each **regulatory year** of a **regulatory control period** in accordance with sections 2.5 and 2.6.
7. The **total financial incentive** determined by the **AER** for the **regulatory year** t–2 will be **included** in the **distributor**'s **total annual revenue** for **regulatory year** t.

Figure : Outline of scheme operation

## Application of the scheme

1. The **AER** will determine how, if at all, this **scheme** will apply to a **distributor** for a **regulatory control period** through the following process:
2. The **AER**’s **framework and approach paper** for a **distributor** will set out whether the **AER** intends to apply this **scheme** to that **distributor**'s forthcoming distribution determination under clause 6.8.1(b)(2)(vi) of the NER.
3. The **distributor**'s **regulatory proposal** must include a description, including relevant explanatory material, of how it proposes this **scheme** should apply for the relevant **regulatory control period**. The **distributor**'s **regulatory proposal** must also detail how its proposed approach would satisfy the requirements of the **National Electricity Law** and **NER**.
4. The **AER**’s distribution determination for the **distributor** will set out how, if at all, this **scheme** is to apply to the **distributor** in the relevant **regulatory control period** under **NER** cl. 6.12.1(9).
5. Without otherwise limiting clause 2.1(1)(c), when the **AER** applies the **scheme** to a **distributor**, it must do so in that **distributor**'s distribution determination. The distribution determination must provide that the **cost multiplier** applicable to any **eligible project** will be the **cost multiplier** specified in the version of this **scheme** that is in effect under clause 6.6.3 of the **NER** at the time at which an **eligible project** becomes a **committed project** (that is, $d\_{v}$ ― the **cost multiplier** d, in version v of this **scheme**).

## Identifying and committing eligible projects

1. An eligible project is a project that a distributor has identified, in accordance with clause 2.2(4), as being an **efficient** non-network option relating to demand management, but that has not had expenditure committed to it by the **distributor** before the first application of this **scheme** to the **distributor** in a distribution determination.
2. An 'efficient non-network option' is a **non-network option** that is a **credible option** to meet an **identified need** on the **distribution network**, where that **credible option** is the **preferred option**. For clarity, the expected relevant net benefit of the preferred option must have a positive NPV when assessed against a base case of doing nothing, unless the project is for reliability corrective action.
3. A **distributor** must identify whether a project is an **efficient non-network option** by completing at least one of the following processes.
4. the **AER**'s regulatory investment test for distribution (**RIT–D**); or
5. the minimum project evaluation requirements.
6. In determining by means of the **minimum project evaluation requirements** whether a project is an **efficient non-network option**, including when estimating the **NPV** of the net economic benefit of a project as part of that process, the **distributor** must include:
7. Costs and benefits of a kind that accrue to consumers via the **distribution** network; and
8. To the extent they exist and may affect the **distributor**'s identification of the **preferred option**:
9. Costs and benefits of a kind that accrue to consumers via parts of the **relevant market** other than the **distribution network**; and
10. Benefits that consist of option value.

### Minimum project evaluation requirements

1. This clause 2.2.1 sets out the **minimum project evaluation requirements** for the purposes of clause 2.2(4)(b) of this **scheme**.
2. Where an **identified need** on its **distribution network** could be fully or partly addressed by a **demand management** solution, a distributor must issue a request for demand management solutionsto the following parties:
3. Persons registered on its **demand side engagement register**.
4. Any other parties the **distributor** may identify as having or potentially having the capabilities to provide a **demand management** product, service or solution to either fully or partly form a **credible option** to address the **identified need** on the **distribution network**.
5. A **request for demand management solutions** may include, but need not include, a request for a quote.
6. As part of the **request for demand management solutions**, the **distributor** must provide the following information:
7. A description of the **identified need** that the **distributor** is seeking to address.
8. Technical information about the **identified need**, including the load at risk, energy at risk, duration and load curves, the annual probability and frequency of relevant events, and the expected value of energy at risk. The expected value of energy at risk must be based, as a minimum, on the average volume of energy at risk, the weighted probability of the energy at risk event occurring, and the relevant value of customer reliability for a given regulatory year.
9. The location of the **identified need** and a description of the affected classes of customers and network area.
10. If the distributor has already identified an initial preferred option to meet the **identified need** on the **distribution network**, a description of its initial preferred option.
11. Other information that is sufficient to enable the parties receiving the **request for demand management solutions** to provide an informed response in presenting an alternative potential **credible option**, including, to the extent relevant, the information that a distributor is required under the **NER** to provide in a **non-network options report**.
12. A **request for demand management solutions** must require the provision of the following information:
13. A description of the proposed **demand management** product, service or solution that is put forward as a **credible option**, or as part of a **credible** **option**, to address the **identified need** on the **distribution networ**k.
14. Where the proposed **demand management** product, service or solution is put forward as part of a **credible option** (but not as the whole of a **credible option**), a description of the other elements of the **credible option**.
15. A reasonable estimate of:
16. The proposed product, service or solution's expected outputs, including theamount ofnetwork demand (based on a specified **kVA** per year) that the party responding to the **request for demand management solutions** expects to be able to manage (either at its influence, request or control).
17. The expected payments that the **distributor** would be required to make to the responding party if the **distributor** were to enter into a contract with the responding party for the responding party to provide that product, service or solution to the **distributor**.
18. Any other information relevant to determining whether the proposed product, service or solution would be a **credible option**, or part of a **credible option**, to address the **identified need** on the **distribution networ**k.

### Committed projects

1. **Project incentives** under this **scheme** are only available for **committed projects**. An **eligible project** becomes a **committed project** where the requirements of this clause 2.2.2 are satisfied and if:
2. the **distributor** enters into a **demand management contract** with another legal entity to procure the **demand management** required to deliver that **preferred option; or**
3. **An** officer or employee of the **distributor** delegated by thechief executive officerof the **distributor**, and who has responsibility for network planning by the **distributor**, approves a **demand management proposal** for the **distributor** to provide to itself the **demand management** required to deliver that **preferred option**. This approval must include a declaration by the delegate of thechief executive officerthat he or she has a reasonable basis for being of the view that the estimated costs of providing that **demand management** set out in the **demand management proposal** are reasonable and were estimated in accordance with an approach commonly used by the **distributor**, as at the date of the approval, for estimating costs of that kind.
4. A **demand management contract** is a contract under which the **distributor** agrees to make payments to another legal entity in return for the other legal entity agreeing to ensure that, by means of the relevant **eligible project**, network demand can be managed, at the **distributor**'sor other legal entity's influence, request or control by an amount that is based on a specified **kVA** per year.
5. A **demand management proposal** is a proposal that, when implemented, will ensure that, by means of the relevant **eligible project,** network demand can be managed, at the **distributor**'sinfluence, request or control, by an amount that is based on a specified **kVA** per year, and that sets out the costs that the **distributor** expects to incur in managing, or having the capacity to manage, the **distributor**'s network demand in this manner.

## Determining project incentives

1. For each **committed project**, the **distributor** must calculate the **project incentive** that the **committed project** (referred to in this clause 2.3 as 'project i') can receive.
2. The **distributor** must calculate project i's **project incentive** in accordance with equation 1, which caps the **project incentive** to the lower of the following two values:
3. the higher of:
4. the expected present value at time t of project i's **demand management** costs, minus the value of subsidies the distributor will receive to provide or procure the demand management component of project i, multiplied by the cost multiplier; and
5. zero; and
6. The expected present value at time t of the relevant net benefit under project i.
7. In this **scheme** (version, $v=1$), the cost multiplier $ d\_{v}=d\_{1}=50\%$.

Equation : Project incentive calculation

$$PV incentive\_{i}\leq max⁡ \{d\_{v}×E\left[PV DMcost\_{i}-S\_{i}\right] , 0\}$$

Subject to the constraint:

$$d\_{v}×E\left[PV DMcost\_{i}\right] \leq E[NPV\_{i}]$$

Where:

* Subscript i means the parameter concerns **committed project** i.
* PV is the present value at time $t$. A parameter following PV is in real dollars at time $t$.
* $incentive\_{i} $is the **project incentive** for each project i.
* max {.} means the higher of the values within the brackets that are separated by commas.
* $S\_{i}$ is the total subsidies provided to the distributor in connection with providing the demand management component of project i.
* $E\left[.\right]$ denotes an expected value, which has been calculated when project i became a **committed project**.
* $DMcost\_{i} $is project i's **demand management** costs.
* $NPV\_{i}$ is the expected relevant net benefit of committed project i.
1. The expected value of project i's **demand management** costs used for the purposes of clause 2.3(2)(a) and equation 1 must be consistent with:
2. The payments, or potential payments for the **demand management** solution under the **demand management contract** or in the **demand management proposal** (as relevant); and

(b) The distributor's reasonable expectation of the frequency and duration on which it will call on or utilise the capability to control network demand under the **demand management proposal** or the **demand management contract** (as relevant). In order to determine this expectation, the **distributor** must probabilistically determine the amount of network demand that it expects to request, control or influence.

1. A distributor must carry out a cost–benefit analysis to calculate the expected **relevant net benefit** for project i referred to in clause 2.3(2)(b) and equation 1. As part of this cost–benefit analysis, the **distributor** must estimate project i's net benefit relative to 'the base case', being, in most cases, where the **distributor** does not implement a **credible option** to address the **identified need**. The exception to this 'base case' is that, where the **identified need** is for reliability corrective action, the **distributor** will use a credible option that has the second highest net benefit as the base case.

## Compliance reporting

1. For each **regulatory year**, a **distributor** must submit a demand management **compliance report** to the **AER** no later than 4 months after the end of that **regulatory year** to which the reported data pertains.
2. The **compliance report** must be reviewed in accordance with the assurance requirements set out in the annual reporting **regulatory information notice** applicable to the **distributor**, at the **distributor**'sexpense and by a person permitted to conduct such a review under that **regulatory information notice**.
3. Each compliance report must include two parts―Part A and Part B. Part A includes information on **committed projects** and Part B contains information on projects that the **distributo**r has identified as **eligible projects**.
4. Each compliance report must include the following information in Part A:
5. The volume of **demand management** delivered by **committed projects** in that **regulatory year** (that is, the kVA per year of demand that a **distributor** controlled (either directly or indirectly) by means of **committed projects** in that **regulatory year**).
6. The **distributor**'s estimate of the benefits realised from the **demand management** delivered by **committed projects** in that **regulatory year**.
7. The **total financial incentive** that the distributor has assessed that it is able to claim in accordance with clauses 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5 of this **scheme,** for that **regulatory year**.
8. For each **eligible project** that a **distributor** identifies as a preferred option in a **regulatory year**, Part B of the compliance report relating to that regulatory year must include the following information about that **eligible project**:
9. In present value terms, the expected costs and benefits that the **distributor** determined, in accordance with clause 2.2, that the **eligible project** would deliver to electricity consumers.
10. A description of the responses that the **distributor** received to either its RIT–D or its **request for demand management solutions** under the minimum **project evaluation requirements** (as relevant) including, for each response:
11. a short description of the proposed project;
12. the proposed costs and deliverables put forward in the response to the **request for demand management solutions**; and
13. for any response that proposed a potential **credible option**, the **distributor**'s estimate of that project's relevant net benefit.
14. Identify whether, if the **distributor** decides (or has decided) to proceed with the project as a **committed project**, it is likely that this will occur via a **demand management contract,** or whether this is likely to occur via a **demand management proposal**. If the former, the **compliance report** must also identify the proposed party or parties to the **demand management contract**.
15. The expected costs of delivering **demand management**, by means of the **eligible project**, that the **distributor** used as an input into its assessment, under clause 2.2, that the project is an **efficient non-network option** in relation to **demand management**.
16. the kVA per year of network demand that the **distributor**:
17. would be able to call upon, influence, dispatch or control if the project is implemented (that is, the kVA per year of **demand management** capacity); and
18. expects to call upon, influence, dispatch or control, based on its probabilistic assessment of future demand, if the project is implemented.
19. Where a **distributor** decides, in a **regulatory year**, to defer or not proceed with an **eligible project** that it has previously decided (either in that **regulatory year** or in a previous **regulatory year**) to proceed with as a **committed project**, the **distributor** must identify that decision and project in its **compliance report** for that **regulatory year.**
20. Where a **distributor** decides, in a **regulatory year**, to proceed with a **network option** to meet an **identified need** that it had previously decided to meet by means of a project that was a **committed project**, the **distributor** must identify that **network option** and **committed project** in its **compliance report** for that **regulatory year**. The **project incentive** for an identified **committed project** will:
21. not be payable, by application of clause 2.6(2), if the **distributor** did not undertake **demand management** expenditure.
22. be returned via a reduction in the **total financial incentive** by the amount calculated in accordance with equation 2, if the **distributor** undertook some **demand management** expenditure, but terminated the **committed project** earlier than the end date it assumed when calculating expected **demand management** costs in applying clause 2.2.(4).

Equation : Project i returnable incentive on early termination in year x

$$ Returnable incentive\_{i,x}=\sum\_{t=x}^{T}δ\_{v}×E\left[PV DMcost\_{i, t}\right]$$

Where:

* $δ\_{v}$ is the effective cost uplift to project i, calculated as $\frac{PV incentive\_{i}}{E\left[PV DMcost\_{i}\right]}$. For clarity, $δ\_{v}$ will equal $d\_{v}$ if $S\_{i}=0$ and the constraints in equation 1 and 3 do not bind.
* T is the committed end date for project i, and x is the date the distributor terminated committed project i.
* PV is the present value at time $t$, which aligns with time t used in equation 1. A parameter following PV is in real dollars at time $t$.
1. The **confidentiality guideline** applies to the information contained in **compliance reports**. If the **distributor**'s compliance report contains confidential information, the distributor must also provide a non-confidential version of the report in a form suitable for **publication**. The **AER** may publish the **compliance report** (or the non-confidential version of the **compliance report**, if applicable) on its website.

## Accruing of project incentives

1. A project incentive accrues to a **distributor** when its **eligible project** becomes a **committed project**.
2. The total **financial incentive** that a **distributor** can accrue across all **committed projects** under this **scheme** in year t is limited to 1.0 per cent of the **AR** for year t.
3. The **total financial incentive** that a **distributor** can include in the **distributor**'s **total annual revenue** in **regulatory year** t is the **total financial incentive** accrued by the **distributor** in **regulatory year** t-2. That is, the **total** **financial incentive** that can be included in a **distributor**'s **annual revenue requirement** in year t is calculated in accordance with equation 3.

Equation : Total financial incentive paid in year t under the scheme

$$Total financial incentive\_{t}=\sum\_{i=1}^{N}[incentive\_{i,t-2}-returnable incentive\_{i,t-2}] $$

Subject to the constraint:

$$Total financial incentive\_{t}\leq AR\_{t-2}×1\%$$

Where:

* $Total financial incentive\_{t}$ is the **total financial incentive** paid in year t.
* $\sum\_{i=1}^{N}incentive\_{i,t-2} $is the summation of the **project incentives** accrued to N number of projects, i in year t–2.
* $returnable incentive\_{i,t-2}$ is calculated in accordance with equation 2, and relates to the returnable element of the **project incentive** that has been paid to **committed project** i, where the **distributor** has notified the **AER** in year t–2 that it has terminated **committed project** i earlier than the end date it assumed when calculating expected **demand management** costs in applying clause 2.2.(4).
* $AR\_{t-2}$ is a distributor's AR for year t–2.

|  |
| --- |
| Explanatory box for equation 3:Equation 3 calculates the **total financial incentive** that a **distributor** can include in its **total** **annual revenue** for the **regulatory year** t ('incentive paid in year t').The incentive paid in year t to a distributor equals the summation of all **project incentives** that a distributor accrued in year t–2 to **eligible projects** under this **scheme**, less any incentives it has identified in year t–2 as needing to return, following from early termination of **committed projects**.The incentive paid in year t to a distributor must not exceed 1.0 per cent of its **AR** in year t–2. |

Example: Calculating the total financial incentive

1. Table 1 provides an illustrative example of how to apply clauses 2.5(1)–(3). In this example, the constraint in equation 2 does not bind for the **committed projects** in year 1, but binds for the **committed projects** in year 2. The numbers in table 1 are real figures and are in year 1 dollars.
2. In this example, a hypothetical **distributor** is undertaking three **eligible projects**. These projects have the following **project incentives**:
* $PV incentive\_{1}=$ $2 million that accrues when project 1 becomes a **committed project** in year 1.
* $PV incentive\_{2}=$ $3 million that accrues when project 2 becomes a **committed project** in year 2.
* $PV incentive\_{3}=$ $1.5 million that accrues when project 3 becomes a **committed project** in year 2.

Table : Illustrative example of incentive calculation ($ million, year 1)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Time** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** |
| **Incentive accrued to project 1** | 2.0 |  |  |  |
| **Incentive accrued to project 2** |  | 3.0 |  |  |
| **Incentive accrued to project 3** |  | 1.5 |  |  |
| **Total incentive accrued to projects** | 2.0 | 4.5 |  |  |
| **1% AR incentive (assumption)** | 3.1 | 3.2 |  |  |
| **Total incentive accrued (up to cap)** | 2.0 | 3.2 |  |  |
| **Incentive paid (total accrued with 2 year lag)** |  |  | 2.0 | 3.2 |

## Application of the total financial incentive

1. Within 4 months of receiving the distributor's **demand management compliance report** as required by clause 2.4(1), the **AER** will determine, and inform the distributor of, the **distributor**'s **total financial incentive** for the **regulatory year** $t-2 $ to be included in the **distributor**'s **total annual revenue** for the **regulatory year** t. The **AER** will make this determination by either:
2. Approving the amount of the **total financial incentive** that the **distributor** submitted in its **compliance report**, if the **distributor**:
3. calculated that **total financial incentive** in accordance with section 2.5 of this **scheme**; and
4. complied with this **scheme** in accruing **project incentives** in year $t-2$; or
5. If the **AER** identifies a calculation or compliance error by the **distributor**, determining a revised **total financial incentive**.
6. In applying clause 2.6(1), the **total financial incentive** to be included in the **distributor**'s **total annual revenue** must only include **p**roject incentives for committed projects which have already undertaken expenditure, or are committed to undertake expenditure, in regulatory years prior to the regulatory year in which the incentives are paid. That is, incentive payments will only be payable in regulatory year t for projects for which expenditure has commenced or is committed to commence in regulatory years t–2 or t–1.
7. The **distributor** may include the **total financial incentive** determined or approved by the AER under clause 2.6(1) for the **regulatory year** $t-2 $in the distributor's **total annual revenue** for the **regulatory year** t.

Figure 2: Process for passing through total financial incentive in regulatory year t

1. Glossary

| Shortened form or term | Extended form or definition |
| --- | --- |
| AER | Australian Energy Regulator |
| AR | annual smoothed revenue requirement as stated in the AER's post tax revenue model |
| committed project | has the meaning given in clause 2.2.2(1) |
| compliance report | the demand management compliance report required under clause 2.4(1) |
| confidentiality guideline  | the document published by the AER entitled "Confidentiality Guideline, November 2013", as amended or replaced by the AER from time to time |
| credible option | has the meaning given in clause 5.15.2(a) of the NER |
| demand management | for the purpose of this scheme, this relates to network demand management. This is the act of modifying the drivers of network demand to remove a network constraint. |
| demand management contract | has the meaning given in clause 2.2.2(2) |
| demand management proposal | has the meaning given in clause 2.2.2(3) |
| distributor | Distribution Network Service Provider |
| efficient non-network option  | has the meaning given in clause 2.2(2) |
| eligible project | has the meaning given in clause 2.2(1) |
| kVA | A kilovolt -ampere or 1,000 volt-amperes |
| minimum project evaluation requirements | has the meaning given in clause 2.2.1 |
| NEO | National Electricity Objective |
| NER | National Electricity Rules |
| non-network option | has the meaning given in chapter 10 of the NER |
| NPV | Net present value |
| preferred option | the credible option that maximises the present value of the relevant net benefit (credible option and relevant net benefit are each defined in this glossary) |
| project incentive | the financial incentive that a project can accrue, as determined in accordance with equation 1 with respect to a project, i |
| relevant market | the National Electricity Market, where the distributor is a part of that market. Otherwise, the relevant electricity market in which the distributor transports electricity. |
| relevant net benefit | the present value of the net economic benefit to all those who produce, consume and transport electricity in the relevant market (as defined in this glossary). To the extent that different market participants' costs and benefits cancel each other out, these costs and benefits must be identified but need not be explicitly calculated to the extent this does not affect the overall result of the calculation. |
| request for demand management solutions  | means a request issued under clause 2.2.1 |
| RIT-D | Regulatory Investment Test for Distribution |
| scheme | Demand Management Incentive Scheme |
| total annual revenue  | the total annual revenue determined by the control mechanism that the AER applies to the distributor, after any revenue smoothing, annual adjustments, carryovers and pass throughs have been applied |
| total financial incentive  | means the sum of all project incentives accrued by a distributor in a particular regulator year, capped (where applicable) at the amount set out in clause 2.5(2) |