

### Introduction

The AER is required to publish the reasons for significant variations between forecast and actual price and is responsible for monitoring activity and behaviour in the National Electricity Market. The Electricity Report forms an important part of this work. The report contains information on significant price variations, movements in the contract market, together with analysis of spot market outcomes and rebidding behaviour. By monitoring activity in these markets, the AER is able to keep up to date with market conditions and identify compliance issues.

### Spot market prices

Figure 1 shows the spot prices that occurred in each region during the week 31 May to 6 June 2015. Two prices in Queensland, 3 and 4 June, triggered the AER reporting threshold. These are discussed later in this report.



### Figure 1: Spot price by region (\$/MWh)

Figure 2 shows the volume weighted average (VWA) prices for the current week (with prices shown in Table 1) and the preceding 12 weeks, as well as the VWA price over the previous 3 financial years.

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### Table 1: Volume weighted average spot prices by region (\$/MWh)

Region	Qld	NSW	Vic	SA	Tas
Current week	41	43	39	45	35
13-14 financial YTD	61	53	55	69	42
14-15 financial YTD	63	36	31	41	38

Longer-term statistics tracking average spot market prices are available on the AER website.

# **Spot market price forecast variations**

The AER is required under the National Electricity Rules to determine whether there is a significant variation between the forecast spot price published by the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) and the actual spot price and, if there is a variation, state why the AER considers the significant price variation occurred. It is not unusual for there to be significant variations as demand forecasts vary and participants react to changing market conditions. A key focus is whether the actual price differs significantly from the forecast price either four or 12 hours ahead. These timeframes have been chosen as indicative of the time frames within which different technology types may be able to commit (intermediate plant within four hours and slow start plant within 12 hours).

There were 65 trading intervals throughout the week where actual prices varied significantly from forecasts. This compares to the weekly average in 2014 of 71 counts and the average in 2013 of 97. Reasons for the variations for this week are summarised in Table 2. Based on AER analysis, the table summarises (as a percentage) the number of times when the actual price differs significantly from the forecast price four or 12 hours ahead and the major reason for that variation. The reasons are classified as availability (which means that there is a change in the total quantity or price offered for generation), demand forecast inaccuracy, changes to network capability or as a combination of factors (when there is not one dominant reason). An instance where both four and 12 hour ahead forecasts differ significantly from the actual price will be counted as two variations.

### Table 2: Reasons for variations between forecast and actual prices

	Availability	Demand	Network	Combination
% of total above forecast	0	41	0	0
% of total below forecast	56	2	0	1

Note: Due to rounding, the total may not be 100 per cent.

### **Generation and bidding patterns**

The AER reviews generator bidding as part of its market monitoring to better understand the drivers behind price variations. Figure 3 to Figure 7 show, the total generation dispatched and the amounts of capacity offered within certain price bands for each 30 minute trading interval in each region.



### Figure 3: Queensland generation and bidding patterns

















### Frequency control ancillary services markets

Frequency control ancillary services (FCAS) are required to maintain the frequency of the power system within the frequency operating standards. Raise and lower regulation services are used to address small fluctuations in frequency, while raise and lower contingency services are used to address larger frequency deviations. There are six contingency services:

- fast services, which arrest a frequency deviation within the first 6 seconds of a contingent event (raise and lower 6 second)
- slow services, which stabilise frequency deviations within 60 seconds of the event (raise and lower 60 second)
- delayed services, which return the frequency to the normal operating band within 5 minutes (raise and lower 5 minute) at which time the five minute dispatch process will take effect.

The Electricity Rules stipulate that generators pay for raise contingency services and customers pay for lower contingency services. Regulation services are paid for on a "causer pays" basis determined every four weeks by AEMO.

The total cost of FCAS on the mainland for the week was \$372 000 or less than 1 per cent of energy turnover on the mainland.

The total cost of FCAS in Tasmania for the week was \$91 500 or around 1 per cent of energy turnover in Tasmania.

Figure 8 shows the daily breakdown of cost for each FCAS for the NEM, as well as the average cost since the beginning of the previous financial year.



#### Figure 8: Daily frequency control ancillary service cost

# Detailed market analysis of significant price events

We provide more detailed analysis of events where the spot price was greater than three times the weekly average price in a region and above \$250/MWh or was below -\$100/MWh.

#### Queensland

There were two occasions where the spot price in Queensland was greater than three times the Queensland weekly average price of \$41MWh and above \$250/MWh.

#### Wednesday, 3 June

### Table 3: Price, Demand and Availability, 7 am

Time	Price (\$/MWh)		Demand (MW)			Availability (MW)			
	Actual	4 hr forecast	12 hr forecast	Actual	4 hr forecast	12 hr forecast	Actual	4 hr forecast	12 hr forecast
7 am	276.37	45.49	46.69	6505	6551	6536	8602	9394	9479

Demand was close to forecast four hour ahead. Available capacity was 792 MW lower than forecast four hours ahead.

### Table 4: Rebids for the 7 am

Submit time	Time effective	Participant	Station	Capacity rebid (MW)	Price from (\$/MWh)	Price to (\$/MWh)	Rebid reason
3.19 am		Callide Power Trading	Callide C	-126	<14	N/A	0318P coal bunkering issues.
3.26 am		Callide Power Trading	Callide C	-126	<14	N/A	0325P coal bunkering issues.
3.47 am		QGC Sales	Condamin e	-58	-1000	N/A	3:47 AM p change in plant capabilities SL
3.54 am		CS Energy	Gladstone	-170	0	N/A	0354P unit rts revised-SL
3.55 am		CS Energy	Callide B	-120	<17	N/A	0355P technical issues-fd fan-SL
4.50 am		CS Energy	Callide B	50	N/A	17	0450P technical issues-coal route issue resolved-SL
5.20 am		CS Energy	Gladstone	-95	0	N/A	0520P unit trip-SL
5.22 am		RTA Yarwun	Yarwun	-36	-975	N/A	alumina refinery constraints
5.36 am		ERM	Oakey	300	312	601	0533F INC PD30@ 07:00 - avoid uneconomic start

Submit time	Time effective	Participant	Station	Capacity rebid (MW)	Price from (\$/MWh)	Price to (\$/MWh)	Rebid reason
6.05 am		Arrow Energy	Braemar 2	-173	<17	N/A	0605P unit trip SL
6.08 am		Millmerran	Millmerran	140	7	13 500	06:07 A change in QNI PD - SL
6.28 am	6.35 am	CS Energy	Wivenhoe	210	298	1400	0627P technical issues-partial target rough running range- SL
6.29 am	6.40 am	ERM	Oakey	70	69	311	0626E correct bid error

The above rebids reduced the amount of low-priced capacity (priced below \$17/MWh) creating a steeper supply curve in Queensland. As the morning peak demand increased the dispatch price in Queensland started increasing from \$70/MWh at 6.40 am to \$303/MWh at 6.45 am. The dispatch remained at around \$300/MWh until 7 am when there was a 181 MW increase in demand and the dispatch reached \$601/MWh.

#### Thursday, 4 June

### Table 5: Price, Demand and Availability, 7 am

Time	Price (\$/MWh)		Demand (MW)			Availability (MW)			
	Actual	4 hr forecast	12 hr forecast	Actual	4 hr forecast	12 hr forecast	Actual	4 hr forecast	12 hr forecast
7 am	253.31	34.68	34.85	6691	6554	6601	9365	9443	9508

Conditions at the time saw demand 137 MW higher and available capacity 78 MW lower than forecast four hours ahead.

Imports into Queensland across QNI were being limited to around 130 MW for most of the trading interval by a system normal constraint managing voltage collapse on the loss of Kogan Creek.

#### Table 6: Rebids for the 7 am

Submit time	Time effective	Participant	Station	Capacity rebid (MW)	Price from (\$/MWh)	Price to (\$/MWh)	Rebid reason
4.23 am		CS Energy	Callide B	-80	17	N/A	0422P emissions limit-SL
6.17 am		Millmerran	Millmerran	230	7	13 500	06:16 A change QNI PD - SL
6.45 am	6.55 am	Callide Power Trading	Callide C	148	-1000	13 500	0644A change in QNI PD- SL

The above rebids reduced the amount of low-priced capacity creating a steeper supply curve in Queensland. As the morning peak demand increased the dispatch price in Queensland started increasing from \$45/MWh at 6.35 am to \$295/MWh at 6.40 am and stayed there for the rest of the trading interval.

### **Financial markets**

Figure 9 shows for all mainland regions the prices for base contracts (and total traded quantities for the week) for each quarter for the next four financial years.





Source: ASXEnergy.com.au

Figure 10 shows how the price for each regional Quarter 1 2016 base contract has changed over the last 10 weeks (as well as the total number of trades each week). The closing quarter 1 2014 and quarter 1 2015 prices are also shown. The AER notes that data for South Australia is less reliable due to very low numbers of trades. The high volume of contracts shown in Figure 10 were the result of the exercising of financial year option contracts.



Figure 10: Price of Q1 2016 base contracts over the past 10 weeks (and the past 2 years)

Note: Base contract prices are shown for each of the current week and the previous 9 weeks, with average prices shown for yearly periods 1 and 2 years prior to the current year.

Source: ASXEnergy.com.au

Prices of other financial products (including longer-term price trends) are available in the <u>Performance of the Energy Sector</u> section of our website.

Figure 11: Price of Q1 2016 cap contracts over the past 10 weeks (and the past 2 years) shows how the price for each regional Quarter 1 2016 cap contract has changed over the last 10 weeks (as well as the total number of trades each week). The closing quarter 1 2014 and quarter 1 2015 prices are also shown.

# Figure 11: Price of Q1 2016 cap contracts over the past 10 weeks (and the past 2 years)



Source: ASXEnergy.com.au

**Australian Energy Regulator** 

June 2015